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California Supreme Court Survey
February 1992 - July 1992
The CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent decisions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the readerof
the issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
starting point for researchingany of the topical areas. The decisions are analyzed in accordancewith the importance of the court's holding and the extent to
which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline and judicial misconduct cases have been omitted from the survey.

I.

C VIL PROCEDURE

................................... 799

Government Code section 815.6 does not provide the
government with a cause of action against the
awardingbody of a public works contract thatfailed
to comply with Labor Code wage requirements:
Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District ................ 799
II.

CONSTITLIONAL LAW ................................. 806

CaliforniaEducation Code section 39807.5, authorizing school districts to charge students transportation fees, violates neither the free school guarantee,
nor the equal protection clause, of the state constitution: Arcadia Unified School District v. State
Department of Education ................. ...... 806
I.

CONSUMER PROTECTION ................................. 811

The regulatory scheme under Business and Professions Code section 5058 constitutionally prohibits
unlicensed persons from using the terms "accountant" or "accounting," insofar as those terms are
potentially misleading and are likely to confuse the
general public as to the user's licensed or
nonlicensed status: Moore v. California State
Board of Accountancy .......................... 811
IV.

CRImINAL LAW ...................................... 819
In sex offense cases, a court may instruct the jury
that the law does not require corroborationof witress testimony to support a conviction, while fur-

ther instructingthe jury to carefully review all testimony relating to a fact that is sought to be proved
by the testimony of a single witness: People v.
Gammage .................................... 819
V.

EMPLOYMENT LAW ................................... 824
Under California Government Code section
12926(c), an employer with five or more full- or
part-time employees on its payroll is subject to the
authority of the Fair Employment and Housing
Commission, regardless of whether fewer than five
employees work on any given day: Robinson v.Fair
Employment and Housing Commission ............. 824

VI.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW .................................. 830
State legislation concerning hazardous waste
disposal facilities neither expressly nor impliedly
preempts local governments from compelling compliance with a local land use permit that imposes a
waste-free buffer zone: IT Corporation v. Solano
County Board of Supervisors ..................... 830

VII. INSURANCE LAW ..................................... 837
A. An employer establishes an ERISA-governed
"employee welfare benefit plan," thereby preempting
any state law cause of action relating.to the plan,
when it purchases an insurancepolicy on behalf of
its employees, contributes toward premiums, and
has the power to discontinue the policy or change
its terms regardless of whether the employer is
otherwise involved in the administration of the
policy: Marshall v. Bankers Life and Casualty
Co ........................................... 837
B.

VIII.

Under Insurance Code section 11580.2, the statute
of limitations for an insured's cause of action
against an insurer to compel arbitrationof an uninsured motorist claim begins to run when the
insurer refuses to submit to arbitration:Spear v.
California State Automobile Association ........... 842

LANDLORD TENANT LAW ............................... 845
A forfeiture restrainton alienationin a commercial
lease restricting the lessee's right to assign or sublease is valid and does not constitute a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

(Vol. 20: 795, 1993]

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

provided that it was bargainedfor at arm's length:
Carma Developers (California), Inc. v. Marathon
Development California, Inc .....................
IX.

TAx lAw ........................................
California's use of a three-factor formula to
A.
apportion the income of a foreign-parent multinational enterprisefor state tax purposes does not
violate the Foreign Commerce Clause of the Federal
Constitution: Barclays v. Franchise Tax Board ......
B.

X.

A privately held leasehold interest in real property,
oumed by a state university and not used exclusively for public schools, is not exempt from property
taxation under the ' public schools" exemption in the
California Constitution: Connolly v. County of
Orange ......................................

TORT LAW .........................................
A. Damagesfor negligently inflicted emotional distress
may be recovered in the absence of physical injury
and based upon "direct" liability, rather than
"bystander"liability, when a duty arisingfrom a
preexisting relationship is negligently breached:
Burgess v. Superior Court .......................
B.

When a plaintiff seeks punitive damages for an
injury that is directly related to professional services dispensed by a health care provider,regardless of
whether the cause of action is identified as an
intentional tort or negligence, the plaintiff must
comply with section 425.13(a) of the Code of Civil
Procedure: Central Pathology Service Medical
Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court ....................

C.

When neither the mishandling of a decedent's
remains nor its consequences are observed, (1) close
family members may recoverfor negligent infliction
of emotional distress if they were both (a) aware

that funeral and/or crematory services were being
performed, and (b) recipients of the benefit of or
contractors for the services rendered, and (2) in
order to recover on a theory of intentional infliction
tf emotional distress, the defendant must have

845
854

854

859
864

864

872

D.

E.

directed the misconduct primarily at the plaintiff
either (a) intentionally, (b) with knowledge to a
substantial certainty that injury would result, or
(c) recklessly and with knowledge of the plaintiffs
presence: Christensen v. Los Angeles Superior
Court ........................................

878

Under the exclusive remedy provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act, an employee is barred
from bringing a civil actionfor intentionalor negligent infliction of emotional distress against the
employer, even when no physical injury or disability has been alleged, provided the employer's conduct
does not contravene fundamental public policy or
exceed the inherent risks of the employment relationship: Livitsanos v. Superior Court .............

891

"Butfor"jury instructionfor proximate cause eliminated; instructionalerror is prejudicialwhen it is
reasonably probable that without the error the jury
would have reached a contrary conclusion: Mitchell
v. Gonzales ...................................

896

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey

[Vol. 20: 795, 1993]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

I.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Government Code section 815.6 does not provide the
government with a cause of action against the awarding
body of a public works contract that failed to comply with
Labor Code wage requirements: Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital
District.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District,' the California Supreme Court
considered two issues. The first was whether California Government
Code section 815.62 provided a cause of action against a public entity
that failed to comply with wage law duties under the Labor Code." The
court answered this question in the negative.' The second issue was
whether the trial court should have allowed a second opportunity to
amend a cross-complaint in order to allege a cause of action under another theory.6 The court held that under the circumstances of this case
the trial court should have granted leave to amend.6
A.

Background

Under section 815.6, a public entity is liable for any injury arising proximately from its failure to discharge a statutory duty, where that duty is
"designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury."' With

1. 2 Cal. 4th 962, 831 P.2d 317, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92 (1992). Justice Panelli wrote
the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Arabian, Baxter, and
George concurred. Justice Kennard wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Mosk
concurred.
2. CAL Gov'r CODE § 815.6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992). See infra note 7 for
statutory text.
3. Aubry, 2 Cal. 4th at 964, 831 P.2d at 318, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93. For references
to such duties see CAL LAB. CODE §§ 1720, 1726, 1770, 1771, 1773, 1773.2 & 1775
(West 1989 & Supp. 1992). See also infra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
4. Aubry, 2 Cal. 4th at 964, 831 P.2d at 318, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93.
5. ld.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 968, 831 P.2d at 321, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96 (quoting CAL GOV'T CODE §
815.6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992)). Section 815.6 provides in relevant partWhere a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment
that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the

regard to public works projects, the Labor Code imposes several mandatory duties upon public entities in awarding the contracts. For example,
an awarding body must procure the prevailing wage8 and specify such to
potential contractors for the project. The awarding body is also under a
duty to assure that the contract provides for payment of the prevailing
wage and for contractor liability for failure to pay such wage.' Finally,
the awarding body must "take cognizance of violations,"" and must assist the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE), a division of
the Department of Industrial Relations, in any court actions necessary to
mitigate violations."
B.

Statement of the Case

The respondent, Tri-City Hospital District (the District), entered into a
contract with Imperial Municipal Services (Imperial) to purchase a "finished addition" to the District's existing hospital facility.'" The contract
provided that the District would act as Imperial's agent in hiring a gener-

public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its
failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992). See also 5 M. BENDER, CAUFORNIA
ToRTs, 60.42[3][a] (1992) (discussing the mandatory duty imposed by section 815.6).
8. Aubry, 2 Cal. 4th at 967, 831 P.2d at 320, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95 (citing CAL
LAB. CODE § 1773 (West 1989)). The awarding body should obtain from the director
of the Department of Industrial Relations the local prevailing wage rate for each type
of worker. Id. For a discussion of the prevailing wage requirement on public works
projects, see 53 CAL JUR. 3D Public Works and Contracts § 7 (1979 & Supp. 1992); 2
B. E. WrmN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNA LAW, Agency and Employment § 331 (1987 &
Supp. 1992).
9. Aubry, 2 Cal. 4th at 967, 831 P.2d at 320, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95 (citing CAL.
LAB. CODE § 1773.2 (West 1989)). The awarding body must specify the wage in the
request for bids, in the bid specifications, and in the resulting contract. Id.; see also
supra note 8.
10. Aubry, 2 Cal. 4th at 967, 831 P.2d at 320, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95 (citing CAL
LAB. CODE § 1775 (West 1989)); see also supra note 8.
11. Aubry, 2 Cal. 4th at 967, 831 P.2d at 320, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95 (quoting CAL
LAB. CODE § 1726 (West 1989)); see also supra note 8.
12. Aubry, 2 Cal. 4th at 967, 831 P.2d 320, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95 (citing CAL LAB.
CODE § 1775 (West 1989)); see also supra note 8. For a discussion of similar federal
laws, see generally Lisa Morowitz, Government Contracts, Social Legislation, and
Prevailing Woes: Enforcing the Davis Bacon Act, 9 INST. PUB. INT. 29 (1989). For
discussions of similar laws in other jurisdictions, see generally Barbara J. FIck, Labor
and Employment Law, 25 IND. L REv. 131 (1992); Nicholas J. Taldone, The New
Prevailing Wage Law Problems for Public Contractors Prevail, 57 N.Y. ST. B.J. 39
(1985); William C. Martucci & Mark P. Johnson, Recent Developments in Missouri:
Labor and Employment Law: The Curators of the University of Missouri, 53 U. Mo.
.C.L REv. 509 (1985).
13. Aubry, 2 Cal. 4th at 965, 831 P.2d at 318-19, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93-94.
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al contractor, monitoring construction, and ensuring that the general
contractor's employees were paid the prevailing wage for public works
projects, as required under the Labor Code.,' Imperial, with the District
as its agent, secured Lusardi as general contractor.' The contract between Imperial and Lusardi neither classified the project as a public
work, nor provided for the wages required under the Labor Code."
Subject to an investigation conducted several years later by the DLSE,
Lusardi was ordered to comply with the Labor Code requirements regarding public works wages, but Lusardi refused. 7 In response, the
DSE requested that the District not pay Lusardi.'
Lusardi subsequently initiated an action against the DLSE, and the
DSE filed a cross-complaint against the District,' which is the subject
of this supreme court decision.5' The DLSE's cross-complaint alleged
that the District's activities "were part of an overall scheme" designed to
circumvent the Labor Code in order to reduce construction costs.' The
District demurred to the cross-complaint, contending that the Labor Code
did not support an action against a public awarding body.' The trial
court granted the demurrer, but allowed the DLSE leave to amend its
cross-complaint to allege a cause of action under California Government
Code section 815.6. ' In response to the DLSE's amended cross-complaint, the trial court sustained a second demurrer in which the District
alleged that no cause of action existed under section 815.6. ' The trial
court denied the DLSE's request for leave to amend.' The DLSE ap-

14. Id. at 965, 831 P.2d at 319, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94. For a discussion of the prevailing wage requirements in public works projects, see supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
15. Aubrt, 2 Cal. 4th at 965, 831 P.2d at 319, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 966, 831 P.2d at 319, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94. The first action was resolved
in Lusardi ConstruCtion Co. v. Aubry, 1 Cal. 4th 976, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837, 824 P.2d
643 (1992) (holding that the DLSE may seek remedies against a public works contractor where the contractor falls to pay the prevailing wage as required by the
Labor Code).
21. Aubry, 2 Cal. 4th at 966,.831 P.2d at 319, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94.
22. ld.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 966, 831 P.2d at 319-20, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94-95.
25. Id. at 966, 831 P.2d at 320, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95.

pealed, and the appellate court affirmed. ' The supreme court affirmed
in part, and remanded in part."

II. TREATMENT
A.

Majority Opinion

The first issue on appeal was whether the DLSE had properly alleged a
cause of action under Government Code section 815.6, which is part of

the Tort Claims Act' The court rejected the DLSE's argument that as
the awarding body, the District breached its Labor Code duties,' thereby violating section 815.6 of the Government Code.3 The court determined that the alleged injury is not protected by the statute because it
does not comport with the Tort Claims Act's definition of "injury."31 Furthermore, by examining the Law Revision Commission comment, the
court determined that under the Tort Claims Act, the legislature intended
only to protect against injuries that would be actionable between private
persons.' The injury in this case was not actionable between private
persons because the public works duties of the Labor Code did not apply
to private entities.'
In order to determine the viability of the other arguments, the court
examined the two cases the DLSE cited as authority.' One case involved a sheriff who falsely imprisoned the plaintiff,' and the other in-

26. Id.
27. Id. at 972, 831 P.2d at 323, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98.
28. Id. at 967-68, 831 P.2d at 320-21, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95-96.
29. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text for some of the duties imposed
under the Labor Code.
30. Aubry, 2 Cal. 4th at 968, 831 P.2d at 321, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96. See supra
note 7 for statutory text.
31. Aubry, 2 Cal. 4th at 968, 831 P.2d at 321, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96. The Tort
Claims Act defines injury as, "death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, reputation, character,
feelings or estate, of such nature that it would be actionable if inflicted by a private
person." Id. (quoting CAL. GOVT CODE § 810.8 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992)). For a
discussion of the Tort Claims Act definition of "injury" and other terms, see 5 B. E.
WmUiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 131 (1988); 35 CAL JuR. 3D Government
Tort Liability § 4 (1988); 52 CAL JUR. 3D Public Officers, Etc. § 196 (1979).
32. Aubry, 2 Cal. 4th at 968, 831 P.2d at 321, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96. "The California Law Revision Commission comment on this definition states that, '[tlhe purpose
of the definition is to make clear that public entities and public employees may be
held liable only for injuries to the kind of interests that have been protected by the
courts in actions between private persons.'" Id. (quoting CAL Gov'T CODE § 810.8
(West 1980) (Cal. Law Rev. Comm'n Cmt.)).
33. Id,
34. Id. at 968-69, 831 P.2d at 321-22, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96-97.
35. Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. 3d 710, 527 P.2d 865, 117 Cal. Rptr.
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volved a county welfare department's violation of child welfare laws.'
In distinguishing the present case from those decisions, the court pointed
out that the DLSE's cases were of the nature that would be actionable
between two private parties, while the case at bar was not. The court
concluded that because the present injury was not the type that would
be actionable between two private parties, it was outside the scope of
the Tort Claims Act and, thus, Government Code section 815.6 provided
no means of recovery.'
In anticipation of the dissenting justices' argument that a worker has
his own action against a contractor for depriving him of the prevailing
wage, the majority emphasized, in a footnote, that this issue had not yet
been decided by the court. ' Furthermore, even if the individual worker
did have such a claim, it would still be outside the scope of the Tort
Claims Act because such an action would be based purely on a contractual relationship, not a tort.' Having determined that the DLSE's action was not proper under Government Code section 815.6, the court
considered whether the DLSE should be granted leave to amend its complaint.' The court reasoned that because the trial court allowed the
DLSE to amend its first complaint solely for the purpose of alleging a
cause of action under Government Code section 815.6, the DLSE was not
given a fair opportunity to amend its complaint to state other theories of
recovery.' Furthermore, the court believed that the DLSE might have a
cause of action based on a third party beneficiary theory.' Thus, the

241 (1974).
36. Ramos v. County of Madera, 4 Cal. 3d 685, 484 P.2d 93, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421
(1971). See also 5 M. BENDER, CAUFORNIA TORTS § 60.22[3][a] (1992) (discussing
Madera).
37. Aubry, 2 Cal. 4th at 969, 831 P.2d at 322, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 969 n.5, 831 P.2d at 322 n.5, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97 n.5. The court explained that in its prior decision, Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry, 1 Cal. 4th 976,
824 P.2d 643, 4 Cal. Rptr 2d 837 (1992), the court held that the DLSE may bring an
action against the contractor under Labor Code section 1775; however, the court did
not reach the issue of whether an individual worker may bring such an action.
Aubry, 2 Cal. 4th at 969 n.5, 831 P.2d at 322 n.5, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97 n.5.
40. Aubry, 2 Cal. 4th at 969 n.5, 831 P.2d at 322 n.5, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97 n.5.
41. Id. at 970-71, 831 P.2d at 323, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98.
42. ld.
43. 1d. at 971, 831 P.2d at 323, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98. The court asserted that because the contract between Imperial and the District guaranteed that Imperial would
ensure that the workers received the prevailing wage, the workers might be considered third party beneficiaries of that contract. Id.

court remanded the case, allowing for a decision to be made on the merits of the amended complaint."
B.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Kennard dissented from the majority opinion because she believed that the injury involved was actionable between private parties.u
Justice Kennard reasoned that because of the court's holding in Lusardi
Construction Co. v. Aubryj that a contractor's duty to pay the prevailing wage on public works projects arises separately from contract and
from statute,4 ' a construction worker on a public works project who is
deprived of the prevailing wage has his own cause of action against the
contractor." Thus, Justice Kennard concluded that the present cause of
action was of the type that could arise between private parties and
therefore would fall within the scope of section 815.6. 4"
Justice Kennard went on to attack the majority's argument that an
individual worker's claim for the prevailing wage was outside the scope
of the Tort Claims Act because it arose solely from contract. '
Analogizing the individual's claim against the contractor to the DLSE's
claim, Justice Kennard reasoned that this argument was incorrect.5 She
explained that in Lusardi, the action was upheld solely on the basis of
statute, not contract," and that therefore an individual worker's action
may be based solely on a statute as well.'

44. ld. at 971-72, 831 P.2d at 323, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98.
45. Id. at 972, 831 P.2d at 324, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
46. 1 Cal. 4th 976, 824 P.2d 643, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (1992).
47. Aubry, 2 Cal. 4th at 974-75, 831 P.2d at 325, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100 (Kennard,
J., dissenting) (citing Lusardi, I Cal. 4th at 986-88, 824 P.2d at 648-50, 4 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 842-44). According to Justice Kennard, the Lusardi court believed that *the
Legislature intended remedies against the contractor for violation of the prevailing
wage law to be cumulative and nonexclusive." Id. at 975, 831 P.2d at 325-26, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 100-01 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (citing Lusardi, 1 Cal. 4th at 988 n.3, 824
P.2d at 650 n.3, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844 n.3).
48. Id. at 975, 831 P.2d at 325-26, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100-01 (Kennard, J., dissent-

ing).
49. Id. at 974-76, 831 P.2d at 325-26, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 100-01 (Kennard, J., dissent-

Ing).
50. Id. at 975, 831 P.2d at 326, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 975-76, 831 P.2d at 326, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 975, 831 P.2d at 326, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101 (Kennard, J., dissenting)
(citing Lusardi, 1 Cal. 4th at 986-87, 824 P.2d at 648-49, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842-43).
53. d. at 975, 831 P.2d at 326, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101 (Kennard, J., dissenting). To
illustrate her reasoning, Justice Kennard posited that if an employee and an employer
entered into a contract providing for payment below the prevailing wage, and the employee later discovered the discrepancy, the employee would have only a statutory
cause of action, since there would be no breach of the contract. Id. at 975-76, 831
P.2d at 326, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101 (Kennard, J.,, dissenting).
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Finally, Justice Kennard argued that the question of whether the action
arose from a contract or a statute was irrelevant since it had no bearing
on the central issue of whether the injury affected an interest that the
courts are willing to protect." Believing that the majority was incorrect
in determining that section 815.6 afforded no protection against the irjury in this case, Justice Kennard would have reversed the judgment of the
court of appeal and granted relief to the DLSE.'
III.

IMPACT

In Aubry, the court held that the DLSE does not have a cause of action under section 815.6 against the awarding body of a public works
contract for not providing the workers with wages at the prevailing
rate.' Unfortunately, it is the innocent workers, not the two parties to
this action, who become the victims of the decision because the workers
are still left without the wages to which they are entitled under the statute. The DISE has now tried to assert a claim against the District using
two theories, and both to no avail. 7
This decision sends many messages. It tells public works employees
that they should be prepared to assert their own rights with respect to
their wages. It tells the DLSE that it should regulate contractors and
awarding bodies more stringently to ensure that workers on public
works projects are paid the prevailing wage. Finally, the ruling tells
awarding bodies and contractors that they might be able to escape liability, as long as they do not contract to pay their workers the required
statutory wage. The DLSE now has one last chance to recover from TriCity Hospital District by amending the cross-complaint to allege that the
workers are third-party beneficiaries of the Imperial-District agreement.' We will soon see whether the Tri-City District has successfully
escaped the law.
NANCY GAYLE DRAGUTSKY

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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58. 'd.
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II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CaliforniaEducation Code section 39807.5, authorizing
school districts to charge students transportationfees, violates neither the free school guarantee,nor the equal protection clause, of the state constitution: Arcadia Unified
School District v. State Department of Education.

In Arcadia Unified School District v. State Department of Education,'
the California Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of section
39807.5 of the Education Code.2 The statute allows school districts to
charge pupils for their transportation to and from school.' The court
held that neither Article IX, section 5 (the free school provision), nor

1. 2 Cal. 4th 251, 825 P.2d 438, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 545 (1992). Justice Panelli delivered the majority opinion of the court with Justices Lucas, Kennard, Arabian, Baxter
and George concurring. Justice Mosk filed a dissenting opinion.
2. The California Department of Education (DOE) issued a legal advisory to the
school districts, directing them to stop charging transportation fees because section
39807.5 violated the state constitution. Id. at 256, 825 P.2d at 440, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
547. Twenty-five school districts instituted a suit against the DOE to determine the
facial validity of the statute. ld, at 255, 825 P.2d at 439-40, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546-47.
Id. The superior court granted judgment in favor of the DOE. Id. at 256, 825 P.2d at
440, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 547. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that section
39807.5 did not violate the state constitution. Id.
3. Section 39807.5 of the California Education Code provides:
When the governing board of any school district provides for the transportation of pupils to and from schools in accordance with the provisions of Section 39800, or between the regular full-time day schools they would attend
and the regular full-time occupational training classes attended by them as
provided by a regional occupational center or program, the governing board
of the district may require the parents and guardians of all or some of the
pupils transported, to pay a portion of the cost of such transportation in an
amount determined by the governing board.
The amount determined by the board shall be no greater than the statewide average nonsubsidized cost of providing such transportation to a pupil
on a publicly owned or operated transit system as determined by the Superintendent of Public Instruction, in cooperation with the Department of Transportation. For the purposes of this section, "nonsubsidized cost" means actual
operating costs less federal subventions.
The governing board shall exempt from these charges pupils of parents
and guardians who are indigent as set forth in rules and regulations adopted
by the board.
No charge under this section shall be made for the transportation of
handicapped children.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to sanction, perpetuate, or
promote the racial or ethnic segregation of pupils in the schools.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39807.5 (West Supp. 1992).
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Article I, section 7 (the equal protection clause) of the California Constitution invalidated the measure.'
At the outset in Arcadia, the court faced a procedural challenge to this
action. In 1985, a suit contesting the validity of section 39807.5 was instituted against the Fillmore school district and the Department of Education (DOE). 6 The court of appeal held that the law violated both the free
school provision and the equal protection clause." The Supreme Court of
California denied review of this decision, but ordered it depublished. 7
Twenty-five school districts then joined in this action to determine the
facial validity of section 39807.5." The victorious party in the original suit
intervened and sought to have Arcadia dismissed on the basis of collateral estoppel." The court refused to dismiss the suit, ruling that the
public policy exception to collateral estoppel applied to this action."0

4. Arcadia, 2 Cal. 4th at 255, 825 P.2d at 439, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546.
5. Salazar v. Honig, 246 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1988). Salazar was a taxpayers suit
against the DOE, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the Fillmore
Unified School District. The suit claimed that the Fillmore district's implementation of
section 39807.6 violated the state constitution. Id.
6. Id. at 842-43. After the filing of the suit, the Fillmore district stopped charging
the transportation fees and was therefore dismissed from the suit. Id at 838. The
DOE then sought to have the 60 school districts that were still charging transportation fees named as indispensable parties. Id. at 839. The trial court, agreeing with the
DOE, dismissed the suit because Salazar failed to join those districts. Id. The court
of appeal declared that the dismissal was an abuse of discretion because the prohibitive costs in litigating the suit against 60 school districts unduly burdened Salazar's
challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 840-44.
7. See id. at 837. The court gave no explanation for denying review of precisely
the same issue the court would later review in Arcadia. See id. at 842-43.
8. Arcadia, 2 Cal. 4th at 256, 825 P.2d at 440, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 547.
9. Id. Collateral estoppel bars the party to a prior action, or one in privity with
that party, from relitigating issues decided against the party in an earlier action. See,
e.g., City of Sacramento v. State, 50 Cal. 3d 51, 785 P.2d 522, 266 Cal. Rptr. 139
(1990) (holding that collateral estoppel applies unless the public interest requires that
relitigatlon of a question of law not be foreclosed); 8 B. WMN, CAUFORNIA PROCEDURE, Attack on Judgment in Trial Court §§ 6-17 (3d ed. 1985) (discussing dismissal through collateral attacks).
10. Arcadia, 2 Cal. 4th at 259, 825 P.2d at 442, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 549. The court
declined to decide whether the school districts were in privity with the DOE, and
thus bound by the Salazar ruling. It seems somewhat peculiar that the court decided
that an exception to the collateral estoppel rules applied before determining whether
collateral estoppel was applicable at all. The court cited City of Sacramento, 50 Cal.
3d 51, 785 P.2d 522, 266 Cal. Rptr. 139, in which the public policy exception to
collateral estoppel was invoked in a suit involving the subversion of unemployment
benefits. Arcadia, 2 Cal. 4th at 256, 825 P.2d at 440, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 547.

The court noted that in the original suit, the DOE and the school districts had never presented evidence on the constitutionality of the statute." Furthermore, the court reasoned that since the appellate court
decision was depublished, it would be in the public interest for school
districts to have a ruling that provided a uniform understanding of the
issue.

The majority opinion first addressed the facial validity of section
39807.5 against the free school guarantee contained in Article IX, section
5 of the California Constitution.' The free school provision states, in
pertinent part, that "Itihe legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be kept up and supported."'
Initially, the court looked at the framers' intent. 5 Although the framers
engaged in virtually no discussion of school transportation, the court
reached the dubious conclusion that transportation was not included
within the free school guarantee."
The majority then sought to supplement this interpretation by looking
to HartzeU v. Connell, 7 the leading case interpreting the free school
provision. 8 The Hartzell court had determined that the guarantee ex-

11. Arcadia, 2 Cal. 4th at 258, 825 P.2d at 441, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 548. The court
mentioned the "unusual history" of Salazar as a factor in applying the public policy
exception, but did not address the court's own role in that history. See supra note 7.
12. Arcadia, 2 Cal. 4th at 285, 825 P.2d at 441, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 548. Again, the
court failed to acknowledge that its own decision to deny review, and to have
Salazar depublished, created the very confusion that the court cited as justification
for refusing collateral estoppeL
13. Id. at 259-60, 825 P.2d at 442-43, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 549-50. The free school
provision was adopted during the 1878-79 Constitutional Convention. The California electorate rejected its repeal at a general election in 1968. Id.
14. CAL CONST. art. 9, § 5.
15. Arcadia, 2 Cal. 4th at 260, 825 P.2d at 443, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550.
16. Id. The court was able to find only one statement regarding transportation.
One delegate told the convention about children who rode horses to and from
school. The court claimed that this remark indicates that the framers did not consider transportation as part of the school system. Id. The court did not explain how the
conclusion necessarily follows that the framers did not intend the free school guarantee to cover transportation.
17. 35 Cal. 3d 899, 679 P.2d 35, 201 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1984). Chief Justice Bird delivered the opinion of the court joined by Justices Broussard and Reynoso. Justices
Mosk, Grodin, Kaus and Bird filed concurring opinions. Justice Richardson wrote a
dissenting opinion. Since the current majority claimed that Hartzell provided the basis
for Arcadia, it is worth noting that the only member of the court who participated
in both decisions was Justice Mosk, who disputed the majority's interpretation of
HartzeU.
18. Arcadia, 2 Cal. 4th at 261, 825 P.2d at 443, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550. In Hartzell,
the Santa Barbara High School District sought to fund its extracurricular activities
partly through participant fees. The court ruled that these fees violated the free
school provision of the state constitution, because extracurricular activities were an
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tended to "all activities which constitute an 'integral fundamental part of
the elementary or secondary education' or which amount to 'necessary
elements of any school's activity.'"" The Arcadia court adopted this test
because it focuses on the educational character of the activity in question.' Thus, the essential determination becomes whether transportation
is educational.' The majority found that it was not and, therefore, was
not included within the free school guarantee.'
The court next addressed the equal protection claim. Because section
39807.5 exempts indigent students from the fee, the court rejected the
contention that the statute discriminates against poor students.23 In re-

essential component of education. HartzeU, 35 Cal. 3d at 910, 679 P.2d at 42, 201
Cal. Rptr. at 608.
19. Hartzell, 35 Cal. 3d at 905, 679 P.2d at 39, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 605 (quoting Bond
v. Ann Arbor Sch. Dist., 178 N.W.2d 484, 488 (Mich. 1970)). The court declined to
adopt a test used by other states which restricts the free school guarantee to programs that are essential to the prescribed curriculum. See, e.g., Smith v. Crim, 240
S.E.2d 884 (Ga. 1977).
20. Arcadia, 2 Cal. 4th at 262, 825 P.2d at 444, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 551. It seems
that this substantially narrows the test, or alters it altogether, since the inquiry becomes the educational nature of the activity, rather than its necessity to the school's
activity. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
21. Arcadia, 2 Cal. 4th at 263, 825 P.2d at 445, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 552. Neither
Salazar, nor the Board of Education, argued this point before the court. Rather, the
City Terrace Coordinating Council, in an amicus brief, contended transportation was
educational in nature. But the court rejected this argument, reasoning that enforcement of behavioral standards on buses did not make it an educational activity. Id. at
261, 825 P. 2d at 44344, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550-51. The court distinguished the provision of textbooks on the basis that "transportation is not an expense peculiar to
education." Id. at 264, 825 P.2d at 445, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 552.
22. Id. The court then cited cases from other states upholding transportation fees
based on school provisions in their state constitutions. Id. at 263-66, 825 P.2d at 44546, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 552-53. The HartzeU court relied heavily upon the Michigan Supreme Court's interpretation of their very similar provision. See Bond v. Ann Arbor
Sch. Dist., 178 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. 1970). See also Sutton v. Cadillac Area Public
Schools, 323 N.W.2d 582 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that failure to provide free
transportation to school did not violate free school provision); Kadrmas v. Dickinson
Public Schools, 402 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1987) (declaring that statute authorizing transportation fee was constitutional). It should be noted that the issue presented in
Sutton is significantly different than the issue at stake in Arcadia. In Sutton, students
were seeking the right to free transportation, whereas the challenge to section
39807.5 questions the imposition of fees where transportation is provided.
23. Arcadia, 2 Cal. 4th at 266, 825 P.2d at 447, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554. See, e.g.,
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 614, 487 P.2d 1241, 1262-63, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 622-23
(1971) (holding that based on equal protection, California must fund each public
school equally because education is a fundamental right).

fusing to find section 39807.5 facially invalid, the court left open the
possibility that its actual implementation could discriminate.2'
Justice Mosk was the lone dissenter in Arcadia. He vigorously disputed the majority's interpretation of the free school guarantee.' In particular, he claimed that the majority had misinterpreted the test adopted in
HartzeU.' Under Justice Mosk's application of the test, "[tlransportation
is essential to education because it is a prerequisite to it. For the student
who cannot walk to school... a school bus is as essential to the process of education as the school building, the desk, the blackboard and
the teacher." ' Additionally, Justice Mosk was not convinced that the fee
waiver provision of section 39807.5 saved the statute from violating the
equal protection clause since the measure left the indigency determination to the individual school districts.'
The ruling in Arcadia is likely to produce a number of lawsuits challenging the school districts' individual plans for implementing section
39807.5.' The court provided little guidance as to how a transportation
fee program could avoid constitutional problems.' Arcadia also indi-

24. Arcadia, 2 Cal. 4th at 266, 825 P.2d at 447, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554.
25. Id. at 268, 825 P.2d at 448, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 555 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
26. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk focused solely on the essential nature
of transportation, rather than its educational value. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). His
opinion is buttressed by statements in HartzeU that the majority ignored, such as
"[iun guaranteeing free public schools, article IX, section 5 fixes the precise extent of
the financial burden which may be imposed on the right to an education-none."
Hartzel, 35 Cal. 3d at 911, 679 P.2d at 43, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 609. To Justice Mosk,
the right to an education involves more than simply an education; it also requires
satisfaction of the prerequisites necessary to obtain that education.
27. Arcadia, 2 Cal. 4th at 268, 825 P.2d at 449, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). Justice Mosk found the majority's distinction between textbooks and
school buses unpersuasive. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). It seems that this debate is a
continuation of the argument over how Hartzel should be interpreted. See supra
note 26.
28. Arcadia, 2 Cal. 4th at 270, 825 P.2d at 449-50, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556-57 (Mosk,
J., dissenting). Mosk's disagreement with the majority seems to revolve around practical considerations. The majority found no problem in allowing each district to define
indigency and to set exemption procedures. Id, at 266, 825 P.2d at 447, 5 Cal. Rptr.
2d at' 554. Justice Mosk was very concerned that those families left above the
indigency line would still be faced with the choice of spending money on necessities
or school transportation. See infra note 30.
29. Twenty-five school districts were joined as plaintiffs in Arcadia. These districts
are likely to begin imposing transportation fees. At the time of the Salazar ruling,
1008 out of 1049 school districts provided transportation to their students, but only
60 were charging fees. Salazar, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 839. Thus, the Arcadia ruling creates the potential for a deluge of suits.
30. The court simply said that proper administration involves not denying
transportation to any student on the basis of poverty. Arcadia, 2 Cal. 4th at 266, 825
P.2d at 447, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554. The court did not address the problems cited by
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cates that the present court is unlikely to interfere with the legislature's
choices regarding school finance."'

DAVID C. KNOBLOCK

III. CONSUMER PROTECTION
The regulatory scheme underBusiness and Professions Code
section 5058 constitutionallyprohibits unlicensed persons
from using the terms "accountant"or "accounting,"insofar
as those terms are potentially misleading and are likely to
confuse the generalpublic as to the user's licensed or

nonlicensed status: Moore v. California State Board of
Accountancy.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Moore v. California State Board of Accountancy,' the California
Supreme Court held that prohibiting the use of the terms "accountant"
and "accounting" by persons not licensed by the State Board of Accountancy (the 'Board) is constitutional where those terms are likely to confuse or mislead the public as to the user's licensed or nonlicensed status.! These terms are defined in section two, title sixteen, of the California Code of Regulations (Regulation 2)' and enforced under the catch-all

the court of appeal in Salazar. That court heard evidence that some families were
not informed of the indigency exemption, that some families were not even permitted
to apply because the school refused to accept the application, and that some families
were forced to choose between buying food and buying a bus pass for their children.
Salazar, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
31. The court seemed to signal that Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d
1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), represented the highmark of judicial intervention in
the area of school finance. See supra note 23. Despite indications that transportation
fees would impose greater burdens on some families, the majority declined to overturn the statute. See e.g., Right to Meaningful Education in California, 10 PAcIFIc

L.J. 991 (1979).
1. 2 Cal. 4th 999, 831 P.2d 798, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (1992) (4-3 decision). Justice
Baxter wrote the majority opinion for the court and was joined by Chief Justice
Lucas and Justices Panelli and Arabian. Justice Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion.
Justice George wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which Justice Mosk and Justice
Kennard joined.
2. Id. at 1005, 831 P.2d at 800, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360.
3. CAL CODE REGS. tit. 16, § 2 (1946). Section 2 states:
The following are titles or designations likely to be confused with the titles

provision in section 5058 of the Business and Professions Code4 (all further references to statutes are to the Business and Professions Code unless otherwise specified). However, the court further held that the use of
these terms in conjunction with modifiers that eliminate any confusion
as to the user's status may not be prohibited.'
Through the Accountancy Act,' the California Legislature reserved the
practice of public accountancy' solely for licensees of the Board.8 Section 5058 expressly prohibits unlicensed persons from using terms that
are "likely to be confused" with the names "certified public accountant"
or "public accountant." Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the Board
adopted Regulation 2, which expressly prohibits unlicensed persons from
using the terms "accountant" in describing themselves, or "accounting" in
describing their services.'0
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Bonnie Moore, an unlicensed accountant, is president of Accounting
Center, a California corporation." She has a college degree with a major
in accounting, but she has never taken the Certified Public Accountant
examination and does not intend to do so." Although Moore meets the
educational requirements necessary to take the examination, she does
not meet the experience requirement. 3 Accounting Center designs and
installs basic accounting systems for small businesses. The firm also

Certified Public Accountant and Public Accountant within the meaning of
Section 5058 of the Business and Professions Code:
(a) "Accountant," "auditor," "accounting," or "auditing," when used either singly or collectively or in conjunction with other titles.
(b) Any other titles or designations which imply that the individual is
engaged in the practice of public accountancy.
Id.
4. Section 5058 provides in pertinent part- "No person or partnership shall assume
or use the title or designation 'chartered accountant,' 'certified accountant,' 'enrolled
accountant,' 'registered accountant' or 'licensed accountant,' or any other title or
designation likely to be confused with 'certified public accountant' or 'public
accountant' . . . ." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, § 5058 (West 1990).
5. Moore, 2 Cal. 4th at 1005, 831 P.2d at 800, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360.
6. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 5000-5173 et seq. (West 1990).
7. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5051 (West 1990) (defining the practice of
public accountancy).
8. Moore, 2 Cal. 4th at 1004, 831 P.2d at 800, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Moore, 2 Cal. 4th at 1005, 831 P.2d at 800-01, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360-61.
12. Id. at 1006, 831 P.2d at 801, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361.
13. Id.
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performs internal audits of its clients' books."
Moore uses the terms "accountant" and "accounting" to describe herself, her services, and the services of the firm in 9096 of her advertising. 6 Furthermore, her business is referred to on building directories, in
telephone directories, and in radio and television advertising as "Accounting Center." The Board issued a letter to Moore ordering her and
Accounting Center to cease and desist from using the terms "accountant"
and "accounting" to describe herself, her services, or the business of Accounting Center."
Bonnie Moore, Accounting Center, and the California Association of
Independent Accountants (CAIA) 7 filed this lawsuit seeking declaratory
relief and a permanent injunction against the Board."8 The plaintiffs
claimed that section 5058 does not bar the use of generic terms such as
accountant and accounting, and that Regulation 2 improperly expands
the scope of section 5058.2 The Board answered and filed a cross-complaint for injunctive relief against the plaintiffs and 2000 Doe defendants.20
The Board, through the Office of the Attorney General, conducted a
poll through an independent research firm to determine whether the
public perceived persons as being licensed when they represent themselves as accountants or when they offer to perform accounting services.2 Two questions were included in the poll: (1) "Do you think that
persons who refer to themselves as accountants in advertising to the
public are required to be licensed by the State of California?" and (2)
"Do you think persons who advertise accounting services to the public
are required to be licensed by the State of California to offer such services?' The results from the first question showed that fity-five percent
of those surveyed believed that a license was required, twenty-six percent did not believe a license was required and nineteen percent did not

14. l
15. 1&L

16. 1& at 1005, 831 P.2d at 801, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361.
17. CAIA is a non-profit membership, organization representing approximately 700

individuals in California
18. Moore, 2 CaL 4th at 1005, 831 P.2d at 801, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361.
19. 1& at 1009, 831 P.2d at 803, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 363.
20. 1l at 1005-06, 831 P.2d at 801, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361. Does 1-1000 were CAIA
members and Does 1001-2000 were individuals who have, and continue to transact, business in California. Id,
21. Ad at 1007, 831 P.2d at 802, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362.

22. Id,

know. The results of the second question were fifty-three percent, twenty-nine percent and eighteen percent, respectively.'
The trial court granted the Board's request for permanent injunction
against all plaintiffs, thereby prohibiting them from using the terms "accountant" and "accounting" when referring to themselves or their services . ' The court of appeal affirmed the decision of the trial court but
modified the injunction to prohibit the use of the terms only when used
without a modifier, qualifier, disclaimer, or warning that would eliminate
any possible confusion.' The supreme court affirmed, holding that the
legislature intended section 5058 to apply to generic terms that may potentially mislead the public' and that Regulation 2 was within the
Board's authority pursuant to the Accountancy Act.'
II.
A.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

Majority Opinion

Justice Baxter, writing for the majority, began the opinion by providing
a brief history of the regulation of public accountancy in California and a
review of the authority granted to the Board.' He then confronted the
principal issue of how section 5058 should be interpreted. The plaintiffs
argued that the statute should be construed under the principle of ejusdem generis which would limit the catch-all provision to terms similar to
those already enumerated in the section.' Since section 5058 expressly
prohibits five titles containing the term "accountant" used with a modifier, the legislature would have included "accountant" without a modifier if
it had intended to prohibit its use as well.' In rejecting this argument,
the court ruled that application of the ejusdem generis doctrine is inap-

23. Id.
24. Id. at 1008, 831 P.2d at 802, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362.
25. Id at 1008, 831 P.2d at 803, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 363.
26. Id. at 1017, 831 P.2d at 809, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369.
27. Id, at 1015, 831 P.2d at 807, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367.
28. Id, at 1010, 831 P.2d at 804, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 364. For general information on
regulating the use of titles and designations by accountants, see 1 AM. JUR. 2d Accountants § 2 (1962); 1 CAL. JUR. 3d Accountants §§ 14-15 (1972); 1 CJ.S. Accoun-

tants § 4 (1985).
29. Moore, 2 Cal. 4th at 1013, 831 P.2d at 806, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366. Under this
principle, if a statute contains a list of items, the meaning of each item must be determined in relation to the others so that similar items will be treated uniformly. Accordingly, an item must be interpreted restrictively when a more expansive construction would make other items unnecessary or redundant. Id. at 1012, 831 P.2d at
805, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365. For general information on the doctrine of ejusdem
generis see 73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes §§ 214-216 (1974); 28 CJ.S. Ejusdem (1941); 82
CJ.S. Statutes § 332 (1953); 58 CAL. JUR. 3d Statutes § 130 (1980).
30. Moore, 2 Cal. 4th at 1012, 831 P.2d at 805, 9 Cal. Rptr.' 2d at 365.
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propriate when it would frustrate the underlying legislative intent.3
Interpretating section 5058 under ejusdem generis would contradict the
statute's purpose of protecting the public from being misled about the license status of a provider of accounting services, the court reasoned,
because the legislature included a catch-all provision proscribing the use
of "any other title or designation that is likely to be confused with 'certified public accountant' or 'public accountant.'"6Turning to a discussion of the legality of Regulation 2, the court stated
that it must determine only whether the regulation is "'within the scope
of the authority conferred'" and "'reasonably necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the statute."'3 This determination is made "with a strong
presumption of regularity" and with deference to the agency's expertise.' The court ruled that Regulation 2 was within the Board's authority as granted in section 5010' and was reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of section 5058.' In support of its holding, the court referred to a California Poll survey' indicating that a majority of those
polled believed that persons representing themselves as accountants or
offering accounting services had to be licensed by the State of California.' The court also noted that the legislature has not tried to amend
section 5058 to restrict the Board's authority since Regulation 2 was enacted almost forty-four years ago, even though section 5058 had twice
been amended in that period of time.' Due to a California Attorney General Opinion' and an appellate court decision4 published since the

31. Id. at 1013, 831 P.2d at 806, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366.
32. Id, (quoting CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5058 (West 1990)).
33. Id. at 1015, 831 P.2d at 807, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367 (quoting CAL GOV'T CODE
§§ 11342.1-11342.2 (West 1992)).
34. Id,
35. Section 6010 provides in pertinent part "The board may adopt, repeal, or
amend such regulations as may be reasonably necessary and expedient for the orderly conduct of its affairs and for the administration of this chapter." CA1 Bus. PROF.
CODE § 5010 (West 1990).
36. Moore, 2 Cal. 4th at 1015, 831 P.2d at 807, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367.
37. Id. at 1007, 831 P.2d at 802, Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362. See supra notes 21-23 and
accompanying text.
38. Moore, 2 Cal. 4th at 1015-16, 831 P.2d at 807-08, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367-68.
39. Id. at 1017, 831 P.2d at 809, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369.
40. Id, at 1018, 831 P.2d at 809, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369. The Attorney General concluded:
The use of the word "accounting" on a building directory and an office
door by an unlicensed individual is a representation to the public that such
individual is sdlled in accounting and that the user is qualified and ready to

adoption of Regulation 2, the court presumed that the legislature had
knowledge of the Board's actions and of Regulation 2
The First Amendment and the commercial speech doctrine formed the
basis for the next argument. The defendant claimed that Regulation 2
actually prohibited "any and all use" of the terms "accountant" and "accounting" by unlicensed persons without regard to whether those terms
are qualified so as to avoid confusion.' The commercial speech doctrine, as defined by the United States Supreme Court, allows states to
prohibit misleading advertising but prevents an absolute ban on potentially misleading information that can be presented in a manner that
eliminates the confusion."*In fact, the United States Supreme Court held
in In -Re R.M.J." that "although the potential for deception and confusion is particularly strong in the context of advertising professional services, restrictions upon such advertising may be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the deception."' Relying on this holding, Justice Baxter concluded that the plaintiffs have a First Amendment right to
use the terms "accountant," "accounting," and "accounting services" as
long as they are "qualified by an explanation, disclaimer or warning" that
eliminates the potential for confusion about those terms or the user's
true status as a licensed or unlicensed accountant."
B.

DissentingOpinions

Justice Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion criticizing the majority's conclusions concerning the validity of Regulation 2, the meaning of section
5058, and the implications of the First Amendment.' He reasoned that

perform professional services. Such a representation by an unlicensed individual is in violation of the Accountancy Act (division M, chapter 1, Business
and Professions Code).

46 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 140, 141 (1965).
41. People v. Hill, 66 Cal. App. 3d 320, 136 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1977). This case concerned an unlicensed individual's business name "A-Accounting-Jack M. Hill Co." The
HiU court recognized that unlicensed persons may offer certain basic accounting ser-

vices but concluded that the risk of confusing the public as to whether the person is
licensed justified barring unlicensed persons from using the terms "accounting" and
"accounting services" when referring to themselves. Id at 328-30, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 34-

35.
42. Moore, 2 Cal. 4th at 1017-18, 831 P.2d at 809-10, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369-70.
43. Id. at 1020, 831 P.2d at 811, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 371.
44. Id, See Peel v. Attorney Regulatory & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990);
In Re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1981); Bates v. State Bar 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia
Pharmacy Bd. v. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1975).
45. 455 U.S. 191 (1981).
46. Id. at 203.
47. Moore, 2 Cal. 4th at 1023, 831 P.2d at 813, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373.
48. Id. at 1025, 831 P.2d at 814, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374 (Mosk, J, dissenting).
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Regulation 2 must be invalid because it prohibits what the legislature
already permitted by statute.' Section 5052' allows unlicensed persons
to perform accounting services related to bookkeeping functions, thereby
allowing them to perform accounting; by definition, therefore, they are
accountants.6 The result is that Regulation 2 directly contradicts section
5052 and must be invalid.'
Furthermore, Justice Mosk argued, Regulation 2 should be declared
invalid because at the time of its adoption the Board consisted exclusively of licensed accountants.' Since a large part of accounting work may
be performed by either licensed or unlicensed accountants, the Board
had a pecuniary interest in preventing unlicensed persons from advertising accounting services." Rules created by a regulatory body with a
pecuniary interest in restricting competitors are looked upon with disfavor.W
As to interpretating section 5058, Justice Mosk argued that since the
term "accountant" was commonly used at the time section 5058 was
enacted, the legislature would have expressly included the term if it had
intended to restrict its use.' He supported this position by noting that
every jurisdiction that has considered this issue, except Texas, has allowed unlicensed persons to use the terms "accountant" and "accountingl67

Justice Mosk questioned the majority's holding by noting its possible
noncompliance with the First Amendment. He argued that since section

49. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
50. Section 5052 provides in pertinent part:
Nothing in this chapter shall apply to any person who as an employee,
independent contractor, or otherwise, contracts with one or more persons,
organizations, or entities, for the purpose of keeping books, making trial
balances, statements, making audits or preparing reports, all as a part of
bookkeeping operations, provided that such trial balances, statements, or
reports are not issued over the name of such person as having been prepared by or examined by a certified public accountant or public accountant
CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5052 (West 1990).
51. Moore, 2 Cal. 4th at 1025, 831 P.2d at 814, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
52. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 1026, 831 P.2d at 815, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
54. I& (Mosk, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1026-27, 831 P.2d at 815, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1025, 831 P.2d at 814-15, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374-75 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 1025-26, 831 P.2d at 815, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375 (Mosk, J., dissenting).

5052 permits unlicensed persons to perform accounting services, the
terms "accountant" and "accounting" are wholly accurate and, therefore,
protected by the First Amendment and the commercial speech doctrine.'
Justice George wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kennard
and Mosk.' The George dissent criticized the majority's dismissal of the
ejusdem generis principle and the absence of foundation for the
majority's interpretation of section 5058.' Justice George argued that
the doctrine of ejusdem generis should apply to the present case."' Under this doctrine, since each item enumerated in section 5058 contains
the term "accountant" coupled with a modifier, the catch-all phrase
would not include the unmodified term "accountant.'
Disagreeing with the majority's determination that Regulation 2 was
valid, Justice George based his argument on the rule of law that administrative regulations that expand the scope of a statute are void even
where the statute is subsequently reenacted without change.' Thus, Regulation 2 is invalid because it expands the scope of section 5058." Justice George also questioned the authority of the Board to adopt Regulation 2 because the regulation constituted a "significant alteration of the
statutory scheme," and therefore any changes, whether beneficial or not,
must be left to the legislature.'
Finally, Justice George disputed the poll survey upon which the majority relied. He pointed out that the real issue in this case is the prohibition
against unlicensed persons using titles that might be confused with
"public accountant" and "certified public accountant. "' But the survey
only revealed that the public believes all accountants must be licensed, a
belief which is irrelevant to this issue.' Justice George concluded that
nothing in the Accountancy Act prohibits unlicensed persons from using
the terms "accountant" or "accounting" to describe themselves or their

58. Id at 1026, 831 P.2d at 815, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1027, 831 P.2d 816, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 376 (George, J., dissenting).
60. Id at 1031, 831 P.2d at 818, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378 (George, J., dissenting). See
supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
61. Moore, 2 Cal. 4th at 1030, 831 P.2d at 818, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378 (George, J.,
dissenting). The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that "'where general words
follow the enumeration of particular classes or persons or things, the general words
will be construed as applicable only to those persons or things of the same general
nature or class as those enumerated.'" Id. (George, J., dissenting) (quoting Harris v.
Capital Growth Indus. XIV, 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 1160 (1991)).

62. ld. (George, J. dissenting).
63. Id. at 1031, 831 P.2d at 819, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379 (George, J., dissenting).
64. 1d at 1032, 831 P.2d at 819, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379 (George, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1032-33, 831 P.2d at 819, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379 (George, J., dissenting).
66. 1d at 1033, 831 P.2d at 820, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380 (George, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (George, J., dissenting).
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services.'e
IV.

CONCLUSION

The court concluded that the use of the terms "accountant" or "accounting" by unlicensed persons could mislead consumers when used
without qualifiers indicating that the persons are not licensed accountants. The court ruled that the Board's regulation prohibiting unlicensed
persons from using those terms was justified and in line with existing
statutes.
The effect of this decision on the accounting profession is significant,
considering that there are approximately 65,000 licensed accountants in
the state along with 60,000 unlicensed persons performing limited accounting services.' The effect, however, is not limited to accountants
alone. The ruling strengthens governmental regulations that already limit
advertising by unlicensed professionals in a variety of practice areas who
perform functions similar to those performed by licensed professionals." Thus, licensed professionals in many fields will gain an advantage
over their unlicensed competition. Consumers will receive the benefit of
being protected from potentially deceptive and misleading advertisements
of unlicensed persons offering professional services.
DAVID C. WRIGHT
IV.

CRIMINAL LAW
In sex offense cases, a court may instruct the jury that the
law does not require corroborationof witness testimony to
support a conviction, while further instructing the jury to
carefully review all testimony relating to a fact that is sought
to be proved by the testimony of a single witness: People v.
Gammage.

In People v. Gammage,' the California Supreme Court addressed

68. Id. at 1034, 831 P.2d at 820, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380 (George, J., dissenting).
69. Philip Hager, Court Upholds Ad Restrictions on Accountants, L.k TIMES, July

3, 1992, at A3.

70. Id.
1. 2 Cal. 4th 693, 828 P.2d 682, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541 (1992).

Justice Arabian

whether it was proper for a trial court to charge the jury with the following combination of instructions: first, to carefully review all testimony
related to a fact being proved by uncorroborated witness testimon?, and
second, that corroboration of witness testimony is not legally required to
convict the defendant.' The supreme court held that the combination of
instructions is appropriate in a sex offense case,4 and thus resolved contradictory appellate decisions on the issue.6

authored the majority opinion with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Baxter,
and George concurring. Justice Mosk and Justice Kennard each delivered separate
concurring opinions. Id. at 702-07, 828 P.2d at 688-91, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 547-50.
In Gammage, a 16-year-old girl accompanied friends to the appellant's apartment
where, she alleged, she was sexually assaulted for three to four hours by appellant
and others. Appellant claimed that the alleged victim had orally copulated him of her
own free will and that he had not raped her. Id. at 696, 828 P.2d at 684, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 543.
2. Id. at 696, 828 P.2d at 684, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 542; CALJIC No. 2.27 (Sth ed.
1992). This instruction, as given by the trial court, provided:
Testimony as to any particular fact which you believe given by one witness
is sufficient for the proof of that fact. However, before finding any fact required to be established by the prosecution to be proved solely by the testimony of such a single witness, you should carefully review all the testimony
upon which the proof of such fact depends.
Gammage, 2 Cal. 4th at 696, 828 P.2d at 684, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 543 (quoting CALJIC
No. 2.27 (4th ed. 1986 rev.)). See generally 17 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 620 (3d
ed. 1985 & Supp. 1992) (stating that the jury should be instructed as provided in
CALJIC No. 2.27 in every criminal case in which no corroboration is required). The
court in Gammage specifically stated that it expressed no opinion as to other cases,
thus confining its holding to sex crimes. Gammage, 2 Cal. 4th at 702, 828 P.2d at 688,
7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 547.
3. Id. at 696-97, 828 P.2d at 684, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 543; CALTIC No. 10.60 (5th
ed. 1992) (formerly CALJIC No. 10.21 (4th ed. 1970)) [hereinafter 10.601. This instruction, as given by the trial court, provided that "[i]t is not essential to a conviction of
a charge of rape that the testimony of the witness with whom sexual intercourse is
alleged to have been committed be corroborated by other evidence." Gammage, 2
Cal. 4th at 696-97, 828 P.2d at 684, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 543. See generally Vitauts M.
Gulbis, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Regarding Necessity for Corroboration of
Victim's Testimony in Prosecutionfor Serual Offense, 31 A.LR.4TH 120 (1984).
4. Gammage, 2 Cal. 4th at 702, 828 P.2d at 688, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 547. See
generally 4 R.E. ERWIN, ET AL, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE, Trial §§
85.02111, 85.04[1][a] (1992) ("All judges and most counsel use California Jury Instructions, Criminal (CALIIC)."). But see 5 B.E. WITKIN & N.L. EPS7IEN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL LAW, Trial § 2934(e) (2d ed. 1989) (stating that instructions not authorized
by CALIIC are not thereby called into question).
5. The supreme court first discussed the conflicting appellate court decisions. In
People v. McIntyre, 115 Cal. App. 3d 899, 176 Cal. Rptr. 3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), the
Fourth District stated that, due to the private nature of a sex offense case, the jury's
decision often depends solely on the credibility of the accused versus the credibility
of the accuser. Id. at 907, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8. Thus, an instruction that corroboration is not required is proper. Id. Accord People v. Jamison, 150 Cal. App. 3d. 1167,
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The supreme court stated that, independently, each of the jury instructions at issue is an accurate statement of the law.6 The court concluded
that together, the instructions are no less accurate or unfair to either
side than when they are proferred separately.! In substantiating its conclusion, the court noted that each individual instruction concentrates on
different jury functions.' The court stated that while CaliforniaJury Instruction, Criminal (CALJIC) number 2.27 causes the jury to be aware
of the standard for evaluating a fact proved by uncorroborated testimony,' CALJIC number 10.60 expresses the substantive legal principle that
the law does not require corroboration of witness testimony to support a

1173, 198 Cal. Rptr. 407, 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). However, in People v. Pringle, 177
Cal. App. 3d 785, 223 Cal. Rptr. 214 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (overruled by People v.
Gammage, 2 Cal. 4th 693, 828 P.2d 682, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541 (1992)), the same division suggested, in dicta, that the combination of CALWIC number 2.27 and CALIIC
number 10.60 raises a fallacious inference "that witnesses other than the prosecuting
witness need be viewed with caution." Id. at 790, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 217. Accord
People v. Adams, 186 Cal. App. 3d 75, 79, 230 Cal. Rptr. 588, 590 (1986) (expressly
finding "no need for CALJIC No. [10.60] when No. 2.27 is given"), overruled by People v. Gammage, 2 Cal. 4th 697, 828 P.2d 682, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541 (1992).
This issue was also addressed again by the Fifth District in People v. Blassingill,
199 Cal. App. 3d 1413, 245 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1988). The Biassingill court found that it
was proper to give both instructions because it makes clear to the jury that the
prosecutrix testimony, which is often subject to aggressive denigration in both
cross-examination and defense arguments, is .not legally required to be corroborated
by other evidence. Id. at 1422, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
The Second District Court of Appeal in the present case rejected the appellant's
contention that the combination of jury instructions caused the jury to scrutinize his
testimony more rigorously than that of his accuser. People v. Gammage, 3 Cal. App.
4th 974, 988, 275 Cal. Rptr. 28, 36 (1990). Accord People v. Holis, 235 Cal. App. 3d
1521, 1525-26, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 524, 527 (1991) (finding that issuing both instructions
to the jury is proper because it strikes a balance "which protects the rights of both
the defendant and the complaining witness"). However, the appellate court disapproved of the second sentence of CALJIC number 2.27 and implored the supreme
court to reevaluate it. Gammage, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 988, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
6. Gammage, 2 Cal. 4th 693, 700, 828 P.2d 682, 686, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541, 545
(1992).
7. Id. at 701, 828 P.2d at 687, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546. But see 5 B.E. WraN &
N.L EPSTIEN, CALIFORNIA

CRIMINAL LAW,

Trial

§

2946(3) (2d ed. 1989) (stating that

CALJIC No. 2.27 must be given when the jury is instructed as provided in CALJIC
No. 10.60). See generally Kristine C. Kamezis, Annotation, Propriety of, or Prejudicial
ffect of Omitting or Giving, Instruction to Jury, in Prosecutionfor Rape or Other
Sexual Offense, as to Ease of Making or Difficulty of Defending Against Such a
Charge, 92 A.LR.3D 866 (1978) (providing relevant source and background material).
8. Gammage, 2 Cal. 4th at 700, 828 P.2d at 687, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546.

9. Id.

conviction of the accused.'0 Moreover, the court noted that CALJIC
number 10.60 does not unduly harm the defendant by expressly restating
what the jury may glean from CALJIC number 2.27, that corroboration is
not required." The court stated that even if it were to make the
over-reaching assumption that the jury knows that corroboration of witness testimony is not required based on CALJIC number 2.27, no harm
would be done by specifically instructing the jury so as to eliminate any
potential misunderstanding."2 Finally, the court found that the combination of the instructions does not elevate the testimony of the accuser
above that of the accused.' The court reasoned that because the trial
court is required to instruct the jury that it must find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, which places a heavy burden of persuasion
on the uncorroborated testimony of the accuser, the no-corroboration
instruction effectuates a balance between protecting the rights of the
accused and the alleged victim."' The court concluded that the credibility contest nature of a sex offense trial makes the instruction that
no-corroboration is required to convict, given in addition to the instruction that suggests careful review of all testimony on a fact that is
sought to be proved by the testimony of a single witness, most appropriate."

10. I& at 700-01, 828 P.2d at 687, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546. See generully 6 R.E.
ERWIN, ET AL, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE, Crimes § 142.13[2][a

(1992

Supp. 1991) (stating that the jury must be instructed sua sponte as to the instruction
provided in CALIC No. 2.27). But see 4 R.E. ERWIN, ET AL, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL

DEFENSE PRACTICE, Trial § 85.02[21b] (1992) C"Cautionary instructions need not be
given sua sponte when the evidence Is being admitted against only one party.").

11. Gammage, 2 Cal. 4th at 701, 828 P.2d at 687, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546. But see
21 CAL JUR. 3d Criminal Law § 3065 (3d ed. 1985) ("Instructions[,] .

.

. the subject

matter of which is fully covered by other instructions that correctly state the law,
though in a different phraseology, may . . .be refused, particularly where the substance of the instructions given is more favorable to the defendant than that of the
accused.").
12. Gammage, 2 Cal. 4th 693, 701, 828 P.2d 682, 687, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541, 546
(1992). But see 21 CAL JUR. 3d Criminal Law § 3091 (3d ed. 1985) ("The instructions to the jury should be general and not confined to the testimony on one side of
the case.").

13. Gammage, 2 Cal. 4th at 701, 828 P.2d at 687, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 546. See also 21
CAL JUR. 3d Criminal Law § 3092 (3d ed. 1985) ("Where a cautionary instruction is.
necessary to ensure proper consideration of the evidence by the jury, the court
should give it on its own motion."); see generally 17 CAL JUR. 3d Criminal Law §
3091 (3d ed. 1985 & supp. 1992) (expressing that CALJIC No. 10.60 does not give the
prosecutrix testimony undue prominence nor create an inference of guilt).
14. Gammage, 2 Cal. 4th at 701, 428 P.2d at 687, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546.
15. 1d. at 702, 828 P.2d at 688, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 547. Justice Mosk, concurring,
reasoned that because of its impermissible focus, the no-corroboration instruction
should be prohibited. Id. at 703, 828 P.2d at 688, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 547 (Mosk, J.,
concurring). Justice Mosk declared that CALJIC No. 2.27 unambiguously makes it
known to the jury that corroboration is not needed to support a conviction. Id at
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In People v. Gammage, the California Supreme Court resolved contradictory appellate court decisions regarding the propriety of a trial court
instructing the jury to carefully review the testimony of all witnesses
when a fact is sought to be proved by uncorroborated testimony, while
further instructing the jury that corroboration is not legally required to
support a conviction of the defendant."6 The supreme court concluded
that it is appropriate for the trial court to submit both instructions to the
jury.1

The combination of CALJIC numbers 2.27 and 10.60 may give rise to
an improper inference by the jury that it should view the accuser's testimony in a more favorable light than that of the accused. 8 In order to
combat this inference, a trial attorney defending an alleged sexual offender would be well advised to request that the judge, in voir dire of
prospective jurors, ask whether they would weigh the testimony of the
alleged victim more heavily than that of the accused, if instructed that it
is not essential that witness testimony be corroborated in order to support a conviction of a sexual offense. If the judge complies with the trial
lawyer's request, improper interpretation of the jury instructions is effectively foreclosed at an early stage of the trial.
MICHAEL EMMET MURPHY

704, 828 P.2d at 689, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 548 (Mosk, J., concurring). Moreover, Justice
Mosk concluded that continuing to instruct the jury that corroboration is not required
to support a conviction may be prejudicial because the jury may misunderstand the
instruction to mean that it should give more weight to the alleged victim's testimony,
because her testimony is expressly pointed out in the second instruction. Id. at 705,
828 P.2d at 690, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 549 (Mosk, J., concurring).
Justice Kennard, concurring in the court's final decision, wrote separately because she did not believe that use of the no-corroboration instruction should be promoted because it repeats the substance of instruction number 2.27. Id. at 706, 828
P.2d at 690, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 549 (Kennard, J., concurring). Justice Kennard reasoned that because of the marginal value and repetitive nature of CALJIC number
10.60, it is unnecessary and should not be given in an effort to balance the accused
and accuser's rights. Id. at 706, 828 P.2d at 690-91, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 549-550
(Kennard, J., concurring).
16. Ld.
at 702, 828 P.2d at 688, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 705, 828 P.2d at 690, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 49 (Mosk, J., concurring)
(relating that because the alleged victim's testimony is expressly pointed out in
CALIIC No. 10.60, the jury may draw an improper inference that her testimony
should be accepted as true).

V. EMPLOYMENT LAW
Under California Government Code section 12926(c), an
employer with five or more full- or part-time employees on
its payroll is subject to the authority of the FairEmployment
and Housing Commission, regardless of whetherfewer than
five employees work on any given day: Robinson v. Fair
Employment and Housing Commission.
I.

INTRODUCTION

California Government Code section 12926(c)' gives the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (FEHO) jurisdiction over employers who
regularly employ five or more employees In Robinson v. FairEmployment and Housing Commission,' the California Supreme Court considered whether section 12926(c) granted the FEHC jurisdiction over an
employer with six employees on its payroll, when five employees were
not on the premises every working day." The supreme court held that
section 12926(c) applied to all employers with five or more individuals
on their payroll, regardless of the number of days the employees
worked!
Section 12926(c) defines an "employer" for the purpose of establishing
FEHC jurisdiction as "any person regularly employing five or more persons .... . An FEHC regulation implementing section 12926(c) defines
the phrase "regularly employing" as "employing five or more individuals
for each working day.... ." In this case, the FEHC applied section
12926(c) to the number of employees on the employer's payroll, not to

1. Section 12926(c) provides in relevant part, "Employer,' except as hereinafter
provided, includes any person regularly employing five or more persons." CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 12926(c) (West 1992). All references to code sections are to the Government

Code.
2. Robinson v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. 4th 226, 231, 825 P.2d
767, 768-69, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782, 784-85 (1992). For background information on the
Fair Employment and Housing Commission and the Fair Employment and Housing
Act see 2 M. KIRBY WILCOX, CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT LAw, § 40.10 (1992 & Supp.

1992).
3. 2 Cal. 4th 226, 825 P.2d 767, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782. Justice Baxter authored the
majority opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Panelli, Kennard, and
George concurring. Justice Arabian wrote a dissenting opinion.
4. Id. at 230-31, 825 P.2d at 768-69, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783-84.
5. Id. at 231, 243, 825 P.2d at 769, 776-77, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 784, 791-92.
6. CAL GOV'T CODE § 12926(c) (West 1992).
7. Robinson, 2 Cal. 4th at 231, 825 P.2d at 768, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783 (citing
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7286.5(a)(1) (1992) (emphasis added)).
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the number of employees on the employer's premises.8 However, this approach was clearly contrary to the language used in the FEHC's own administrative regulation.! Thus, in Robinson, the court was called upon to
determine the legislature's intended definition of the phrase "regularly
"
employing. 10

The controversy in Robinson over the FEHC's application of section
12926(c) arose when Robinson, a dentist, failed to reinstate an employee
when the employee returned from a six-week pregnancy leave. The employee filed a grievance with the FEHC accusing Robinson of unlawful
discrimination in violation of section 12945(b)(2)." Robinson argued
that he was exempt from the Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FE{A)'" because, although he had six employees on his payroll, he did
not have five employees on the premises each working day'3 as the
FEHC's own regulation required." The FEHC, however, insisted that the

8. Id. at 233, 825 P.2d at 769-70, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 784-85. The court noted, "The
FEHC has asserted Jurisdiction when an employer has five or more persons on the
payroll for each working day, and includes part-time employees--i.e., those who work
less than a full shift and those who do not work each day." Id.(citations omitted).
9. Id. at 231, 825 P.2d at 768, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783 (citing CAL CODE REGS. tit.

2, § 7286.5(a)(1) (1992)).
10. Id. at 234, 825 P.2d at 771, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786. With regard to the regulation, the court stated, "Whenever by the express or implied terms of any statute a
state agency has authority to adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make specific
or otherwise carry out the provisions of the statute, no regulation adopted is valid or
effective unless consistent and not in conflict with the statute ... ." Id. at 243-44,
825 P.2d at 777, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792 (citing CAL Gov'T CODE § 11342.2 (West

1992)).
11. Section 12945(b)(2) provides in relevant part
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based upon a bona fide
occupational qualification: ... (b) For any employer to refuse to allow a
female employee affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions .. .(2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of time; provided, the period shall not exceed four months .... Rea-

CAL

sonable period of time means that period during which the female employee
is disabled on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.
GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1992).

12. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996.

13. Robinson, 2 Cal. 4th at 232, 825 P.2d at 769, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 784. Employees
were scheduled as follows: on Mondays and Tuesdays four employees were on the
premises; on Wednesdays only one employee was on the premises; on Thursdays and
Fridays, five employees were on the premises; finally, on Saturdays, three employees
were on the premises. Id. at 232 rL2, 825 P.2d at 769 n.2, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 784 n.2.
14. Id. at 233-34, 825 P.2d at 770, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785. See aLso 2 WiLcox, supra
note 2, § 42.26[2] (explaining jurisdictional and other procedural defenses to FEHC

statute, and not the regulation, prescribed the FEHC's jurisdiction over
employers accused of the unlawful discriminatory practices enumerated
in section 12945.' On this basis, the FEHC determined that section
12926(c) applied to employers with five or more persons on their payroll." Finding Robinson within its authority, the FEHC awarded the employee damages for Robinson's violation of section 12945(b)(2). 7 Robinson then obtained a writ of administrative mandamus from the superior
court ordering the FEHC to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.'"
The court of appeal, granting the FEHC's petition for review, found that
the aggregate number of employees on an employer's payroll was conclusive as to the number of workers a business regularly employs." The
California Supreme Court affirmed.'

II. TREATMENT
A.

The Majority Opinion

The determinative question in this case was whether section 12926(c)
supported the FEHC's avowal of authority over this particular employer.2 As a preliminary matter, the court indicated that the FEHC regulation would be invalid to the extent that it conflicted with section
12926(c).' In addition, because the phrase "regularly employing" as used
in section 12926(c) was ambiguous,' further analysis would be necessary to determine legislative intent.
First, the court considered the administrative interpretation of section
12926(c), but found that this did not conclusively establish its meaning.'
Fair employment law used the phrase "regularly employing" to determine
jurisdiction before the creation of the FEHC, section 12926(c), or the
regulation purporting to define that phrase.' Thus, the FEHC's regulatory definition may be viewed as inconsistent with the legislature's under-

actions).
15. Robinson, 2 Cal. 4th at 231, 825 P.2d at 768-69, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783-84.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 232, 825 P.2d at 769, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 784.
18. Id. For information on the procedural aspects of judicial review of FEHC decisions, see generally 2 WILcox, supra note 2, § 42.40.
19. Robinson v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 275 Cal. Rptr. 656, 657-58
(1990), afd, 2 Cal. 4th 226, 825 P.2d 767, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782 (1992). For a treatment of the appellate decision see 41 CAL JUR. 3D Labor § 4 (Supp. 1992).
20. Robinson v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. 4th at 245, 825 P.2d
at 778, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
21. Id. at 234, 825 P.2d at 770, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d -at 785.

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 234, 825 P.2d at 771, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785.
25. Ld.at 235, 825 P.2d at 771, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786.
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standing of the phrase at the time section 12926(c) was enacted.'
Next, the court analyzed the legislative history of the FEHA.' The
court examined a fair employment bill,' an initiative measure and its
ballot pamphlet, ' and a law review article,' all of which came into existence contemporaneously with the enactment of the FEHA's predecessor, the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA). These sources, however, did not provide a clear understanding of the phrase "regularly employing."
Finally, the court examined the legislature's intent in enacting the statute.' Noting that other states had enacted comparable fair employment
laws prior to the enactment of section 12926(c),' the court found that

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 236, 825 P.2d at 772, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787. "Fair employment legislation
was first proposed in California in 1943. The fair employment bill which is the forerunner of the present law was introduced on January 9, 1945 .. . and was reintroduced in each odd-numbered year thereafter until passage of the Fair Employment
Practice Act in 1959 (FEPA)." Id. (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 236-37, 825 P.2d at 772, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787. The FEPA initiative read:
"The term 'employer' ... does not include any person regularly employing fewer
than five (5) persons ...

."

Id. (citations omitted).

30. Id. at 237-38, 825 P.2d at 773, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788 (quoting Michael C.
Tobriner, California FEPC, 16 HASTINGS LJ. 333, 342-43 (1965)). According to
Tobriner's interviews with the FEPC, the phrase "regularly employing" . . . "mean[s]
that [the employer] must have an 'average' or 'normal' couplement of five or more
persons in his employ on a 'regular' basis." Id.
31. Id. at 236-37, 825 P.2d at 772-73, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787-88. The California
Legislature adopted the FEPA in 1959. In 1980, the FEPA was repealed and substituted with the FEHA. Id. at 235, 825 P.2d at 771, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786. In effect, the
FEHC inherited the powers and jurisdiction of the FEPC in 1980. Id. at 235 n.8, 825
P.2d at 771 n.8, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786 n.8. See 8 B. E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, CGmstitutional Law §§ 756, 758 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992) (discussing the
FEHA's succession to the FEPA); 41 CAL JUR. 3D Labor §§ 4-5 (1978 & Supp. 1992)
(explaining the FEPA in detail and discussing the FEHA's succession of powers). See
also Majorle Gelb & JoAnne Frankfurt, California's Fair Employment and Housing
AcL A Viable State Remedy For Employment Discrimination,34 HASTINGS LJ. 1055
(1983) (providing an historical background of fair employment laws, the FEPA, and
the FEHA in California).
32. Robinson, 2 Cal. 4th at 239-43, 825 P.2d at 773-77, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788-92.
The court reasoned that because of its remedial nature, the FEHA requires an expansive interpretation in the event of ambiguity; thus, the FEHA should be interpreted to
promote the authority of the FEHC. Id. at 243, 825 P.2d at 776, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
791.
33. Id. at 239.40, 825 P.2d at 773-74, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788-89.

these statutes had objectives similar to that of the California statute.'
The court determined that the legislative purpose behind exempting employers with fewer than five regular employees from FEHC jurisdiction
was to allow the FEHC to concentrate its enforcement activities in the
areas with the most job opportunities.' Interpreting "regularly employing" as the number of employees on an employer's payroll would advance that legislative purpose* because the number of employees on a
payroll is more indicative of the number of job opportunities available
than the number of employees working every business day.' Therefore,
the FEHC had jurisdiction over the employer in the present case because
he retained six employees on his payroll.'
B.

The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Arabian's dissent criticized the majority's attempt to discern
legislative history through unreliable secondary sources and unreliable
precedent." The first step in determining legislative intent, Arabian ar-

34. 1l at 239, 825 P.2d at 773, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788.
35. Id. at 240, 825 P.2d at 774-75, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789-90. The court cited three
law review articles published contemporaneously with the enactment of the FEPA in
which the critics, examining the legislation, agreed that the objective of exempting
employers of fewer than five persons was to "reliev[eJ the administrative body of the
burden of enforcement where few job opportunities are available." Id Furthermore,
all of the critics understood "regularly employing" to mean the aggregate number of
workers on the employer's payroll. Id. at 240-41, 825 P.2d at 775, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
790.
36. ld. at 242, 825 P.2d at 776, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791.
37. Id. at 241, 825 P.2d at 775, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790.
38. Id. at 243, 825 P.2d at 776-77, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791-92. The court rejected
Robinson's estoppel argument that Regulation 7286.5, CAL CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7286.5
(1992), does not provide an employer with notice that part-time employees will be
considered when determining the FEHC's authority over the employer. Robinson, 2
Cal. 4th at 243-44, 825 P.2d at 777, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792. The court reasoned that
although the regulation defines employer as "employing five or more individuals for
each working day," CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 2, § 7286.5 (1992), if it were read as the
plaintiff suggested, the regulation would be inconsistent with section 12926(c) of the
California Government Code and, thus, invalid. Robinson, 2 Cal. 4th at 243-44, 825
P.2d at 777, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792. A regulation with two possible meanings, one
valid and one not, should be interpreted in favor of validity. Id. at 244, 825 P.2d at
777, 5 CaL Rptr. 2d at 792. Furthermore, there is a presumption that employers know
the law. Id. Therefore, the court concluded that the regulation gives employers notice. Id.
Robinson also argued that the FEHC should be estopped from sanctioning him
because the regulation misled him. Id. The court found that although the doctrine of
estoppel can be applied against the government for this reason, Robinson did not
satisfy the necessary elements. Id. at 244-45, 825 P.2d at 777-78, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
792-93.
39. Robinson, 2 Cal. 4th at 245, 248 n.5, 825 P.2d at 778, 780 n.5, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d
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gued, is to look at the plain meaning of the words used in the statute.'
Because the majority did not examine the woi ds themselves, the remainder of its analysis was critically flawed.4' Movover, the majority's interpretation of section 12926(c) caused the qualifier "regularly" to become
meaningless surplusage.' For Justice Arabian, the FEHC regulation
made it clear that the FEHC may exercise jurisdiction only as to those
employers with five or more employees actually on the job every business day. 3
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Robinson, the California Supreme Court interpreted Government
Code section 12926(c) to determine whether it included an employer
with six employees on its payroll, when five employees worked at the
same time only two days a week. The court concluded that a showing of
five or more employees on an employer's payroll conclusively subjects
the employer to the FEHC's authority. This interpretation of section
12926(c) makes the FEHA applicable to most employers.' Small businesses might try to avoid FEHC authority by not offering part-time employment.' Moreover, small businesses that cannot afford to comply

at 793, 795 n.5 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 246, 825 P.2d at 778, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
41. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 246, 825 P.2d at 778-79, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793-94 (Arabian, J., dissent-

ing).
43. Id. at 250, 825 P.2d at 781, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 796 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
44. It is estimated that 95% of the businesses in California employ fewer than 50
employees. Many of these businesses employ part-time workers and might have been
exempted if the court had accepted Robinson's interpretation of section 12926(c). Id.;
Stephen G. Hirsch, Court Considers Challenge to State Bias Law; Ruling Could
Reduce the Number of Small Businesses Covered, THE RECORDER, Jan. 8, 1992, at 1.
45. Robinson, 2 Cal. 4th at 249, 825 P.2d at 781, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 796 (Arabian,
J., dissenting). Justice Arabian posited that the majority's construction of the statute
will have the ultimate effect of decreasing the availability of part-time jobs. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting). Justice Arabian believed that employers, who can feasibly employ
four full-time workers instead of employing numerous people part-time, will now
avoid employing part-timers in order to escape the authority of the FEHC. ld. (Arabian, J., dissenting). Furthermore, an employer falling within FEHC authority that
changes its employment scheme in response to the court's decision may still be
subject to FEHC authority. See CAL CODE REGS. tit 2, § 7286.5(a)(1) (1992) (defining
"regularly employing" as "employing five or more individuals for each working day in
any twenty consecutive calendar weeks in the current calendar year or preceding
calendar year") (emphasis added). It is unclear whether the supreme court's decision

with FEHA pregnancy leave provisions may choose to go out of business
or relocate outside of California." On the other hand, the broad application of section 12926(c) will provide a remedy for small business employees who, in the past, have had no protection against the type of discriminatory employment practices listed in section 12945."
MICHAEL EMMET MURPHY

VI. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
State legislationconcerning hazardous waste disposal
facilities neitherexpressly nor impliedly preempts local
governments from compelling compliance with a local land
use permit that imposes a waste-free buffer zone: IT
Corporation v. Solano County Board of Supervisors.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In IT Corp. v. Solano County Board of Supervisors,' the California
Supreme Court assessed the ability of local governments to enforce local
land use regulations that affect hazardous waste disposal facilities
(HWDFs).' On the state level, the Hazardous Waste Control Act
(HWCA)3 governs the operation of HWDFs primarily through the Department of Health Services.' Cities and counties, however, have historically

has left the italicized portion of the regulation intact But see supra note 10 (relating
that the court may have invalidated the entire regulation).
46. Philip Hager, Justices Refuse to Narrow Anti-Bias Law, LA. TIMES, Mar. 15,
1992, at A3. See Hirsch, supra note 44 (stating that this case takes on added significance, considering legislation proposed by Governor Pete Wilson which would provide
the FEHC with the authority to award punitive and compensatory damages).
47. See Hirsch, supra note 44 (noting that a decision in Robinson's favor could
have hit minorities hard, since they make up the bulk of workers in transitory,
seasonal jobs"); see also Hager, supra note 46 (This is a major victory, not only for
pregnant workers but all employees across California now subject to the

[Alct ..

").

1. 1 Cal. 4th 81, 820 P.2d 1023, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513 (1991) (en banc).
2. See generally 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property § 77
(9th ed. 1987); 61A Am. JUR. 2D Pollution Control §§ 247, 250, 253-255 (1981 & Supp.
1992); William B. Johnson, Annotation, Validity of Local Regulation of Hazardous
Waste, 67 A.LR. 4th 822 (1989).
3. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25100-25250.25 (Deering 1988 & Supp. 1992).
See generally Arthur D. Gunther, Enforcement in Your Backyard: Implementation of
California's Hazardous Waste Control Act by Local Prosecutors, 17 ECOLOGY LQ. 803
(1990); 1 JAMES LONGTIN, CAL. LAND USE § 5.33 (2d ed. 1987).
4. The Department of Health Services (DHS) is a state agency that issues permits
of operation for HWDFs, establishes standards and regulations for both the operation
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regulated land use through zoning ordinances and use permits.' In addition to holding that the HWCA neither impliedly nor expressly preempted
local enforcement of a legitimate land use regulation,' the court held
that the county's order in this case was valid because it did not conflict
with state interests and required ultimate approval from all appropriate
state agencies.! The dispute between IT Corporation and the county centered on the type of remedy for the buffer zone' violation: IT Corporation sought closure in place (partial closure)' and the county sought
"clean closure" (complete closure).

and closure of HWDFs, and approves "closure and post closure plans'.., that
compl[y] with all pertinent regulations." IT Corp., I Cal. 4th at 91-92, 820 P.2d at
1029, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519. See generally 50 CAL. JUR. 3D Pollution and Conservation Laws §§ 146-156 (1979 & Supp. 1992) (describing the responsibilities of DHS); 2
KENNETH A.

IANASTER & DANIEL P.

SELMI,

CAL

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND LAND USE

§ 50.10 (Mark H. Wasserman & Katherine Hardy eds., rev. 1991) (same).
However, DHS is not the only agency authorized to enforce the HWCA. See, e.g.,
Gunther, supra note 3, at 807-08.
5. IT Corp., 1 Cal. 4th at 89, 820 P.2d at 1027, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517. Article XI
of the California Constitution provides: 'A county or city may make and enforce
within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in
conflict with general laws." CAL CONST. art. XI, § 7. See generally 8 B. WrrmN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 793 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992)
(specifying common areas of local regulation, including the use of land); 3 MANASTER
& SELMI, supra note 4, §§ 60.10-60.11 (discussing police power and the California
Constitution as sources of zoning power); I LO NGTIN, supra note 3, § 1.20 (same);
DONALD G. HAGMAN ET AL., CAL ZONING PRACTICE § 4.8 (Herbert Gross, ed., Continuing Educ. of the Bar, 1969 & Supp. 1992) (same).
6. See infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text for the court's reasoning on
implied preemption and notes 32.43 and accompanying text for the court's reasoning
on express preemption. See generally 8 B. WrTKIN, supra note 5, § 794 (describing
express and implied preemption of local law); LONGTIN, supra note 3, §§ 1.70-1.71
(same); 8 B. WmrKIN, supra note 5, § 804 (giving examples of state laws that preempt
local regulation); HAGMAN, supra note 5, §§ 4.94.12 (discussing possible areas of
state-local conflict); Johnson, supra note 2, at 848-66 (comparing state legislation that
did and did not preempt local regulation of hazardous waste).
7. IT Corp., 1 Cal. 4th at 96, 820 P.2d at 1032, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 522. For a
description of the defenses to the enforcement of local land use regulations, including
constitutional limitations (such as preemption), procedural defects, statute of limitations and laches, estoppel, and good faith, see Johnson, supra note 2, at 836-41
(comparing valid and invalid local hazardous waste ordinances); I LONGTIN, supra
note 3, § 3.94; HAGMAN, supra note 5, §§ 11.13-11.19.
8. See generally David J. Lennett & Linda E. Greer, State Regulation of Hazardous Waste, 12 ECOLOGY LQ. 183, 224-27 (1985) (discussing buffer zones). See infra
PRACTICE

text accompanying note 14 for the purpose of buffer zones.

9. IT Corp., 1 Cal. 4th at 92-93, 820 P.2d at 1030, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 520.
10. Id. at 93, 820 P.2d at 1030, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 520. Clean closure requires

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

IT Corporation owns and operates a large HWDF in Solano County."
The county imposed a conditional use permit"2 on the facility barring
the handling or storing of hazardous waste within 200 feet of the property line. 8 Such waste-free buffer zones protect the environment as well
as public health and safety by catching migrating contaminants before
they reach neighboring waters and lands that are zoned for incongruous
purposes." The 106-acre dumping facility abuts on the city of Benecia
and is otherwise surrounded by agricultural land. 5
Uncontroverted evidence revealed that in 1987 several liquid waste
ponds, a surface solid waste pile, a landfill, and a drum burial site encroached upon the prescribed buffer zone. 6 The County Planning Commission (Commission) issued a "clean closure order" 7 requiring IT Corporation to promptly discontinue and close the encroachments; submit a
plan for clean closure within 90 days to state and federal regulatory
agencies; modify the plan as the agencies may require; and implement
the plan immediately upon their assent thereto. 8
IT's appeal to the county's Board of Supervisors (Board) led the Commission to reevaluate alternative solutions, including IT's suggestion to
close and clean only the infringement abutting on the city and to assign a
new 200-foot buffer zone." Later, when the Board approved the
Commission's original clean closure order, IT Corporation petitioned for
a writ of mandamus.' The superior court granted the writ, reasoning
that the Board had no jurisdiction to define the remedy because state
law superseded local law in the handling, storage, and elimination of hazardous waste.2' The court of appeal affirmed.' Granting review, the
elimination of all contaminants from the buffer zone. Id. at 87, 820 P.2d at 1026, 2

Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516.
11. Id at 85, 820 P.2d at 1025, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515.
12. See 3 MANASTER & SELMi, supra note 4, §§ 60.70-60.71 (discussing conditional
use pernits); LONGTIN, aupmr

note 3, § 3.71 (same).

13. IT Corp., 1 Cal. 4th at 85-86, 820 P.2d at 1025, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515.
14. 1d. at 100 n.16, 820 P.2d at'1035 n.16, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 525 n.16. This is a
particularly realistic concern in this case because the City of Benicia is located
downhill from the facility, which is nestled in the rolling hills of Solano County. l
at 85, 820 P.2d at 1025, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515.
15. Id, at 85, 820 P.2d at 1025, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515.
16. Id. at 87, 820 P.2d at 1026, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516.
17. Ld.See supra note 10 for the definition of "clean closure."
18. IT Corp., 1 Cal. 4th at 87, 820 P.2d at 1026, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516. According
to IT, compliance with the clean closure order would cost approximately $40.5 mil-

lion. Id,
19. Id. at 87-88, 820 P.2d at 1026, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516.
20. Id. at 88, 820 P.2d at 1026, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516.

21. Id.
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California Supreme Court addressed (1) whether state laws concerning
hazardous waste management are so exhaustive as to supersede enforcement of local limitations on treatment and storage locations within an
HWDF,n and (2) whether a local government can order an HWDF operator to abate the violation and restore the site to its initially authorized

condition.'
111.

THE COURT'S OPINION

A. State Law Governing Hazardous Waste Management Does Not
Impliedly Preempt Enforcement of a Local Regulation Controlling
Treatment and Storage Location Within a Facility Because State
Law is Not So Comprehensive as to Make It the Exclusive Means by
which to Regulate Hazardous Waste
One of the ways in which a state law can impliedly preempt local law
is when state law is so pervasive in a particular area that it makes the
whole area an exclusive state concern.' IT Corporation argued that
state law concerning hazardous waste is so comprehensive that it is the
only means of regulating and enforcing its proper storage, treatment, and
disposal.' The court rejected IT's argument for two reasons. First, the
HWCA specifically acknowledges local law," which necessarily includes

22. Id
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
determine

at 88, 820 P.2d at 1027, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517.
at 91, 820 P.2d at 1028, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518.
at 97-98, 820 P.2d at 1033, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 523.
at 91, 820 P.2d at 1028, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518. There are three tests to
whether the legislature has impliedly preempted local regulation:

(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general
law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state
concern; (2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law
couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern
will not tolerate further or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter
has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of ... local [regulation] on the transient citizens
of the tate outweighs the possible benefit to the [local government].
Id. (quoting People ex rel. Deukmejlan v. County of Mendocino, 36 Cal. 3d 476, 485,
204 Cal. Rptr. 897, 902, 683, P.2d 1150, 1156 (1984)).
26. Id. at 90, 820 P.2d at 1028, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518. IT also argued that the
Board's order contradicted state law because the HWCA does not mandate restoration
of an HWDF to its pre-violation condition. Id. at 92-93, 820 P.2d at 1030, 2 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 520.
27. Id. at 93, 820 P.2d at 1030, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 520. The HWCA provides: "No
provision of this chapter shall limit the authority of any state or local agency in the

ordinances.' In addition, clear statutory language authorizing local regulation eradicates any implication of preemptive intent, therefore statutory
recognition of local regulation must yield the same result. ' Second, in
the sensitive area of hazardous waste disposal, when the legislature has
wanted to supplant local law, it has done so clearly and unequivocally.'
As a result, the court concluded that state regulation does not impliedly
preempt a local regulation that specifies where a facility operator may
store contaminants within an HWDF.3'
B.

State Regulation of Hazardous Waste FacilitiesDoes Not Expressly
Preempt Enforcement of a Local "Clean Closure" OrderBecause
Requiring Complete Abatement of a Local Land Uuse Violation is
Neither an UnreasonableNor ProhibitoryRegulation of an

Existing Facility
The HWCA authorizes local regulation of land use,' but expressly
prohibits enforcement of any local permit that constitutes an unreasonable regulation of an existing HWDF.' IT's arguments centered on the

enforcement or administration of any provision of law which it is specifically permitted or required to enforce and administer." Id. (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25105 (Deering 1988)).
28. Id. (citing Mendocino, 36 Cal. 3d at 486-87, 683 P.2d at 1156, 204 CaL Rptr. at

903).
29. Id. at 94, 820 P.2d at 1031, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 521 (citing Mendocino, 36 Cal.
3d at 485, 83 P.2d at 1156, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 903).
30. Id. See, e.g., CA. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25149(a) (Deering 1988 & Supp.
1992) (expressly forbidding local governments from "prohibit[ing] or unreasonably
regulat[ing]" the treatment of contaminants at "existing" HWDFs); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25167.3 (Deering 1988) (preempting "all local regulations and all
conflicting state regulations concerning the transportation of hazardous waste" and
prohibiting any local agency from "adopt[ing] or enforc[ing] any ordinance or regulation... inconsistent with (state] regulations").
31. IT Corp., 1 Cal. 4th at 96-97, 820 P.2d at 1032-33, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 522-23.
32. Id. at 97, 820 P.2d at 1033, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 523. Health and Safety Code
section 25147 states that "[eixcept as expressly provided in Section 25149, it is not
the intent of this article to preempt local land use regulation of existing hazardous
waste facilities." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25147 (Deering 1988).
33. IT Corp., 1 Cal. 4th at 97, 820 P.2d at 1033, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 523. Health and
Safety Code section 25149 provides in pertinent part that
(n]otwithstanding any other provision of law [and certain exceptions not here
applicable] no city or county .. . or district may enact, issue, enforce, suspend, revoke, or modify any ordinance, regulation, law, license, or permit
relating to an existing hazardous waste facility so as to prohibit or unreasonably regulate the disposal, treatment, or recovery of resources from hazardous waste ... at that facility.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25149(a) (Deering 1988 & Supp. 1992).
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interpretation of the statutory terms "prohibit" and "unreasonable."' IT's
attempts to construe the word "prohibit" as precluding any local regulation of 1T's dump within the facility were unsuccessful.' The stated
purpose of article 4.5 of the HWCA is to limit local land use prerogatives
only as needed to further the statewide concern of preserving the current
number of HWDFs.' The court reasoned that not only does the purpose
itself belie IT's contention,' but the 200-foot buffer zone "cannot be
considered part of the... 'existing' hazardous waste disposal capacity
which the Legislature sought to 'retain.'" Furthermore, nothing in the
statute precludes compelled compliance with a permit geogmphically restricting the storage of waste. ' IT then argued that the Board's order
for complete cleanup was unreasonable because (1) costs were prohibitive and there was a lack of supporting evidence, and (2) the Board
failed to explain the necessity of total clean-up, as opposed to IT's proposal for partial closure.' However, the court stated that the chosen
remedies are not unreasonable simply because they are stricter than
those that the transgressor suggests.4 The court reasoned that by requiring complete clean-up, the Board is simply insisting that IT preserve the
waste-free protection zone according to the original permit.' Thus, the

34. IT Co-p., 1 Cal. 4th at 98, 820 P.2d at 1033, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 523.
35. Id. at 97, 820 P.2d at 1033, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 523.
36. Id. at 98-99, 820 P.2d at 1033-34, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 523-24. The legislature
found that the decreasing statewide disposal capacity and the simultaneously increase
in demand created a greater risk of illegal disposal because proper disposal would
require that hazardous waste be transported farther. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY

CODE

§§ 25146, 25146.5 (Deering 1988) (outlining the legislative findings and declarations).
37. IT Corp., 1 Cal. 4th at 98-99, 820 P.2d at 1034, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 524.
38. Id. at 99, 820 P.2d at 1034, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 524. The legislature's purpose
was to prevent inhabitants from putting pressure on local governmental representatives to increase the restrictions on neighboring HWDFs, thereby indirectly forcing
them to close, given that HWDFs are admittedly "unpopular neighbors." Id. However,
this purpose has no £Epplication to the buffer zone, where dumping has never been
permitted, and which has existed long before the statutes went into effect. Id. Thus,
the setback zone cannot be deemed a part of the facility that the legislature wanted
to protect. Jd.
39. Id. at 100, 820 P.2d at 1034-35, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 524.
40. Id. at 100, 820 P.2d at 1035, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 525.
41. Id. at 101, 820 P.2d at 1035, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 525. IT recommended dedicating "a new setback line, consistent with the current boundaries of IT's property, so
as to enclose all but one of the current encroachments," a solution which would
have "ratified IT's violations by simply expanding the permit boundaries to accommodate them." Id. at 101, 820 P.2d at 1035-36, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 525-26.
42. IT Corp., 1 Cal. 4th at 101, 820 P.2d at 1035, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 525.

court concluded that the HWCA did not expressly supersede the Board's
order because it was neither an unreasonable nor prohibitory regulation
of an existing HWDF.4'
IV.

IMPACT

The California Supreme Court's decision in IT Corp. increased the
power of local governments, despite the state's expanding authority in
recent years.' The effect is to give the people living closest to the dump
sites-those people most affected by the land use-more control over
their operations.' The ruling also reaffirmed that when a land use violation occurs, the responsible agency, including a local government, may
require (1) removal of whatever is causing the infringement and (2) restoration of property to a pre-violation condition, regardless of the cost.'
In making its ruling, the court relied heavily upon People ex rel.
Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino."7 Although the supreme court acknowledged that the legislature had overturned Mendocino's fact-specific

holding,'8 thereby declaring the state's exclusive control of agricultural
poisons,* the court maintained the continued vitality of Mendocino's
broader holding "that preemption should not be implied when state regulation acknowledges local 'law.'"' Thus, a significant portion of
Mendocino remains good law.

43. Id. at 102, 820 P.2d at 1036, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526.
44. Harriet Chiang, Solano Wins Toxic Cleanup Dispute, S.F. CHRONICLE, Dec. 24,
1991, at A13.
45. California in Brief, San Francisco; Ruling Allows Local Toxic Waste Control,
LA. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1991, at A43. The facts of this case do not represent an isolated
problem. Eighteen counties, some facing similar enforcement difficulties, supported
Solano County's appeal in this case by joining in the court filings. Id, See IT Corp., 1
Cal. 4th at 89 n.5, 820 P.2d at 1027 n.5, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517 n.5 for a list of the
counties.
48. See, e.g., County of San Diego v. McClurken, 37 Cal. 2d 683, 234 P.2d 972
(1951) (remove 48,000-gallon containers); People v. Gates, 41 Cal. App. 3d 590, 116
Cal. Rptr. 172 (1974) (remove vehicle junkyard); City and County of San Francisco v.
Padilla, 23 Cal. App. 3d 388, 100 Cal. Rptr. 223 (1972) (remove two dwelling units);
People v. Watkins, 175 Cal. App. 2d 182, 345 P.2d 960 (1959) (remove portion of
building Inrnging upon setback line); Donovan v. City of Santa Monica, 88 Cal.
App. 2d 386, 199 P.2d 51 (1948) (remove 24 apartments and reconvert principal
building to a single-family residence). See also LONGTIN, supra note 3, § 3.90 (stating
that the city or county is responsible for enforcing its land use regulations).
47. 36 Cal. 3d 476, 683 P.2d 1150, 204 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1984).
48. IT Corp., 1 Cal. 4th at 93 n.9, 820 P.2d at 1030 n.9, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 520 n.9.
Specifically, Mendocino held that an ordinance prohibiting the aerial application of
phenoxyherbicides was valid because it was not preempted by state law. Mendocino,
36 Cal. 3d at 488, 683 P.2d at 1157, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
49. IT Corp., 1 Cal. 4th at 93 n.9, 820 P.2d at 1030 n.9, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 520 n.9.
50. Id. See Mendocino, 36 Cal. 3d at 485, 683 P.2d at 1156, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Despite its breadth and specificity, the HWCA apparently only sets a
minimum Standard." The HWCA implies no overall purpose to proscribe
the traditional prerogative of local governments to impose and enforce

restrictions on the use of land' and expressly overrides local land use
regulations only to the extent necessary to satisfy the legislature's concern for maintaining existing HWDFs.' Having the authority to impose
as well as enforce backs up the local government's legal bark with some

regulatory bite.u
LORRAINE A. MUSKO

VII. INSURANCE LAW
A. An employer establishes an ERISA-governed "employee
welfare benefit plan," thereby preempting any state law cause
qf action relating to the plan, when it purchases an insur-

ance policy on behalf of its employees, contributes toward
premiums, and has the power to discontinue the policy or
change its terms regardless of whether the employer is otherwise involved in the administrationof the policy: Marshall

v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)' pre-

51. IT Corp., 1 Cal. 4th at 95, 820 P.2d at 1032, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 522.

52. Id.
53. Id, at 99, 820 P.2d at 1034, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 524.
54. As one attorney commented, "If you don't have the right to enforce, then your
authority to remedy the condition is meaningless." Harriet Chiang, supra note 44.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. 1992). For excellent summaries of the
major provisions of ERISA, see BARBARA J. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (3d ed. 1989); Joseph R. Simone, Statutory Framewo,,
Language and Fiduciary Responsibility Provisions of ERISA, in UNDERSTANDING
ERISA. AN INTRODUCTION TO BASIC EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 9 (PLI Tax Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 302, 1990). See also, MCKINNEY, CALIFORNIA DIGEST OF
OFFICIAL REPOcrrs 3D, Labor § 78.5 (1990 & Supp. 1992) (providing case notes dealing
with the purpose, preemption provision, and scope of ERISA); MCKINNEY, CALIFORNIA
DIGEST OF OFFICIAL REPORTS 3D, Pensions and Retirement Systems §§ 10-13 (1992)
(providing general reference materials and case notes dealing with the purpose,
preemption provision, and scope of ERISA); 49 CAL. JUR. 3D Pensions and Retirement
Systems §§ 1-3 (1979 Supp. & 1992) (same); 2 B.E. WITIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA

empts every state law cause of action that relates to an "employee welfare benefit plan"2 unless the state law regulates insurance as ERISA
construes the term.' In Marshall v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,' the
California Supreme Court considered whether an employer that sponsored a group insurance policy established an ERISA-governed "employee
welfare benefit plan" even though the employer maintained only a minor
role in the plan's ongoing administrative scheme.' The supreme court
held that an employer establishes an ERISA-govemed plan, thereby pre-

LAW Agency and Employment § 341 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1992) (providing Congressional findings and policies of ERISA and listing numerous decisions and commen-

taries dealing with ERISA).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988). This section defines an "employee welfare benefit
plan" as "any plan, fund, or program .. . established or maintained by an employer ... for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through
the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits."
3. Marshall v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 2 Cal. 4th 1045, 1051, 832 P.2d 573,
576, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72, 75, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 601 (1992) (citing FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57 (1990)). See also, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), 1003(a)(1) (1988)
(ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws Insofar as they... relate to any
employee benefit plan . . . established or maintained . . . by any employer engaged
in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce"); 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(2)(A) (1988) (ERISA does not preempt "any law of any state which regulates
insurance"); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988) ("[Ain employee benefit plan . . . shall
[not] be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer . . . or to be engaged
in the business of insurance ... for purposes of any law of any State purporting to
regulate insurance"). 3 M. KIRBY WILCOX, CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT LAw §§ 60.03[3][e],
60.09[l][c] (1992) (suggesting that in a wrongful termination action, plaintiff's counsel
should avoid any reference to an employer's motive to deprive the employee of
ERISA regulated benefits because ERISA will then preempt the cause of action).
4. 2 Cal. 4th 1045, 832 P.2d 573, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 601
(1992). In MarshaU, an employee's dependent brought several state law causes of
action against both the issuer (Bankers Life and Casualty Co.) and the administrator
(Frank B. Hall & Co. of Californa/MIA Administrators) of an employer-sponsored
group insurance policy. The plaintiff alleged that both the issuer and administrator
improperly denied medical benefits under the policy. The trial court held that federal
law preempted the plaintiffs state law causes of action because the employer had
established an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan. Id. at 1050, 832 P.2d at 575-76,
10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 74-75. The appellate court reversed, finding that the employersponsored group insurance policy was not an ERISA-governed plan because the
employer was not involved in the administration of the policy. The Supreme Court of
California reinstated the trial court's ruling, finding that the employer had established
an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan despite the employer's minimal involvement
in administering the policy to employees. Id. at 1057, 832 P.2d at 580, 10 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 79. Justice Panelli authored the majority opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas and
Justices Kennard, Arabian, Baxter and George concurring. Justice Mosk authored a
separate dissenting opinion arguing that ERISA does not preempt state law where the
employer has less than a substantial role in administering the plan. Id. at 1059-63,
832 P.2d at 582-85, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81-84 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 1049, 832 P.2d at 574-75, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 73-74.
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empting any state law cause of action relating to the plan, when the employer purchases an insurance policy on behalf of its employees, contributes toward premiums, and has the power to discontinue the policy or
change its terms, regardless of whether the employer is otherwise involved in the administration of the policy.'
The court began by finding that the federal government's concern for
protecting employee interests in benefit plans and the need for national
uniformity in the regulation of such plans is present whenever there is
any ongoing administrative activity, regardless of whether the employer
is actively involved therein.7 The court then proceeded to determine
whether an ERISA-governed benefit plan existed and if so, whether the
employer "established or maintained" the plan. The court first determined that the employer-sponsored group insurance policy constituted a
"plan" because a reasonable person viewing the surrounding circumstances could determine "the intended benefits, beneficiaries, source of financing, and procedures for receiving benefits." The court next determined
that the plan was an "ERISA plan" because the employer established it in
order to provide employees with one of ERISA's enumerated benefits."
Finally, the court determined that the employer "established or maintained" the ERISA plan because it purchased the insurance policy on
behalf of its employees, contributed toward premiums, and had the power to discontinue the policy or change its terms." In concluding that the
employer established an ERISA plan, the court emphasized that the
employer's actions constituted more than a "bare purchase" of insurance. 2 Furthermore, the court stated that the employer's noncompliance

6. Id. at 1057, 832 P.2d at 580, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79. Miller Import was minimally involved in the administration of the insurance policy. Besides purchasing and
paying the premiums under the policy for all its employees, Miller Import provided
Its employees with enrollment cards, change of beneficiary forms, and claim forms.
Miller Import was an intermediary between its employees and the policy administrators only in the sense that the administrators would give Miller Import materials to
distribute to its employees, which Miller Import did. Employees submitted claim
forms directly to the policy administrators and Miller Import never reviewed them.
Miller Import asked its employees to contact the policy administrators for any information regarding the policy. Id. at 1049-50, 832 P.2d at 575, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 74.
7. Id. at 1052-54, 832 P.2d at 577-78, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 76-77.
8. Id, at 1051-56, 832 P.2d at 578-79, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 77-78.
9. Id. at 1054, 832 P.2d at 578-79, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 77-78 (quoting Donovan v.
Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 (1lth Cir. 1982)).
10. Id. at 105455, 832 P.2d at 579, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 78.

11. Id. at 1057, 832 P.2d at 580, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79.
12. Id. at 105-57, 832 P.2d at 580, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79. The court stated that

with ERISA reporting requirements and the employer's lack of intent to
create an ERISA plan were irrelevant in determining whether an ERISA
plan had been established.' Moreover, the court concluded that the
employer's delegation of the majority of administerial responsibilities did

not prevent the establishment of an ERISA-governed plan."
The supreme court's holding that the employer in Marshall established
an ERISA-governed plan restricts the plaintiffs damages to the benefits

an ERISA plan is not established by the "bare purchase" of a group insurance plan.
Id. at 1055, 832 P.2d at 579, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 78. A "bare purchase" of insurance
occurs when:
(1) the employer makes no contributions toward premiums;
(2) participation is completely voluntary for employees;
(3) the employer's sole functions are, without endorsing the program, to allow the insurer to publicize it to employees, to collect premiums through
payroll deductions, and to remit them to the insurer, and
(4) the employer receives no consideration in connection with the program
other than reasonable compensation for administrative services rendered in
connection with the payroll deductions.
Id. at 1055, 832 P.2d at 579, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 78 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-10)).
13. Id. at 1058-59, 832 P.2d at 581-82, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 80-81. The court declined
to hear the plaintiffs claim that the employer should be estopped from asserting
ERISA preemption because the plaintiff did not raise the claim below. Id. An employer that fails to comply with the requirements of ERISA may be subject to penalties
and other liability under ERISA, but the purposes of ERISA are still served by adjudicating benefits disputes under ERISA. Id. at 1059, 832 P.2d at 582, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 81 (citing Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1352 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985)); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)) (1988).
14. Id. at 1057, 832 P.2d at 580, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79. The court found that
employers regularly delegate administration of a group plan and that ERISA envisioned such a delegation. Id. (citing Brundage-Peterson v. Compcare Health Servs.
Ins., 877 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1989)); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(16)(A), 1102(b)(2), 1105(c)
(1989 & Supp. 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(c), (g)(2)) (1992). Justice Mosk, in his
dissenting opinion, urged that ERISA preempts state law "only if the employer takes
a substantial role in administering an insurance policy." Id. at 1059-60, 832 P.2d at
582, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Mosk contended that the majority's reasoning that an employer establishes or maintains an
ERISA plan whenever an employer purchases an insurance policy on behalf of its
employees, contributes toward premiums, and has the power to discontinue the policy
or change its terms was "inconsistent on its face." Id. at 1062, 832 P.2d at 584, 10
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk advanced the proposition that
while the majority found that ERISA does not necessarily govern an employer's "bare
purchase" of insurance, an employer could not make such a "bare purchase" without
meeting the court's requirements for finding that an ERISA plan had been established
or maintained. Id. at 1062-63, 832 P.2d at 584-85, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83-84 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). Justice Mosk concluded that the irony of the majority's decision is "that
a federal statute designed to defend the interests of insured employees is construed
to ...
deprive (I countless Californians defrauded by insurers of the protection
afforded by state law." Id. at 1063, 832 P.2d at 585, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84 (Mosk, J.,

dissenting).
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the plaintiff would have originally received under the insurance policy."
Thus, insurance companies that are responsible for the administration of
benefits under employer-sponsored group insurance plans may regard the
court's ruling as an invitation to defraud employees and their dependents
with little risk of state law punitive damages.'6 Most employer-sponsored
group insurance policies delegate administrative responsibilities to either
the insurer or a third party administrator.'" Accordingly, the risk that
insurance companies will abuse the administration of insurance benefits
is high. If this risk manifests itself in the form of improper denial of
insurance benefits, any solution will have to come from Congress since
the United States Supreme Court has already denied review of the California Supreme Court's ruling.'" Therefore, Congress may need to provide additional remedies under ERISA in order to prer erve ERISA's objective of promoting the interests of employees and t0eir dependents in

employee pension and benefit plans."'
MICHAEL EMMET MURPHY

15. See Stephen G. Hirsch, High Court Limits Insurance Coverage Claims, THE
RECORDER, July 10, 1992, at 3.
16. See id,
17. See Marshall, 2 Cal. 4th at 1053, 832 P.2d at 577, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 76
('[Hiolders of group insurance policies commonly do not bear primary responsibility
for processing claims. That function is generally either retained by the insurer or
delegated to a third party administrator, as in this case."); Hirsch, supra note 15, at
3 Che plaintiffs appellate lawyer stated that "almost all employee benefit plans are
of the type at issue in this case-where the employer merely selects the plan and a
third party administers it").
18. Marshall v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 113 S. Ct. 601 (1992).
19. See High Court Rejects Employee Benefit Case, JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Dec. 1,
1992, at A9. See also Marshall, 2 Cal. 4th at 1050-51, 832 P.2d at 576, 10 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 75 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983) ("ERISA is ...
designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee
pension and benefit plans.")). See generally Laurie F. Hasencamp, Note, ERISA and
Preemption of State Fair Employment Laws, 59 S. CAL L REV. 583 (1986) (suggesting that Congress should amend section 1144(a) to exempt state fair employment
laws from preemption); Robert L Aldisert, Note, Blind Faith Conquers Bad Faith
Only Congress Can Save Us After Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 21 LoY. LA.
L REV. 1343 (1988) (asserting that Congress must amend ERISA to permit insured
welfare benefit plan participants to sue for bad faith under state law); Karen L
Peterson, Comment, ERISA Preemption of California Tort and Bad Faith Law:
What's Left?, 22 U.S.F. L REV. 519 (1988) (same).

841

B.

Under Insurance Code section 11580.2, the statute of
limitationsfor an insured's cause of action againstan
insurerto compel arbitrationof an uninsured motorist claim
begins to run when the insurerrefuses to submit to
arbitration:Spear v. California State Automobile
Association.

In Spear v. California State Automobile Association,' the California
Supreme Court held that under contract law principles and under Code
of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, a plaintiffs cause of action to compel
arbitration of an uninsured motorist's claim under Insurance Code section 1158W.2 accrues upon the insurer's refusal to arbitrate.' The court
noted that although section 11580.2 provides conditions precedent to the
accrual of an insured's cause of action,5 the statute does not provide for

1. 2 Cal. 4th 1035, 831 P.2d 821, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 381 (1992). Justice Panelli wrote
the court's unanimous opinion with Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Mosk, Kennard,
Arabian, Baxter and George concurring.
2. Section* 1281.2 provides in relevant part, "On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the (parties] . . . to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement
to arbitrate... exists." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West 1982). See also 11 B.E.
WITuN, SUMMARY OF CAUIFORNIA LAw, Equity §§ 36, 37, 39 (9th ed. 1990) (discussing
California statutory law regarding arbitration). See generally 6 CAL JUR. 3D Arbitra(ion and Award §§ 15-23 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
3. CAL INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992).
4. Spear, 2 Cal. 4th at 1040, 831 P.2d at 824, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384. At present,
California lacks statutory authority regarding the statute of limitations for an action
to compel arbitration. Id. Courts, however, have generally agreed that because an
arbitration clause is a contractual provision, actions to compel such arbitration are
governed by the contract statute of limitations. Id.
Statutory authority is also lacking on the subject of accrual of a cause of action
to compel arbitration. Id. Section 11580.2(i) does contain conditions precedent for
accrual of such a claim, however, the statute does not indicate when accrual actually
occurs once such conditions are satisfied. CAL INS. CODE § 11580.2(1) (West 1988 &
Supp. 1992). See infra note 5 setting forth the conditions precedent. However, in
California State Auto. Ass'n v. Cohen, 44 Cal. App. 3d 387, 396, 118 Cal. Rptr. 890,
1895 (1975), the court held that such action accrues when any one of the section
11580.2(i) conditions are satisfied. The Cohen decision was relied upon by the appellate court in Spear v. California State Auto. Ass'n, 7 Cal. App. 4th 66, 286 Cal. Rptr.
662 (1991), rev'd, 2 Cal. 4th 1035, 831 P.2d 821, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 381 (1992). Several
jurisdictions have held that an action to compel arbitration accrues only when the
other party refuses to submit to arbitration. See infra note 16.
5. Section 11580.2(1) provides:
No cause of action shall accrue to the insured under any policy or endorsement provision issued pursuant to this section unless one of the following
actions have been taken within one year from the date of the accident- (1)
Suit for bodily injury has been filed against the uninsured motorist, in a
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an accrual time.6 The court concluded that a cause of action to compel
arbitration accrues when the insurer has refused to participate in arbitration.7
In determining that a cause of action to compel arbitration accrues
when the defendant refuses to arbitrate, the supreme court reversed the
court of appeal's holding.' Additionally, the supreme court undermined
California State Automobile Association v. Cohen,' a prior appellate
decision upon which the court of appeals based its decision.'" The supreme court explained that although the appellate courts in both Spear
and Cohen correctly determined that section 11580.2(i) provided conditions to accrual," both courts erred in reasoning that such conditions
were the final conditions to accrual.'" Furthermore, the court posited

court of competent jurisdiction. (2) Agreement as to the amount due under
the policy has been concluded. (3) The insured has formally instituted arbitration proceedings.
CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(i). For a discussion of section 11580.2(i) and related provisions, see 6 B.E. WmuIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts § 1189 (9th ed. 1988 &
Supp. 1992); 39 CAL JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts and Coverage §§ 373, 452 (1977 &
Supp. 1992).
6. Spear, 2 Cal. 4th at 1041, 831 P.2d at 824, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384.
7. 1& at 1037, 831 P.2d at 822, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382. In Spear, the plaintiff was
injured in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist during the course and
scope of his employment. After unsuccessfully seeking redress from the uninsured
motorist, the plaintiff pursued an action against his insurer pursuant to the uninsured
motorist provisions of his policy. However, because the plaintiff had a worker's
compensation claim pending, the insurer refused to settle the insurance claim. Subsequently, the plaintiff settled his worker's compensation claim; however, the insurer
still refused to settle the insurance claim. The plaintiff then petitioned to compel
arbitration, but the insurer asserted that the statute of limitations barred the
plaintiffs claim. The trial court denied the plaintiffs petition, and the appellate court
affirmed, holding that because the cause of action had accrued when the plaintiff
filed suit against the uninsured motorist, the statute of limitation barred the plaintiffs
petition. Il at 1039, 831 P.2d at 823, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383.
8. Id. The court of appeal held that because the plaintiff, under section
11580(i)(1), filed suit for bodily injury against the uninsured motorist within one year
after the accident, the plaintiffs cause of action to compel arbitration accrued as of
the date of such filing. Id. See also Spear v. California State Auto. Ass'n, 7 Cal. App.
4th 66, 286 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1991).
9. 44 Cal. App. 3d 387, 118 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1975). The court held that a cause of
action against an insurer accrues when any of the section 11580.2(1) conditions are
met. Id. For the conditions set forth in section 11580.2(i), see supra note 5.
10. Spear, 2 Cal. 4th at 1039, 831 P.2d at 823, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383.
11. Id. See CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(1). For a more in-depth discussion of section
11580.2(1), see supra note 5.
12. Spear, 2 Cal. 4th at 1040, 831 P.2d at 823, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383. The Cohen

that since the arbitration clause was contractual, the action to compel
arbitration was akin to an action for specific performance. 3 The court
noted that the appropriate statute of limitations for a contractual specific
performance claim is four years,' and that the claim does not accrue
until the contract has been breached." Moreover, the court noted that
Civil Procedure section 1281.2 indicated that a plaintiff may only bring an
action to compel arbitration after the defendant has refused to arbitrate." Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs cause of action
accrued on the date he petitioned to compel arbitration.'" By holding
that a plaintiffs cause of action to compel arbitration does not accrue
until the defendant refuses to submit to arbitration, the court has reaffirmed California's preference of arbitration over litigation as a dispute
resolution process." Furthermore, this decision illustrates the court's

court reasoned that the satisfaction of at least one of the section 11580.2(i) conditions is an absolute prerequisite to the accrual of a cause of action. Id. at 1040, 831
P.2d at 824, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384 (citing Cohen, 44 Cal. App. 3d at 395, 118 Cal.
Rptr. at 895). The supreme court In Spear explained that such reasoning was sound
and based upon reliable authority. Id. However, the court believed that the Cohen
court erred in its determination that accrual is automatic and immediate once any of
the section 11580.2(i) conditions are satisfied. Id.
13. Id. at 1042, 831 P.2d at 825, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 385 (citing Freeman v. State
Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 14 Cal. 3d 473, 479, 535 P.2d 341, 344, 121 Cal. Rptr. 477,
480 (1975)).
14. Id at 1040, 831 P.2d at S24, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384.
15. Id. at 1042, 831 P.2d at 825, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 385 (citing 3 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUi ORNLu LAw, Actions § 375 (1985)). The court reasoned that unlike one
party's refusal to arbitrate, good faith negotiations prior to arbitration and mutual
agreement to delay arbitration do not constitute breach of the arbitration clause in a
contract. Id.
16. Id. at 1041, 831 P.2d at 825, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 385 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1281.2; Meyer v. Carnow, 185 Cal. App. 3d 169, 174, 229 Cal. Rptr. 617, 619
(Cal. CL App. 1986)). For a more in-depth discussion of Code of Civil Procedure
section 1281.2, see supra note 2.
17. Spear, 2 Cal. 4th at 1042-43, 831 P.2d at 825-26, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 385-86. In a
footnote, the court cited several cases from other jurisdictions which also held that a
plaintiff's cause of action to compel arbitration accrues only when the defendant refuses to submit to arbitration upon the plaintiffs demand. Id. at 1043 n.7, 831 P.2d at
826 n.7, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 386 n.7 (citing Har-Mar, Inc. v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc.,
300 Minn. 149, 218 N.W. 2d 751 (1974); Mitchell v. Alfred Hofmann, Inc., 48 N.J.
Super. 396, 137 A.2d 569 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958)).
18. California has a long-standing public policy that favors arbitration because it
avoids many disadvantages inherent to litigation. Meyer, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 173, 229
Cal. Rptr. at 618. This California public policy is further evidenced by a post-Spear
opinion in which the court expressed Its willingness to uphold arbitration decisions
with very few exceptions. Moncharsh v. Heily, 3 Cal. 4th 1, 9, 832 P.2d 899, 903, 10
Cal Rptr. 2d 183, 187 (1992).
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desire to spread costs among society by allowing the insured more latitude to bring actions against insurers.

NANCY GAYLE DRAGUTSKY

VIII. ]LANDLORD TENANT
A forfeiture restraint on alienationin a commercial lease
restricting the lessee's right to assign or sublease is valid and
does not constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing provided that it was bargainedfor at
arm's length: Carma Developers (California), Inc. v. Marathon Development California, Inc.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Carma Developers (California), Inc. v. Marathon Development
California, Inc.,' the California Supreme Court considered whether a
provision in a commercial lease "allowing the lessor to terminate the
lease and recapture the leasehold upon notice by the lessee of intent to
sublease or assign" was reasonable and conformed with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.2 In a unanimous decision,' the court
held that the recapture clause was reasonable under California law4 and
did not violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'
A.

Background

The general rule in California regarding alienation of commercial leaseholds is that a tenant's rights are freely alienable unless the lease pro-

1. 2 Cal. 4th 342, 826 P.2d 710, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467 (1992).
2. Id. at 350, 826 P.2d at 712, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469.
3. Pursuant to a California Supreme Court order, this case was heard by the
Third District Court of Appeal because the California Supreme Court, being a tenant
of Marathon, was required to recuse itself. Id. at 350 n.1, 826 P.2d at 712 n.1, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at ,469 n.l. Acting Chief Justice Puglia wrote the decision and Justices
Blease, Sparks, Sims, Marler, Scotland, and Nicholson concurred.
4. Id. at 371, 826 P.2d at 726, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 483. The court also analyzed the
clause's reasonableness under the law prior to the 1989-90 statutory enactment and
determined that the clause was reasonable under prior law as well. See iqfra noies
28-53 and accompanying text.
5. Carma, 2 Cal. 4th at 376, 826 P.2d at 729, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 486.

vides otherwise." If the lease contains a restriction on alienation, the
restriction must be reasonable,' and is valid unless it is repugnant to the
interest created." The general rule regarding a lease provision requiring
the landlord's consent to an assignment or sublease is that such consent
may not be unreasonably withheld.9 Withholding consent means that "the
lessor has a commercially reasonable objection to the assignee or proposed use."'" The courts have used the balancing test set forth in
WeUenkamp v. Bank of America" to assess the reasonableness of restraints on alienation:' 2 the greater the restraint, the greater the need for
justification of such restraint.' However, on January 1, 1990, a new
chapter of the Civil Code" became effective. These code sections codified the general rules regarding transfer restrictions in commercial leases
and expressly authorized several types of restrictions on transfer.'"
6. Id. at 355, 826 P.2d at 715, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472 (citing Kassan v. Stout, 9
Cal. 3d 39, 43, 507 P.2d 87, 89, 106 Cal. Rptr. 783, 785 (1973)). See also 4 B.E.
WmuN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Real Property § 648 (9th ed. 1987); William G.
Coskran, Assignment and Sublease Restrictions: The Tribulations of Leasehold Transfers, 22 Low. LA. L REv. 405, 427-47 (1989) (discussing the general rules regarding
alienation of commercial leases).
7. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 953, 582 P.2d 970, 976-77, 148
Cal. Rptr. 379, 385-86 (1978) (holding that a due-on-sale clause in a promissory note
must be reasonably necessary). See also 27 CAL JUR. 3D Deeds of Trust § 150 (1987);
Coskran, supra note 6, at 454-59 (discussing the impact of Wellenkamp).
8. CAL Civ. CODE § 711 (West 1982). See also 26 CAL JUR. 3D Deeds § 214 (1978)
(discussing the rules regarding repugnant conditions).
9. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 496, 709 P. 2d 837, 841-42, 220
Cal. Rptr. 818, 822-23 (1985). For general discussions of Kendall and the rules regarding withholding consent, see 42 CAL JUa. 3D Landlord and Tenant §§ 202, 223
(Supp. 1992); 4 B.E. WrrIUN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Real Property §§ 649-650
(9th ed. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 15.2 cmt. h (1976).
10. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 506-07, 709 P.2d at 849, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
11. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
12. The Wellenkamp court stated, "We recognize that a direct relationship exists
between the Justification for enforcement of a particular restraint .. . and the Quantum of restraint [resulting] from enforcement .. . [t]hus, the greater the quantum of
restraint [resulting] from enforcement . .. the greater must be the justification for
that enforcement." Welienkamp, 21 Cal. 3d at 948-49, 582 P.2d at 973, 148 Cal. Rptr.
at 382. For a discussion of the Wellenkamp test, see 27 CAL JUR. 3D Deeds of Trust
§ 150 (1987); 3 B.E. WmnUN, SUMMARY OF CAIIFORNIA LAw, Security Transactions in
Real Property § 79 (1987); David Greenclay Crane, Note, Wellenkamp v. Bank of
America.: A Victory for the Consumer?, 31 HASTINGS LJ. 275, 286-87 (1979).
13. See Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 639, 526 P.2d 1169,
1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639 (1974) (holding a high quantum of restraint was involved with the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause upon sale of the property, thus
requiring a significant showing that enforcement was necessary). See also Crane,
supra note 12, at 279-80 (discussing Tucker).
14. CAL CIV. CODE §§ 1995.010-.270 (West Supp. 1992). See generally 4 B.E.
WrrUN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property §§ 650A, 650B (9th ed. Supp.

1992).
15. Carma, 2 Cal. 4th at 366, 826 P.2d at 722-23, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479-80. See
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B. Statement of the Case
This controversy involved a provision in a ten-year lease between two
commercial development companies: Marathon Development, Inc., the
landlord, and Carma Developers, Inc., the tenant.'6 Paragraph 15(a) of
the lease provided that the tenant must submit a written request and
receive written permission from the landlord before assigning or subleasing the property.' Paragraph 15(b) provided that upon receipt of the
tenant's written notice of intent to assign or sublease, the landlord could,
within thirty days, terminate the lease, recapture the property, and enter
into a new lease with any other party at a profit.' Upon such termination, the tenant would be relieved of all obligations under the lease and
would not be entitled to future profits."
Several years into the lease term, after having made improvements to
the property, Carina submitted a written request to sublease eighty percent of the premises at an increased rental rate.' Marathon sent Carma
a termination notice and unsuccessfully pursued a new lease with
Carma's intended sublessee.' Carma sued Marathon for breach of
paragraphs 15(a) and (b) of the lease, and for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.' The trial court granted the
tenant's summary judgment, finding that the landlord had acted unreasonably in withholding consent to sublease, in terminating the lease to
obtain profits, and in not allowing the tenant to recover the value of its
improvements to the property.' Marathon appealed, arguing that the

supm notes 6-9 and accompanying text for the general rules; see also infra notes 55,
60-63 and accompanying text for the statutory codifications. See generaly 6 HARRY D.
MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE §§ 18.61-18.62
(2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1992) (discussing the general rules before and after revision of
the Code).
16. Carma, 2 CaL 4th at 351, 826 P.2d at 712-13, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469-70.
-17. Id. at 351, 826 P.2d at 713, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470. Paragraph 15(a) also stated
that consent to assign or sublease would not be unreasonably withheld. Id.
18. Id. at 352, 826 P.2d at 713, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470. The provision stipulated
that this "other party" could be the intended assignee or sublessee.
19. Id.
20. Ld.at 352, 826 P.2d at 713, 6 CaL Rptr. 2d at 470.
21. Id.
22. Id. he petitioner also sued for interference with prospective economic advantage. Id. Such action was not at issue on appeal to the supreme court.
23. Id. at 352-53, 826 P.2d 713-14, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470-71.

court erred in applying a reasonableness standard.' Carna also appealed, contesting cost and fee awards. ' The court of appeal affirmed,
finding "reasonableness" was the proper standard, and remanded the
case to the trial court on the issue of costs.' The California Supreme
Court granted Carma's petition for review and affirmed the court of
appeal's holding that reasonableness was the proper standard, but reversed the holding that the provisions in the lease were unreasonable
and that these provisions violated the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing."
II. TREATMENT
A. Restraint on Alienation
1. The Law Prior to 1990
After declaring that the language in the lease was unambiguous, and
that the companies were at equal bargaining positions,' the court considered the question of whether paragraphs 15(a) and 15(b) constituted a
valid restraint on alienation under the law prior to the 1990 statutory
enactment.' The court analyzed this issue under two tests, the repugnancy test and the reasonableness test.'
First, the court applied Civil Code section 711, which provides that
"'fc]onditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest created, are void." 3 ' The court accepted the landlord's argument that because
a condition could not be considered repugnant to an interest of which
that interest is an integral part, repugnancy could be considered the
same as reasonableness.'
Second, the court applied the reasonableness test set forth in
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America.' Wellenkamp stated that a direct relationship exists between the extent of the restraint and the amount of

24. Id. at 353, 826 P.2d at 714, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id,at 376, 826 P.2d at 730, 6 CaL Rptr. 2d at 487.
28. Id. at 353-54, 826 P.2d at 714, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471.
29. Id. at 354, 826 P.2d at 714-15, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471-72.
30. Id. at 356, 826 P.2d at 716, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473.
31. Cavma, 2 Cal. 4th at 355, 826 P.2d at 715, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472; CAL. Crv.
CODE § 711 (West 1982). See supra note 8.
32. Carma, 2 Cal. 4th at 356, 826 P. 2d at 716, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473. "[T]he
'repugnancy' argument is nothing more than an inaccurate expression that public
policy is opposed to such a restraint." Id. (quoting Merrill 1.Schnebly, Restraints
Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests: I, 44 YALE LJ. 961, 981 (1934)).
33. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 948-49, 582 P.2d 970, 973, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 382 (1978). See
supra notes 7, 12 and accompanying text.
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justification required for the restraint such that as the former increases
so must the latter increase proportionally.' The court reasoned that
because a leasehold interest, unlike a fee estate, is limited in duration
and scope by its very definition, restraints on alienation of leasehold
estates are less likely to be repugnant, and therefore less likely to be
unreasonable.' Moreover, the court reasoned, since disabling restraints' are generally upheld in leases despite their binding effect on
the lessee,' fqrfeiture restraints,' such as the one in the present case,
are likely to be upheld as well.'
Turning to the facts of the case at hand, the court frst determined that
the court of appeal erred in its conclusion that the lease provisions constituted total restraint on alienation.' The court reasoned that because
the instrument was a lease, the restraint was "limited both by the duration and scope of the leasehold interest."4 The court further reasoned
that a forfeiture restraint does not bind the lessee into an unfavorable
lease.' Finally, the court reasoned that because the landlord is only
likely to exercise the right to terminate when he or she will benefit, this

34. Wdlenkamp, 21 Cal. 3d at 94849, 582 P.2d at 973, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
35. Carma, 2 Cal. 4th at 358, 826 P.2d at 717, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474. The court
observed that "[t]he primary feature of th[e] emerging fee estate was the power of
alienation." The court also noted, however, that "since very early times, the common
law recognized the validity of restrictions on leasehold interests." Id. at 358-59, 826
P.2d at 717-18, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474-75 (citing GRAY, RESTRAINTs ON THE ALIENATION
OF PROPERTY § 101 (2d ed. 1985)).
36. Disabling restraints are restrictions which void alienations. IdL at 359, 826 P.2d
at 718, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475. Such a restraint binds the lessee to the lease. Id. See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY Donative Transfers § 3.1 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY Landlord and Tenant § 15.2 cmt. c (1976 and
Supp. 1992).
37. Carma, 2 Cal. 4th at 359, 926 P.2d at 718, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475.
38. A forfeiture restraint allows a lessee to terminate his obligation by finding a
suitable transference. Such a restraint merely accelerates exercise of the lessor's
reversionary interest, thus letting the lessee out, and unlike a disabling restraint, does
not bind the lessee. Id at 359, 826 P.2d at 718, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475. For discusslons of forfeiture clauses see generally

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

PROPERTY Donative

Tranafers §§ 3.2, 4.2 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY Landlord and
Tenant § 15.2 cmL b (1977); 4 B.E. WrnUN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Prperty §§ 405-408 (9th ed. 1987).
39. Carma, 2 Cal. 4th at 359-60, 826 P.2d at 718, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 475. See also
Coskran, supra note 6, at 453 (discussing forfeiture restrictions).
40. Carma, 2 Cal. 4th at 361, 826 P.2d at 719, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
41. Id.
42. Id.

will only occur in a rising market.'
The court next concluded that the court of appeal erred in finding
inadequate justification for the restraint provision." The court rejected
Carma's argument that "termination for the purpose of appropriating increased rental value [was] per se unreasonable."* The court distinguished Carma's cases by pointing out that the restrictions on assignment and sublease in those cases were for the purpose of avoiding an
unwanted tenant,' whereas the purpose of the restriction in the present
case was to appropriate appreciated rental value.""
The court explained that disputes arise when one party, at the expense
of the other, attempts to gain more from a bargain than it reasonably
should expect.' The court found that in the case at hand, Carma was
trying to obtain a better deal than the one for which it bargained." According to the court, paragraphs 15(a) and (b) were included in the lease
with the intent of allowing Marathon, as landlord, to terminate the lease
and claim the increased rental value.' The court reasoned that
Marathon's actions were consistent with these lease provisions, and thus
Carna, as tenant, was left to suffer the consequences of its bargain."
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the recent trend in balancing the
competing public policies of freedom of alienation and freedom of contract favors the freedom of contract.' The court concluded that in this
case, the policy of freedom of contract outweighed the "marginal restraint on alienation" and, thus, the restriction here was both reasonable
and lawful63

43. Id.
44. 1d&
45. 1d. at 361, 826 P.2d at 720, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477.
46. Id. at 361-62, 826 P.2d at 720, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477. See Kendall v. Ernest
Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P. 2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1985). Such was
clearly not the purpose of the restriction in the case at hand, as evidenced by the
fact that the respondent here sought to enter into a lease with the petitioner's intended sublessee.
47. Carma, 2 Cal. 4th at 362, 826 P.2d at 720, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The court's finding was largely based on the lease provisions, which allowed the lessor to enter into a new lease with the intended sublessee. Id

51. Ild.
52. Id. at 363, 826 P.2d at 720-21, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78. Civil Code- section
1995.270, enacted in 1990, provides that "[lilt is the public policy of the state and
fundamental to the commerce... of the state to enable and facilitate freedom of
contract by the parties to commercial real property leases." CAL CIV. CODE §
1995.270(a)(1) (Supp. 1992).
53. Carma, 2 Cal. 4th at 363, 826 P.2d at 721, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478.
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2.

Analysis Under Current Law

The court next considered whether paragraphs 15(a) and (b) of the
lease were unreasonable restraints on alienability based on recent statutory enactment" The court agreed with Carma that sections 1995.260
and 1995.270, which provide a reasonableness standard for withholding
consent for transfer as to leases entered into after September 23 1983,'
are inapplicable to the present case.M The court reasoned that since
paragraph 15(a) contained an express reasonableness standard, application of these statutes was unnecessary."' Furthermore, the court reasoned that since paragraph 15(b) was a termination provision, not a
consent provision, these code sections were inapplicable to that provision as well. '
The court next considered Marathon's argument that other sections of
the statutory enactment applied:' section 1995.210(a), which authorizes
transfer restrictions on a tenant's interest;' section 1995.230, which allows restrictions that prohibit transfers entirely; ' section 1995.240,
which permits restrictions that give the landlord "some or all of any
consideration the tenant receives from a transferee in excess of the rent
under the lease";' and section 1995.250, which provides that "[a] restriction... may require the landlord's consent... subject to any express
standard ... including... [that] the landlord's consent may not be unreasonably withheld."' Furthermore, Marathon argued, the Code defines

54. Id. at 366, 826 P.2d at 722, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479.
55. Civil Code Section 1995.260 provides in relevant part, "If a restriction on transfer... in a lease requires the landlord's consent... but provides no standard for
giving or withholding consent, the restriction ... shall be construed to include an implied standard that... consent may not be unreasonably withheld." CAL. CiV. CODE §
1995.260 (West Supp. 1992). Section 1995.270 provides in relevant part, "Section
1995.260 applies to a restriction on transfer executed on or after September 23,
1983." CAL CIv. CODE § 1995.270(b) (West Supp. 1992).

Carma, 2 Cal. 4th at 367, 826 P.2d at 723, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 480.
Id.
Carma, 2 Cal. 4th at 367, 826 P.2d at 723, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 481. See also
notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
Carma, 2 Cal. 4th at 367-68, 826 P.2d at 723-24, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 480-81. See
CAL CIv. CODE §§ 1995.010-.250 (West Supp. 1992) (authorizing liberal use of transfer
restrictions).

56.
57.
58.
supra
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

CAL.
CAL.
CAL.
CAL

CIV.
CIv.
Civ.
CIv.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

§
§
§
§

1995.210(a) (West Supp. 1992).
1995.230 (West Supp. 1992).
1995.240 (West Supp. 1992).
1995.250 (West Supp. 1992).

"'restriction on transfer' as 'a provision... that restricts the right of
transfer of the tenant's interest,'" and "'[t]ransfer' [as] 'an assignment,
sublease... of all or part of a tenant's interest. ..." However, the
court felt that the Code left construction of the words "restrict" and
"restraint" somewhat open.' The court explained that a broad construction of the term "restraint" would include any restraint on alienation
regardless of its purpose, whereas a narrow construction would include
only "direct" restraints, whose primary purpose is to restrain alienation.'
The court examined the legislative intent to determine whether the
legislative wanted to allow the type of restrictions at issue here.' Looking to the Law Revision Commission Report, the court concluded that
the statute was applicable because the legislature intended to protect
restrictions giving the landlord the right to recover possession and profits.18
In applying the statute to the present case, the court determined that
the restrictions were reasonable because both the statute and paragraph
15(b) authorized the landlord's conduct of terminating the lease and
entering into a new lease. '
B. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing
The court next addressed the issue of whether the respondent's enforcement of the lease provisions constituted a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing." The court observed that "'ev-

64. Carmm, 2 Cal. 4th at 368, 826 P.2d at 724, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 481 (quoting CAL
CIV. CODE § 1995.020 (West Supp. 1992)).
65. Id, at 369, 826 P.2d at 725, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482.
6. I&
67. Id at 369, 826 P.2d at 725, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482.
68. 1& at 370-71, 826 P.2d at 725-26, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482-83. According to the
Law Revision Commission:
The parties should be able to agree on standards ... for transfer, and those
standards . . . should be enforceable ... [and] might include ... that the
landlord is entitled to recapture any consideration realized by the tenant as a
result of a transfer... [provided that] the limitation satisfies the general
restrictions on freedom of contract ....
Id. at 370, 826 P.2d at 725, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482 (quoting Assignment and Sublease,
20 CAL. L REviSioN COMM'N REP. 251, 258-59 (1990)). See Coskran supra note 6, at
417-18 (discussing the different categories of restrictions). See also CAL CIV. CODE §
1995.270(a)(1) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that "[ilt
is the *public policy of the state
and fundamental to the commerce and economic development of the state to enable
and facilitate freedom of contract by the parties to commercial real property leases").
69. Carma, 2 Cal. 4th at 371, 826 P.2d at 726, 6 CaL Rptr. 2d at 483.
70. I&
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ery contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement, '" " but that no single definition
of this duty existed.' According to the general principles of this covenant, its breach does not require breach of a specific contract provision;' a party's conduct need not be dishonest;'4 and the covenant protects the express terms of the contract, not some general overriding
public policy.'
The court rejected Carma's argument that the covenant prohibited
enforcement of paragraph 15(b).' In surveying relevant California cases,
the court observed a general rule that the implied covenant should not
prohibit enforcement of express provisions of a contract, and in fact,
implied terms should never be construed to alter express, bargained-for
provisions." The court reasoned that in the present case, construing the
implied covenant of good faith to prohibit paragraph 15(b) would be
contrary to the general rule.'3 Since Marathon's conduct, terminating the
lease and re-leasing the property, was permitted by the express provisions of the lease, such conduct could be reasonably expected by both

71. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 683, 765 P.2d 373, 389, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 227 (1988) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979)).
For explanations of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, see 1 B.E.
WmIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 926 (9th ed. 1987); Coskran, supra
note 6, at 459-62.
72. Carma, 2 Cal. 4th at 372, 826 P.2d at 727, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 484.
73. Id. at 373, 826 P.2d at 727, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 484 (citing Conoco, Inc. v.
Inman Oil Co., Inc., 774 F.2d 895, 908 (8th Cir. 1985)).
74. Id. at 373, 826 P.2d at 727, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 484 (citing Robert S. Summers,
"Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 54 VA. L REv. 195, 204-06 (1968)).
75. "The implied covenant of good faith is read into contracts 'in order to protect
the express covenants or promises of the contract, not to protect some general
public policy interest not directly tied to the contract's purpose.'" Id. (quoting Foley
v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 690, 765 P.2d 373, 394, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211,
232 (1988)).
76. Id. at 373-74, 826 P.2d at 728, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 485.
77. "'the'general rule [regarding the covenant of good faith] is plainly subject to
the exception that the parties may, by express provisions of the contract, grant the
right to engage in the very acts and conduct which would otherwise have been
forbidden by an implied covenant.

. . . " VrR Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

303 F. Supp. 773, 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (quoting 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 564 (1980)).
For holdings consistent with the general rule, see Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. Gourmet
Farms, 108 Cal. App. 3d 181, 166 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1980); Brandt v. Lockheed Missles &
Space Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1124, 201 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1984); Gerdlund v. Elec. Dispensers Int'l, 190 Cal. App. 3d 263, 235 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1987).
78. Carma, 2 Cal. 4th at 374, 826 P.2d at 728, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 485.

parties and, thus, did not violate the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
III.

IMPACT

In Carma, the California Supreme Court upheld provisions in a commercial lease allowing the landlord to terminate the lease and recapture
the premises upon the tenant's attempt to sublease or assign without the
landlord's consent.~' The events leading up to the dispute in Carma occurred in the early 1980s, during a positive economic swing. Based on
the current recession, the real estate community has largely disregarded
the case." However, the decision has caused the legal community to
take notice.' Commercial lessees in California will enter into leases only after carefully scrutinizing each term and its consequences. Lessors, on
the other hand, will be more confident in the validity of the restrictions
in their leases.
The Carma decision is part of a trend in California toward permitting
forfeiture clauses in leases.' However, some scholars believe that
Carma is fact specific, and that forfeiture restrictions for the purpose of
appropriating increased rents may not always be upheld.'
NANCY GAYLE DRAGUTSKY

IX. TAX LAW
A.

California'suse of a three-factorformula to apportion the
income of a foreign-parentmulti-nationalenterprisefor state
tax purposes does not violate the Foreign Commerce Clause
of the FederalConstitution: Barclays v. Franchise Tax
Board.

In Barclays v. Franchise Tax Board,' the California Supreme Court
was faced with the issue of whether California could apportion state
taxes based upon a three-factor formula consistent with the Foreign

79. Id. at 376, 826 P.2d at 729, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 486.
80.. Id. at 376, 826 P.2d at 730, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 487.
81. Morris Newman, Real Estate; Los Angeles Inundated by Sublet Space, N.Y.
Tims, June 24, 1992, at D19.

82. Id.
83. Cheryl B. Welborn, Subleasing and Assignment Under Commercial Leases, in
C761 AU-ABA 423 (Morrison & Foerster eds., 1992).

84. Id.
1. 2 Cal. 4th 708, 829 P.2d 279, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 31 (1992). Justice Arabian deliv-

ered the unanimous opinion of the court with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk,
Panelli, Kennard, Baxter, and George concurring.
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Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.! The court held that
this type of apportionment was valid and that the inherent limitations of
the Foreign Commerce Clause j did
not apply, given Congress' acquies3
cence in formula apportionment.
The court first addressed the methodology of state taxation formulas.'
States are permitted to tax corporations based upon their intrastate activities." lhe contested issue involves how to properly identify the portion of a company's income which is attributable to those activities.' The
court examined the two foremost accounting methods: the "arm's
length/separate accounting" (AL/SA) method and the "unitary business/formula apportionment" method.7 The AL/SA method calculates
income by treating intercorporate transfers as arms length transactions.!
Businesses tend to prefer this method of accounting.' The "unitary business/formula apportionment" method calculates the combined income of
the entire business and then determines the percentage attributable to
the state by an averaged ratio of property, payroll, and sales." California
and a miority of states use formula apportionment." The court ana2. Id. at 712, 829 P.2d at 280, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32. In Barclays, the foreignowned Barclays Bank International and the Barclays Bank of California were challenging tax assessments by the Franchise Tax Board of California in 1977. Id The
superior court held that formula apportionment was unconstitutional as applied to
foreign owned corporations. Id. at 713, 829 P.2d at 280, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 32. The court
of appeal affirmed the trial court's decision. Id The California Supreme Court granted
review. Id. at 714, 829 P.2d at 281, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33.
3. Id. at 738-39, 829 P.2d at 298, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 50.
4. Id. at 714-15, 829 P.2d at 281-82, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33-34.
5. Id. The court recognized the proposition that "a State may not permissibly tax
value earned outside its borders." Id. (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax
Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (defining proper "unitary business" principle for
formula apportionment)).
8. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980) (discussing problems with characterizing income of a business as having a single source);
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (approving Iowa's single factor formula apportionment); Butier Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942) (approving
California's three factor formula apportionment plan for corporations).
7. Barclays, 2 Cal. 4th at 715, 829 P.2d at 282, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 34.
8. Id. Under the ALISA method, the income attributable to a state would depend
upon the amount of the transactions made by the subsidiaries located in the state.
Id
9. Id.
10. Id. Under this method, the state calculates the combined income of all the
corporation's subsidiaries. Then, the state calculates the ratio of property, payroll, and
sales that was located in the state compared the total unitary business. That ratio is
the taxable income for state tax purposes. Id,
11. Id. at 716, 829 P.2d at 282, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 34. California Revenue and

lyzed the two methods and found neither to be technically superior'
because each method only estimates the true income of a corporation
which is attributable to a state.'"
The United States Supreme Court has never imposed uniform rules for
the division of income for state tax purposes.' The Court has decided
that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Due Process Clause mandates
the use of a particular method" and, thus, that any method is valid as
long as it is not unreasonable or arbitrary. 6
The Supreme Court had previously ruled that formula apportionment
was constitutional when applied to a domestic company with foreign
holdings." The California Supreme Court noted that this decision was
likely dispositive of the present case, but nevertheless addressed
Barclay's argument as to whether the Foreign Commerce Clause may apply differently to foreign owned corporations. 8

Taxation Code section 25101 (West 1992) states in pertinent part as follows:
When the income of a taxpayer subject to the tax imposed under this part is
derived from or attributable to sources both within and without the state the
tax shall be measured by the net income derived from or attributable to
sources within this state in accordance with the provision of Article 2 (commencing with section 25120).
Id, (citing CAL REV. & TAX CODE § 25120 (West 1992)). Section 25120 spells out the
particulars of the three factor formula apportionment used by California. CAL. REV. &
TAx CODE § 25120 (West 1992). See also California Taxes, Franchise and Corporation
Income Taxes, § 4.75 (May 1992) (explaining unitary business doctrine and factor formula apportionment applied to corporations).
12. Barclays, 2 Cal. 4th at 721, 829 P.2d at 286, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38.
13. Id. at 716, 289 P.2d at 283, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 35. For critiques of both methods, see James FX. Rudy, The California Unitary Tax Concept as. Applied to the
Worldwide Actitnties of Foreign Corporations:A Modern Commerce Clause Analysis,
15 U.S.F. L. REv. 371 (1980-81); Walter Helierstein, State Income Taxaion Qf
Multijurisdictional Corporations: Reflections on Mobil, Exxon and H.R. 5076, 79
MICH. L REV. 113 (1978). In short, the criticism of AL/SA accounting is that there is
administrative complexity caused by the need to analyze every transaction, and the
fiction that these transfers resemble true competitive transactions. The criticism of
formula apportionment usually centers on the fact that it is misleading to characterize
the income of a business as having a single identifiable source.
14. Barclays, 2 Cal. 4th at 718, 829 P.2d at 284, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 36. See, e.g.,
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980).
15. Barclays, 2 Cal. 4th at 720, 829 P.2d at 285, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 37. See e.g.,
Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 438; Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
16. Barclays, 2 Cal. 4th at 718, 829 P.2d at 284, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 36. See also
Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931) (tax may not be "out of
all appropriate proportion to the business transacted by the [taxpayer] in that State").
17. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 197 (1983).
18. Barclays, 2 Cal. 4th at 720-21, 829 P.2d at 286, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38. Barclays
was claiming that the explicit rejection of challenges to formula apportionment in
Containerapplied only to domestic corporations with foreign holdings and not to foreign-based corporations. The Barclays court thought this claim was semantic. Id. at
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The court initially examined this dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
issue."9 The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution imposes
inherent limitations on the ability of the states to tax commerce.20 The
United States Supreme Court decided that one must consider the following when determining whether state taxes violate these limitations: 1)
whether the tax applies to an activity with a substantial nexus to the
state; 2) whether the tax is fairly apportioned; 3) whether the tax discriminates against interstate commerce; and 4) whether the tax is fairly
related to the services provided by the state.2' The Court also ruled that
two additional considerations are required when examining a tax on
foreign commerce.' First, the tax must not create a substantial risk of
multiple international taxation and, second, it must not prevent the Federal Government from speaking with "one voice" on foreign commercial
relations.' Barclays argued that California's use of formula apportionment breached this latter consideration.'
Although the court addressed this dormant Commerce Clause argument, it ultimately ruled that such an analysis was not applicable in the
instant case.' It based this holding on the Supreme Court's decision in
Wardair Canada, Inc. v. ForidaDepartment of Revenue.' In Wardair,
the Court decided that inherent Commerce Clause limitations were only
relevant when Congress had not spoken on the issue." Specifically, the
Court held that when Congress has adopted certain measures and de-

722, 829 P.2d at 286, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38.
19. Id. at 722, 829 P.2d at 286-87, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38-39.
20. Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). The U.S. Constitution
states that Congress shall have the power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. The Court has held that
this clause has self-executing powers since itsdecision in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.

1 (1824).
21. Complete Auto Trnsit Inc., 430 U.S. at 279.
22. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1978).

23. Id.
24. Barclays v. Franchise Tax Bd., 2 Cal. 4th 708, 724, 829 P.2d 279, 288, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 31, 40 (1992). The court noted that this factor was "essentially a species of
preemption. Id. (quoting Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194
(1983)). In other words, the crucial consideration was whether federal law should
preempt the inconsistent state law.
25. Id. at 727, 829 P.2d at 290, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42.

26. 477 U.S. 1 (1986).
27. Id. at 8. In Wardair, a Canadian airline was challenging the constitutionality of
a Florida state sales tax on aviation fuel. They claimed that the tax violated the inherent limitations of the Foreign Commerce Clause. Id,at 4.

clined others in a certain field, the inherent limitations of the Commerce
Clause are not invoked.' In other words, the negative implications of
not acting indicate that Congress would acquiesce rather than remain
silent.3
The Barclays court found that Congress had explicitly refused to prevent states from using formula apportionment "in cases of this kind."3
The court cited numerous bilateral tax treaties between the United States
and other nations." In every such treaty, formula apportionment by
states was not barred, although the issue had often been raised in preliminary discussions.' Therefore, the court held that dormant Commerce Clause analysis was inappropriate in this case.' Because this was
the only remaining challenge to formula apportionment at issue before
the court, the supreme court remanded the case to the court of appeal.'
The court's decision in Barclays seems to foreclose any further challenges to formula apportionment within state taxation.' More importantly, the court's interpretation and approval of Wardairmay practically

28. Id. Wardair had pointed to the Chicago Convention on International Civil
Aviation, approved by the United States, to demonstrate that there was a commitment
to eliminate the type of tax that Florida had imposed. Id. at 9. The Court claimed
that this showed only that there was an aspiration to dispense with these taxes. Id.
at 9-10. The Court said that it stood in sharp contrast to the actual law which allowed for such a tax. Id at 10. Thus, it could be assumed that Congress had considered the desired policy, but had rejected it by failing to implement it. Id. at 8-10.
29. Id. at 8-10.
30. Barclays v. Franchise Tax Bd., 2 Cal. 4th 708, 733, 829 P.2d 279, 294, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 31, 46 (1992).
31. Id. The court cited one particular example where the executive branch had
negotiated an income tax treaty with the United Kingdom where states would be
prohibited from using formula apportionment. The Senate rejected this provision,
explicitly recognizing its negative implications. Id.
32. Id. The court noted the executive branch's attempt to change the policy on
formula apportionment following the Senate rejection of the Great Britain treaty
provision and the Supreme Court's decision in Container. However, the court ruled
that this demonstrated only aspiration (as in Wardair), and not policy. Id. at 734, 829
P.2d at 295, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 47.
33. Id. at 734, 829 P.2d at 295, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 47. The court saw many parallels between the governmental silence on formula apportionment and the silence
present in Wardair. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (discussing
Wardair).
34. Barclays, 2 Cal. 4th at 742-43, 829 P.2d at 300, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 52. The trial
court had found that the compliance burden on Barclays violated the Due Process
Clause independent of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis. The court of appeals
had only addressed the latter issue. Therefore, the California Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeal for a decision in light of its opinion. Id.
36. There appear to be no further avenues of facial challenge to formula apportionment in light of Container and Barclays. However, there remains the possibility
that such a tax plan could prove to be burdensome in practice to some foreign
corporations. See supra note 34.
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dispense with dormant Commerce Clause analysis altogether. The challenging party must demonstrate that Congress has failed to consider an
issue in order to show the type of silence which triggers the dormant
Commerce Clause protections.'
DAVID C. KNOBLOCK
B.

A privately held leasehold interest in real property, owned by
a state university and not used exclusively for public schools,
is not exempt from property taxation under the 'public
schools" exemption in the CaliforniaConstitution:Connolly
v. County of Orange.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Connolly v. County of Orange,' the California Supreme Court considered whether a county could assess a property tax on a leasehold
interest in real property that is owned by a state university and improved
with homes owned and occupied by university employees.! The court
concluded that the exemption for property used exclusively for a public
schoo did not extend to the privately owned leasehold interests of state
university employees."

36. This places new policy proponents in a difficult position. Proponents of new
state policies may not want to bring their claim before Congress since the failure of
Congress to act, for any reason, could subsequently be interpreted as rejection or a
lack of silence on the issue. On the other hand, if Congress never has an opportunity
to consider, then that silence might trigger the inherent limitations of the Commerce
Clause. Ironically, the result would be that the only state laws that would be struck
down are those Congress never addressed.
1. 1 Cal. 4th 1105, 824 P.2d 663, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 857 (1992). Justice Baxter, who
wrote the majority opinion, was joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk,
Paneli, Arabian, and George. Justice Kennard concurred in the judgment only.
2. Id. at 1115.16, 824 P.2d at 669, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863.
3. The following are exempt from property taxation:

(a) Property owned by the State.
(b) Property owned by a local government ....
(c)Bonds issued by the State or a local government in the State.
(d) Property used for libraries and museums that are free and open to the
public and property used exclusively for public schools, community colleges,
state colleges, and state universities.
CAL CoNsr. art XIII, § 3(d). See generaUy 51 CAL. JUR. 3D Property Taxes § 28 (1981
& Supp. 1992).
4. ConnoUy, I Cal. 4th at 1130, 824 P.2d at 679, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 873.

The plaintiffs brought this action against the County of Orange for
refusing to exempt some 260 homeowners from a property tax on their
leasehold interests.' The trial court granted the plaintiff Connolly a writ
exempting his leasehold interest from taxation, and the defendant then
stipulated to a similar order for approximately 200 other similarly situated persons." The defendant appealed from this judgment. The court of
appeal found that the writ was improper because mandate could not
issue against the County," and that the proper defendant would have
been the Assessor of the County of Orange.! However, the court of appeal also ruled on the merits, finding that the California Constitution
entitled the plaintiffs to exemption.! Both parties appealed this decision.
The supreme court agreed that the case involved grievous procedural
violations requiring reversal."0 The court of appeal had purportedly made
a ruling upon the merits that would be binding authority, and therefore
the supreme court felt that the constitutional issue needed clarification."
II.

TREATMENT

California has a long history of taxing possessory interests in property
that would otherwise be exempt."2 Property is normally exempt because

5. The plaintiffs were the Board of Regents of the University of California, the
Irvine Campus Housing Authority, and Professor Connolly. Id. at 1110, 824 P.2d at
665-66, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859-60.
6. These persons first had to submit claims for exemption and identify themselves
as university employees. Id. at 1111, 824 P.2d at 666, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860.
7. This finding was based on the preemptive effect of California Revenue and
Taxation Code section 4807, which states, "No injunction or writ of mandate or other
legal or equitable process shall issue ...
to prevent or enjoin the collection of
property taxes sought to be collected." Id. at 1113, 824 P.2d at 667-68, 4 Cal. Rptr. at
861-62.
& California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085 requires that mandates or
Inunctions be directed specifically to the office that has the legal duty to act. CAL
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1085 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
9. Although the defendant had not briefed the merits of the exemption question,
the court of appeal felt justified in examining the merits because granting an exemption is normally discretionary. Connolly, I Cal. 4th at 1113 n.7, 824 P.2d at 667 n.7, 4
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861 n.7.
10. The supreme court found that California Revenue and Tax Code section 4807
barred the action and that the proper defendant was the county assessor. Id. at 1114,
824 P.2d at 668, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862. To cure these problems, the court found that
the defendant had preserved the bar under section 4807 and could use it to prevent
the trial court from issuing a writ in the future, and that the Orange County Assessor
could intervene as a defendant Id. at 1115-16, 824 P.2d at 669, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
863.
11. Id. at 1115, 824 P.2d at 669, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863.
12. See Scott David McKinlay, Comment, Recognizing the Limits of California's
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the fee simple title belongs to the government or because the state constitution so provides.' As in the present case, taxation becomes an issue when an exempt body has granted an interest in the property to a
private entity that would be required to pay taxes if it possessed title."
The clearest case is a grant of an exclusive possessory interest. However,
some courts have extended this to include even the grant of a license or

easement."
The practice of taxing the private possessory interests within an exempt property has been justified under the principle that an extension of
the exemption would not serve the original purpose of the grant of exemption.'" Further, when a government entity leases its land "[i]t creates
valuable privately-held possessory interests, and there is no reason why
the owners of such interests should not pay taxes on them just as lessees of private property do through increased rents."" Thus,. all
non-exempt residents must share the tax burden."'
The court examined the constitutional history of the state owned and
public school property tax exemption. Even before the constitution contained an express statement, courts implied an exemption for government owned lands, including public schools on state owned property."

Possessory Interest Tax, 19 U.S.F. L REv. 159 (1985) (discussing the history of taxing
possessory interests in tax exempt property in California); 9 B. E. WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALFORNIA LAW, Taxation §§ .137-138 (1989) (discussing when a leasehold may be

taxed).
13. For a list of exempted properties see CAL. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 3-4.
14. See generally 9 B.E. WrmUN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Taxation §§ 129-130
(discussing when it is appropriate to tax a possessory interest).
15. See, e.g., Wells Nat'l Servs. v. County of Santa Clara, 54 Cal. App. 3d 579, 126
Cal. Rptr. 715 (1976) (finding that the right to lease televisions to county hospital
patients was a taxable interest); Stadium Concessions, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60
Cal. App. 3d 215, 131 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1976) (finding that concession rights at cityowned stadiums were a valuable private benefit and taxable).
16. Connoi/y, 1 Cal. 4th at 1120, 824 P.2d at 672, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866 (citing
State v. Moore, 12 Cal. 56 (1859) (finding that an individual's interest in a mining
claim granted by the federal government is taxable)).
17. Id. at 1118, 824 P.2d at 671, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857 (citing Texas Co. v. County
of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. 2d 55 (1959)).
18. It was also argued that to grant a transfer of the exemption would give the
government an unfair advantage over private landlords who had to pay property tax.
Ild.
19. The earliest case on the subject was People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 432 (1868).
In McCreery, the court found that the legislature did not have the power to exempt
non-profit organizations from taxation, but that there was an implied exemption for
government owned property. Id. at 452.

This exemption was explicitly extended to privately owned property
"used exclusively" for public schools.' However, the additional exemption did not have an effect on the tax status of privately owned possessory interests in property owned by schools or universities.2
In resolving whether residential use of university property was exclusive use for public schools, the court examined two cases upon which
the court of appeal had relied.' The first was English v. County of
Alameda,' which dealt with exemptions under sections 3(e) and 4(b) of
article 13 of the California Constitution.' In English, citizen taxpayers
brought an action to force the county to tax the possessory interest in
properties belonging to charitable institutions but occupied by employees
and beneficiaries of the institutions.' The English court construed the
law to limit exemption to cases where the use is reasonably necessary to
accomplish the purposes of the institution that owns the property.' For
example, one legitimate purpose of a charity is to provide housing to
those who would otherwise become a burden upon the state.' Thus, the
use of the properties as residences was within the constitutional exemption and the possessory interest could not be taxed.'
The second case the supreme court examined was Mann v. County of
Alameda,' which involved an exemption under section 3(d) of article
13.' In Mann, student families living in rental units owned by the University of California at Berkley brought an action seeking a refund of
taxes assessed on their possessory interests and paid under protest."'
The court of appeal applied the test used in English and found that the
residency interests were reasonably necessary to accomplish the
university's purposes.'

20. After studying the legislative history of article XIII, section 3(d), the court
determined that this was the purpose of the language, "used exclusively for."
Connolly, 1 Cal. 4th at 1121-23, 824 P.2d at 673-75, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867-69.
21. Id. at 1123-24, 824 P.2d at 675, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869 (citing Ross v. City of
Long Beach, 24 Cal. 2d 258, 148 P.2d 649 (1944)).
22. Id. at 1125-27, 824 P.2d at 663-77, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 870-71.
23. 70 Cal. App. 3d 226, 138 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1977).
24. Sections 3(e) and 4(b) of article XIII of the California Constitution contain the
language "used exclusively for" and are thus similar to the section 3(d) exemption at
issue in this case. See supra note 3.
25. This group included hospital and college administrators, professors, doctors,
nurses, and aged persons. English, 70 Cal. App. 3d at 231, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
26. Id. at 237, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
27. Id. at 239, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 642.

28. Id. at 244, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
29. 85 Cal. App. 3d 505, 149 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1978).
30. This was the constitutional exemption under consideration in ConnoUy. See
supra note 3 and accompanying text.
31. Mann, 85 Cal. App. 3d at 506-07, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53.
32. Id. at 509, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 554. The County of Alameda also asserted that

[Vol. 20: 795, 1993]

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

The supreme court accepted the reasonably necessary standard of
English and Mann, but distinguished between exemptions under sections
3(d) and 3(e).' In a claim arising under section 3(e), the phrase "used
exclusively for educational purposes" applies to any "nonprofit institution
of higher education. "' Whereas, in a claim arising under section 3(d),
the issue is whether the property interest of the private entity is reasonably necessary for the exclusive purpose of a public school.'
In Connolly, the possession of title by the university seemed incidental
to the private leasehold. The faculty members had ninety-nine-year leases
on the land and built their own homes on the soil.' They could assign
their interest in the subleased property as security to a lender.' However, there were limitations on the resale price and the university had the
right to repurchase the property if the owner's employment was terminated.38

The supreme court rejected the argument that providing low cost
housing for employees was an "exclusive use of property for university
purposes" within the meaning of section 3(d).' The court pointed out
that this would produce the untenable result that even a faculty
member's interest in a piece of private property would have to be exempt because private or public ownership is not an issue under section
3(d)* This made it fairly easy for the court to conclude that "[t]he
leasehold interests of plaintiffs, which are privately owned interests used
for the private owner's residences, are not property used exclusively for

section 3(d) applied only to housing that was not state-owned and that any different
construction of that statute would be surplusage because section 3(a) already exempted all state-owned property from taxation. Thus, the Mann court found that the
county's construction of the statute would be anomalous, depending upon whether
the state or the private entity leasing to the state held title. Id. at 509-10, 149 CaL
Rptr. at 564.
33. Connoly, 1 Cal. 4th at 1127, 824 P.2d at 677, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871.
34. CAL CONST. art. 13, § 3.
35. ConnoUy, 1 Cal. 4th at 1127, 824 P.2d at 677-78, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871-72.
36. Technically, the Board of Regents of the University of California leased the
land to the Irvine Campus Housing Authority, which in turn leased it to university
employees. Id. at 1116, 824 P.2d at 670, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864.
37. Id. at 1116-17, 824 P.2d at 670, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864.
38. Id. The employees could continue to possess the property during retirement as
well. Id.
39. "We do not agree, however, that all residential use of school-owned property
by faculty and staff can be characterized as a use that is exclusively for school purposes." Id. at 1127, 824 P.2d at 677, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871.
40. Id. at 1129, 824 P.2d at 679, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 873.

university purposes within the meaning of section 3(d)."4
Ill.

CONCLUSION

The impact of this case upon more than 400 University of California
Irvine employees is explicit." they can add the ad valorem tax to their
list of expenses. The university argued that being able to provide taxfree, affordable housing was part of their competitive advantage in gaining valuable employees.' If this is true, the university will have to either
increase salaries or lower monthly lease rates in order to maintain the
competitive edge. This might be difficult in the face of the tightest budget constraints in the history of the California university system.
Looking at the big picture, ConnoUy appears to be another case in the
trend allowing cities and counties to collect as much tax revenue as
possible." The California courts have given great deference to the state
to tax who and how it sees fit. This has recently caused controversy as
courts have allowed taxing almost any license or right conferred by an
exempt entity upon a private, taxable one.' Thus,. if tax relief is to
come, it will most likely be from the legislature.'
DAN O'DAY

X. ToRT LAW
A.

Damagesfor negligently inflicted emotional distress may be
recovered in the absence of physical injury and based upon
"direct"liability, rather than "bystander"liability, when a
duty arisingfrom a preexisting relationship is negligently
breached: Burgess v. Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Burgess v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court consid-

41. Id. at 1130, 824 P.2d at 679, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 873.

42. By the time the case reached the supreme court there were over 400 homes in
the project. Id. at 1116, 824 P.2d at 670, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864.
43. Id. at 1117, 824 P.2d at 670, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864.
44. For a discussion of this trend, see generally McKinlay, supra note 12.
45. See supra note 15; see also McKinlay, supra note 12 (criticizing recent trends
to expand taxable interests).

48. In 1939, the legislatures responded to a similar situation by enacting section
107 of the California Revenue and Tax Code, defining a possessory interest in government property. See CAL REv. & TAX CODE § 107 (West 1992).
1. 2 Cal. 4th 1064, 831 P.2d 1197, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615 (1992). Justice Panelli
wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Kennard,
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ered whether a mother could recover damages for negligently inflicted
emotional distress arising from the injury to her child during delivery.'
The court concluded that the mother was entitled to recover for emotional distress, but not for damages arising out of "loss of affection, society, companionship or similar harm" incurred due to the child's death.'
The plaintiff entered labor and was admitted to the hospital under the
care of her obstetrician, the defendant." While in labor, the defendant
artificially ruptured the plaintiff's membranes, allegedly causing a prolapsed umbilical cord. The defendant told the plaintiff that the situation
was an emergency and that she had to breathe deeply to get oxygen to
the baby. The obstetrician performed an emergency Ceasarean section
while the plaintiff was under general anesthesia.' The baby suffered permanent brain damage and died during the course of the litigation.
At trial, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting
that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages for emotional distress. The trial court considered the plaintiff as a "bystander" who did

not contemporaneously observe the infant's injuries 6 Thus, the plaintiff
was barred from recovering damages for emotional distress under the
precedent set forth in Thing v. La Cusa.! The plaintiff petitioned for a
writ of mandamus.

Arabian, Baxter, and George. Justice Mosk wrote a concurring opinion.
2. Id. at 1069, 831 P.2d 1198, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616. The issue was whether a
mother can "recover damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress against a
physician who entered Into a physician-patient relationship with her for care during
labor and delivery, ifher child is injured during the course of the delivery?" I
& Ld.Thus, recovery is limited to emotional distress arising from the "fright,
nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation and indignity, as
well as physical pain" associated with the negligent delivery itself. Id. at 1085, 831
P.2d at 1209, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626 (quoting Deevy V. Tassi, 21 Cal. 2d 109, 120, 130
P.2d 389, 396 (1942)).
4. Narendra Gupta, R&D., was the real party in interest. West Covina Hospital was
also named as a defendant, but did not participate in the appeal. Id. at 1069, 1069
n.1, 831 P.2d at 1198, 1198 n.L, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616, 616 n.l.
5. Because the plaintiff was not conscious during the procedure, the defendant
argued that she was not entitled to damages for emotional distress because she was
not aware at the time. Id. at 1091, 831 P.2d at 1199, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
6. Id.
7. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989) (establishing that to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a "bystander" to an accident,
one must be (1)closely related to the victim, (2)present at the scene and aware of
what is happening, and (3) suffer emotional distress beyond that of a disinterested

witness).

In a cursory, unpublished opinion, the court of appeal found that

Thing was not controlling because the mother was a "direct" victim of
the alleged negligence.' The supreme court granted review to redress uncertainty surrounding claims for emotional distress in cases in which
unique relationships exist' The court found that the mother was entitled
to damages for emotional distress based upon traditional professional
negligence theories because the defendant owed a duty to her directly.
IU. TREATMENT

Justice Panelli's opinion began with a discussion of the two theories of
recovery under California law for negligent infliction of emotional distress: the "bystander' theory or the "direct victim" theory." This distinction has confused courts and commentators alike.'" Analysis reveals that
both theories are rooted in traditional common law negligence;' the
primary difference between the two is the nature of the duty that the
defendant owes the plaintiff.
The "bystander cases have their origin in Dillon v. Legg,'" and culmi-

8. Burgess, 2 Cal. 4th at 1071, 831 P.2d at 1199, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617. The
supreme court reached substantially the same conclusion. See inlfra notes 34 - 37 and
accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the importance of a preexisting duty between the
tortfeasor and the victim under California law, see Julie A. Davies, Direct Actions for
Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?, 67 WASH L REV. 1 (1992).
10. Burgess, 2 Cal. 4th at 1071-72, 831 P.2d at 1199-1200, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617-18.
Because the doctor was simultaneously operating on the mother and the infant, and
owed a duty to protect the welfare of both, the mother could sue directly. Id.
11. Id. at 1071, 831 P.2d at 1199, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
12. The opinion cited many cases to demonstrate this confusion. See, e.g., Ochoa
v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985); Hurlbut v.
Sonora Community Hosp., 207 Cal. App. 3d 388, 254 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1989); Martinez
v. County of Los Angeles, 186 Cal. App. 3d 884, 231 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1986); Newton v.
Kaiser Found. Hosp., 184 Cal. App. 3d 386, 228 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1986); Andalon v.
Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1984); Sesma v. Cueto, 129
Cal. App. 3d 108, 181 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1982); Johnson v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App.
3d 1002, 177 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1981).
13. The court stated that it has "repeatedly recognized that '[t]he negligent causing
of emotional distress is not an independent tort, but the tort of negligence.'" Id. at
1072, 831 P.2d at 1200, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618 (quoting Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc. 48 Cal. 3d 583, 588, 770 P.2d 278, 281, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98,
101 (1989)). See also 6 B.E. WrnaN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts § 838 (1988)
(declaring that negligent infliction of emotional distress is the same tort as negligence).
14. For example, one difference Is whether the duty was based on a preexisting
relationship between the parties. See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
15. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). For a discussion of
Dillon, see 6 B.E. WrITKN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 841 (1988).
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nated in Thing v. La Chusa.6 Both Dillon and Thing involve plaintiffs
seeking to recover for emotional distress arising from witnessing an
injury to another. In Thing, the California Supreme Court considered
whether a mother who did not witness an accident in which her child
was injured, but arrived on the scene shortly thereafter, should recover
damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 7 As viewed by
the court in Burgess, the issue in Thing was to what extent does a
tortfeasor owe a duty to a third part with whom she had no preexisting
relationship. In Thing, the court determined that this duty extends only to situations where the plaintiff
(1) is closely related to the injury victim, (2) is present at the scene of the injuryproducing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to
the victim and, (3) as a result suffers emotional distress beyond that which would
be anticipated in a disinterested witness."

Thus, because the mother was not present at the scene, nor aware of the
accident at the time it occurred, she could not recover as a "bystander."' This was the result because the defendant owed no duty to her
and failure to establish duty is fatal to any claim for negligence whether
or not the damages involve emotional distress.2
On the other hand, "direct" victim cases arise in scenarios in which the
defendant and the plaintiff had a preexisting relationship which entailed
a duty that the defendant breached. The supreme court had previously
established this distinction in two cases: Molien v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals' and Marlene F. v. Affiliated PsychiatricMedical Clinic.'
Molien was the first case in which the California Supreme Court used
the "direct victim" label.' That case involved a doctor who misdiagnosed the plaintiffs wife as having syphilis. The doctor instructed the
wife to notify her husband and have him undergo blood tests to deter-

16.
17.
18.
Rptr.
19.

48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
Id. at 647, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1064, 1072-73, 831 P.2d 1197, 1200, 9 Cal.
2d 615, 618 (1992).
Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 647, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866. See also 48
CAL JUn. 3D Negligence § 76 (discussing recovery by accident witnesses).
20. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 669, 771 P.2d at 830, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
21. See Davies, supra note 9, at 1.
22. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
23. 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770 P.2d 278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1989).
24. Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1064, 1073, 831 P.2d 1197, 1201, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 615, 619 (1992) (citing Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167
Cal. Rptr. at 834).

mine whether he had been infected. The erroneous diagnosis made the

plaintiff's wife suspicious that the plaintiff had engaged in extramarital
activities and resulted in their eventual divorce.'
To distinguish this case from "bystander" actions the Molien court
stated that
[i]t must be remembered... that in Di/on the plaintiff sought recovery of damages she suffered as a percipient witness to the injury of a third person, and the
three guidelines... served as a limitation on that particular cause of action. Here,
by contrast, plaintiff was himself a direct victim of the assertedly negligent act"

Hence, the duty that the doctor owed the plaintiff was direct. The only
issue was that of foreseeability.' On this issue, the court found that it
was reasonably foreseeable that a misdiagnosis of syphilis would produce emotional distress."
In Marlene F., the court faced the issue of whether a mother could
collect damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress from a psychotherapist who sexually molested her son.' The therapist was treating
a mother and son for intra-family problems.' The trial court granted,
and the court of appeal sustained, the defendants' demurrer because the
mother could not state a cause of action as either a "bystander" under
Di/lon or as a "direct victim" under Molien.3" In reversing this decision,
the supreme court made it clear that the therapist owed a duty to the
mother directly. The court noted that the mother was the therapist's
patient, which should have alerted the therapist to the emotional impact
his actions would likely have on the mother.' Therefore, by molesting
the son, the therapist breached his duty to both the son and the moth3

er.

25. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
26. Id. at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)..
27. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
28. Id. The Motien court stated, "It is easily predictable that an erroneous diagnosis of syphilis and its probable source would produce marital discord and resultant
emotional distress to a married patient's spouse." Id.
29. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, 48 Cal. 3d 583, 585, 770
P.2d 278, 278-79, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98, 98-99 (1989).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 588, 770 P.2d at 280, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 100. The court of appeal reasoned (1) that the mother was not a witness and thus, not a "bystander"; and (2) the
tortlous conduct was committed upon the son, not the mother, and thus, she was not
a "direct victim." The supreme court disagreed with the second point Id.
32. As a professional psychologist, the defendant knew, or should have known,
that the sexual molestation would cause direct emotional harm to the mother and
strain the very family relations he was employed to mend. Id. at 591, 770 P.2d at
282, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
33. The court emphasized that "the mothers here were the patients of the therapist
along with their sons, and the therapist's tortious conduct was accordingly directed
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Similarly, the doctor in Burgess owed a duty to both the infant and
the mother. The physician-patient relationship makes the duty self-evident.' The court considered Burgess "a 'traditional' plaintiff with a professional negligence cause of action."' Even the defendant admitted that
he owed a duty to the plaintiff.' However, because the mother was not
physically harmed, the defendant argued that the duty which he breached
was that owed to the infant and not to the mother.'
The supreme court rejected this argument because it "would require
[the court] to ignore the realities of pregnancy and childbirth."' The
court considered it axiomatic that any treatment for the fetus would
implicate the mother because the only access to the fetus was through
the mother. Furthermore, childbirth is an event with strong emotional
implications, as any obstetrician should know.' Thus, any negligence

against both." Id. at 591, 770 P.2d at 283, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 103. For further discussion of the concept of duty in Marlene F., see Davies, supra note 9, at 1.
34. See 6 B.E. WrrIlN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA JAW, Torts § 776 (1988) (stating
that liability for malpractice arises when a physician-patient relationship gives rise to
a duty of care between the plaintiff and the defendant).
35. Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1064, 1075, 831 P.2d 1197, 1202, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 615, 620 (1992).
36. Id.
37. The defendant wanted the court to treat the fetus as a separate entity who
would be the only one harmed by a negligent delivery in which the mother was not
physically injured. Id.
38. Id. at 1076, 831 P.2d at 1202, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 620.
39. The court was particularly sensitive to this issue when it stated as followins:
In addition to the physical connection between a woman and her fetus,
there is an emotional relationship as well. The birth of a child is a miraculous occasion which is almost always eagerly anticipated and which is invested with hopes, dreams, anxiety, and fears. In our society a woman often
elects to forego general anesthesia or even any anesthesia, which could ease
or erase the pain of labor, because she is concerned for the well-being of
her child and she anticipates that her conscious participation in and observance of the birth of her child will be a wonderful and joyous occasion. An
obstetrician, who must discuss the decision regarding the use of anesthesia
with the patient, surely recognizes the emotionally charged nature of pregnancy and childbirth and the concern of the pregnant woman for her future
child's well-being. The obstetrician certainly knows that even when a woman
chooses to or must undergo general anesthesia during delivery, the receiving
of her child into her arms for the first time is eagerly anticipated as one of
the most joyous occasions of the patient's lifetime. It is apparent to us, as it
must be to an obstetrician, that for these reasons, the mother's emotional
well-being and the health of the child are inextricably intertwined.
Id.

during delivery which injures the fetus and causes the mother emotional
anguish is a breach of the duty owed directly to the mother.'
In upholding its finding that a duty existed, the court analyzed several
factors traditionally used to establish a duty.4' First, the court found that
the foreseeability of emotional harm to the mother from negligent delivery is patently obvious. Second, the negligent delivery of a child is inextricably related to the emotional harm suffered by the mother. Third,
because there will only be liability when there is professional malpractice, there is sufficient moral blame to hold a doctor liable.' Fourth, if
mothers were forced to sue as ubystanders," it might encourage doctors
to use general anesthesia to avoid potential liability.' Fifth, while acknowledging a medical malpractice insurance crisis, the court reasoned
that the impact of this decision would be negligible and that the Legislature has already taken remedial measures."
Finally, the court in Burgess addressed the defendant's argument that

40. Cf. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661
(1985) (noting that parents who witnessed physician's negligent care of child must
state a cause of action based on "bystander" theory).
41. The factors include:
(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that
Plaintiff suffered injury;
(2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered;
(3) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct;
(4) the policy of preventing future harm;
(5) the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care
with resulting liability for breach.
Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1064, 1079-1080, 831 P.2d 1197, 1205, 9 Cal. Rptr.
2d 615, 623 (1992) (citing Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181,
2 Cal. Rptr.2d 79 (1991)).
42. With respect to moral blame, the court stated:
Whether the negligent act is the result of a momentary lapse of concentration
or gross disregard for the health of the patient, in order to prevail on a
claim for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must convince the trier of fact that
the physician's peers would consider his act to be blameworthy. Under such
circumstances, we cannot conclude that this factor supports a public policy
limitation of a physician's liability to his patient.
Id. at 1081, 831 P.2d at 1206, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 624.
43. This is true because a "bystander" must contemporaneously observe the negligent act in order to recover for emotional distress. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
44. The court made reference to the 1975 legislative enactment of Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), ch. 2, 1975 Cal. Stat. 3949-4007 (Second Ex.
Sess.), which caps emotional distress damages at $250,000 and provided a three year
maximum statute of limitations for adults. Burgess, 2 Cal. 4th at 1083, 831 P.2d at
1208, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 626. See 6 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Torts §§
778-786 (1988) (discussing the application of MICRA).
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the plaintiff's claim must be barred because her damages for emotional
distress are coextensive with damages for loss of filial consortium.* It is
well established in California that parents are not entitled to damages for
loss of filial consortium.' However, the court found that the emotional
damage suffered from a negligent delivery can be distinguished from filial
consortium."7 Thus, the supreme court held that the plaintiff did not
have to sue as a "bystander," but rather could state a claim directly for
the emotional distress caused by the negligent delivery of her child.'
However, the plaintiff's recovery could not include damages for emotional distress arising from loss of affection, society, companionship, love,
and disruption of life to care for her son. Therefore, she was entitled to
damages for the "abnormal event" of a negligent delivery and the associated emotional and physical pain. '
III.

CONCLUSION

The Burgess case gave the California Supreme Court the opportunity
to clarify its earlier decisions, particularly the relationship between "bystanders" and "direct victims. " ' This distinction, which the court established in Molien and Mariene F., left the lower courts confused about the
proper application and distinction."' Burgess expands the courts reason-

45. Burgess, 2 Cal. 4th at 1083, 831 P.2d at 1208, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
46. See, e.g., Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr.
315 (1977) (finding that public policy demanded a limitation because damages for loss
of filial consortium were too intangible and speculative).
47. Burgess, 2 Cal. 4th at 1085, 831 P.2d at 1209, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 627. The court
emphasized that "Burgess's emotional distress is of the type for which we have
previously recognized recovery should be provided and is distinguishable from the
type of emotional distress for which recovery is prohibited by virtue of the policy
considerations underlying the prohibition of filial consortium claims." IL
48. 1 Cf. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661
(1985) (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander" theory, rather than "direct victim" theory, as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly
Ill child).
49. Burgess, 2 Cal. 4th at 1085, 831 P.2d at 1209, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 627. The court
limited Burgess' recovery to "damages for... fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety,
worry, mortification, shock, humiliation and indignity, physical pain, or other similar
distress." Id.
50. See supra notes 15-33 and accompanying text. See also 46 CAL JUR. 3D Negligene §§ 74-76 (discussing negligent infliction of emotional distress both directly and
as a witness).
51. For a discussion of the issues raised by Mariene F., see Davies, supra note 9,
at 1.

ing in Marlene F. by emphasizing the importance of duty.' Its dependence on "traditional" elements for establishing a cause of action clearly
demonstrates that there is no separate cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Rather, the cause of action is ordinary
negligence where the damages are based on emotional injury.
Although the court decided that the mother was not a "bystander," the
court clarified what "bystander" meant. "Bystander" status is used by
those to whom no direct duty is owed because no preexisting relationship exists. Any duty owed to a "bystander" is derived by the duty owed
to the direct victim. Thus, the court deems it proper to significantly limit
the type of person to whom a duty is owed.
The Burgess decision seems to expand the law by allowing recovery
when a preexisting duty can be established.' However, a proper analysis of case law demonstrates that this case merely fills in the grey areas
by using historical guidelines for negligence.
DAN O'DAY
B.

When a plaintiff seeks punitive damagesfor an injury that
is directly related to professional services dispensed by a
health care provider,regardless of whether the cause of
action is identified as an intentional tort or negligence, the
plaintiff must comply with section 425.13(a) of the Code of
Civil Procedure: Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic,
Inc. v. Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In CentralPathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court,'
the California Supreme Court considered whether a plaintiff could request punitive damages for medical malpractice without complying with
California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13(a),2 which requires a
showing at the pleading stage that there is a "substantial probability" of
prevailing on the claim.' The court concluded that the plaintiffs must

52. See Davies, supra note 9, at 29-62.
53. See, e.g., Harriet Chiang, State High Court Allows ChUdbirth Distress Suit, SAN
FRAN. CHRON., July 10, 1992, at A23.
1. 3 Cal. 4th 181, 832 P.2d 924, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208 (1992). Chief Justice Lucas
wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Panelli, Kennard, Arabian,
Baxter, and George. Justice Mosk wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
2. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 425.13(a) (West 1992).
3. Central Pathology, 3 Cal. 4th at 185, 832 P.2d at 926, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 210.
The court did not address the plaintiffs argument that section 425.13(a) unconstitutionally impinges on the right to a jury trial because the issue was not raised with
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comply with the statute even though they requested punitive damages
under an intentional tort theory of liability.'
The plaintiffs 6 sued the defendants6 for failing to inform one plaintiff
that her pap smear test revealed abnormal cells and failing to notify her
that she should be retested despite a later order that the defendant clinic
retest all patients who used the service in the previous five years.! Two
months before the case was scheduled for trial, the plaintiffs moved for
leave to amend the complaint to add causes of action for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs sought punitive
damages under these causes of action. The defendants opposed the motion to amend on the grounds that section 425.13(a) required the plaintiffs to show a substantial probability they would prevail on a claim for
punitive damages.8 The plaintiffs argued that section 425.13(a) did not

the trial court. Id. at 185 n.2, 832 P.2d at 926 n.2, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 210 n.2.
4. Id. at 192-93, 832 P.2d at 931, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215. The plaintiffs had
requested punitive damages under causes of actions for fraud and for intentional
infliction, of emotional distress. Because these claims arose out of the manner in
which the defendants performed medical services, the court found that section
425.13(a) applied. Id. For a discusion of pleading damages in general, see 49 CAL.
JuR. 3D Pleading § 89 (1979).
5. Constance and Michael Hull.
6. Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc., Central Pathology Services
Medical Group, Inc. [hereinafter defendant clinic], Elizabeth Irwin, M.D., and Elizabeth
Irwin, M.D., Inc. [hereinafter defendant doctor].
7. Central Pathology, 3 Cal. 4th at 185, 832 P.2d at 926, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
There were further allegations that the defendant doctor tried to cover the problem
by denying that she used the defendant clinic to conduct the tests. Id.
8. California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13 states in pertinent part(a) In any action for damages arising out of the professional negligence of a
health care provider, no claim for punitive damages shall be included in a
complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing an
amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive damages to be filed. The
court may allow the filing of an amended pleading claiming punitive damages
on a motion by the party seeking the amended pleading and on the basis of
the supporting and opposing affidavits presented that the plaintiff has established that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on
the claim pursuant to Section 3294 of the Civil Code. The court shall not
grant a motion allowing the filing of an amended pleading that includes a
claim for punitive damages if the motion for such an order is not filed within two years after the complaint or initial pleading is filed or not less than
nine months before the date the matter is first set for trial, whichever is
earlier.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13(a) (West 1992). See 6 B.E. WrrIuN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Torts § 1368 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing application of section 425.13).

apply to intentional torts and the trial court agreed.' The defendants petitioned for a writ of mandate, which the court of appeal summarily denied.' The supreme court granted review."
II.

TREATMENT

The California Supreme Court began by analyzing the trial court's reliance on the appellate court decision Bommareddy v. Superior Court.2
In Bommareddy, a defendant doctor sought to strike a request for punitive damages under a battery action based on alleged medical malpractice.'" The battery claim stemmed from the defendant's performing
unconsented surgery on the plaintiffs right eye when the plaintiff had
consented to surgery only on the left eye. 4 The court of appeal found
that the term "professional negligence" in section 425.13(a) was not intended to apply to intentional torts and, therefore, that it was proper for
the trial court to deny the defendant's motion to strike the punitive damages clause from the complaint."
The supreme court disagreed with the reasoning and holding of
Bommareddy, basing its criticism on the statutory language and legislative history of section 425.13(a)." The court felt that the statutory intent
could be derived from an examination of the statutory language, keeping
"in mind [that] the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections
relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and
with each other, to the extent possible."" Furthermore, the court noted
that "[wihere uncertainty exists consideration should be given to the
consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation."" In exam-

9. Central Pathology, 3 Cal. 4th at 186, 832 P.2d at 927, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211.
The trial court relied on Bommareddy v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1017, 272
Cal. Rptr. 246 (1990), which held that section 425.13(a) did not apply to intentional
torts. For a detailed discussion of the supreme court's criticism of Bommareddy, see
infra notes 16-35 and accompanying text.
10. Central Pathology, 3 Cal. 4th at 184, 832 P.2d at 926, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 210.

11. Id.
12. 222 Cal. App. 3d 1017, 272 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1990).
13. Id. at 1018-19, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 246-47.

14. Id.
15. Id. at 1024, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 250. "Professional negligence' as used in Code of
Civil Procedure section 425.13 is a term of art that does not include intentional torts,
such as battery, even when occurring during the provision of medical services." Id.
16. Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, Cal. 4th 181,
186, 832 P.2d 924, 927, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208, 211 (1992).
17. 1d. at 187, 832 P.2d at 927, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211 (citing Walnut Creek Manor
v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 54 Cal. 3d 245, 268, 814 P.2d 704, 717-18, 284
Cal. Rptr. 718, 731-32 (1991)).
18. Id. (citing Walnut Creek Manor, 54 Cal. 3d at 268, 814 P.2d at 717-18, 284 Cal.

Rptr. 731-32.
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ining section 425.13(a), the court fust considered the ambiguity in the
phrase "professional negligence." Because section 425.13 contained no
definition, the court turned to the Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act (MICRA),' which defines "professional negligence" in six sections
as
a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of
professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal
hnjury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction
imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital.'

While this definition was not used in section 425.13, the court assumed
that the legislature must have been familiar with this definition and intended the same meaning for its use.'
The next ambiguous phrase of concern to the CentralPathology court
was "arising out of," as section 425.13(a) applies to "any action for damages arising out of the professional negligence of a health care provider."' Neither section 425.13 nor the MICRA defines the term, but case
law does.' Generally, the term "'is equated with origination, growth or
flow from the event.'"' However, the court felt that "[iun the context of
section 425.13(a) it is unclear whether the intentional tort causes of action in this case may be said to originate, grow, or flow from 'professional negligence." Moreover, because the words of the statute shed no
light on the uncertainty, the court examined legislative history.'
Section 425.13 was created as part of the Brown-Lockyer Civil Liabilities Reform Act.' This Act limited the availability of exemplary damages

19. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), ch. 2, 1975 Cal. Stat. 39494007 (Second Ex Sess.).
20. Centra Pathology, 3 Cal. 4th at 187, 832 P.2d at 928, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 212
(citing CAL. Civ. PROc. CODE § 364(f(2) (West 1982); CAL CIV. PROC. CODE §
667.7(e)(4) (West 1987); CAL CIV. PROc. CODE § 1295(g)(2) (West 1982); CAL Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 6146(c)(3) (West 1990); CAL. CiV. CODE § 3333.1(c)(2) (West Supp.
1993); CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 3333.2(c)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
21. Id. (citing Bailey v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 970, 977 n.10, 568 P.2d 394, 398
n.10, 140 Cal. Rptr. 669, 673 n.10 (1977)).
22. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 425.13(a) (West 1992) (emphasis added).
23. Central Pathology, 3 Cal. 4th at 187, 832 P.2d at 928, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
24. Id. (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Civil Serv. Employee's Ins Co.,
33 Cal. App. 3d 26, 32, 108 Cal. Rptr. 737, 741 (1973)).
25. Id. at 188, 832 P.2d at 928, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212.
26. Id. (citing Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 54 Cal.
3d 245, 268, 814 P.2d 704, 717-18, 284 Cal. Rptr. 718, 731-32 (1991)).
27. Brown-Lockyer Civil Liabilities Reform Act, 1987 Cal. Stat. 5777-5782.

in general and to health care providers in particular.' The original statute had no language requiring that the act arise out of professional negligence. However, a year later, the statute was amended to include this
language for fear that in its original state, section 425.13 included acts of
a health care provider unrelated to health care treatment. ' In the
court's view, the legislature enacted section 425.13 "because it was concerned that unsubstantiated claims for punitive damages were being included in complaints against health care providers."' Given this interpretation, the court found that emphasis should be placed on whether
the lawsuit was brought against a health care provider in her professional capacity."
The supreme court also criticized the Bommareddy court for focusing
on the difference between intentional torts and professional negligence.' Rather, the emphasis should have been on whether the claim
was one "'arising out of the professional negligence of a health care
provider.'"' Further, the court noted that because of the few situations
in which punitive damages are predicated on mere negligence, the
Bommareddy interpretation would give section 425.13 virtually no effect.' Thus, it would be too easy to avoid the statute by including intentional torts as causes of actions in the complaint. This would clearly
circumvent any intent the legislature had for the law.'
The court's opinion concluded that merely identifying an action as an
"intentional tort" is not sufficient. The allegations regarding the nature
and cause of the plaintiff's injury must be examined to determine whether it was "directly related to the manner in which professional services

28. "The Act increased the evidentiary threshold that must be met to recover punitive damages to clear and convincing evidence of oppression, fraud, or malice. The
definition of malice was changed to include 'despicable conduct' done 'with a willful

and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.'" Central Pathology, 3 Cal.
4th at 188, 832 P.2d at 928-29, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 212-13 (quoting Brown-Lockyer Civil
Liabilities Reform Act, 1987 Cal. Stat. 5780).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 189, 832 P.2d at 929, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213. But see Bommareddy v.
Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1017, 1022, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 246, 249 (1990) (reach-

ing a different conclusion from the same legislative history).
31. Central Pathology, 3 Cal. 4th at 190, 832 P.2d at 930, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 191, 832 P.2d at 931, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214 (quoting CAL Civ. PRoc.
CODE § 425.13(a) (West 1992)) (emphasis added).
34. Id. The court in Bommareddy also recognized this, but reasoned that the law
was designed to limit collection of punitive damages under negligence theories in
cases in which the conduct may also have been outrageous enough to collect punitive damages. Bonmareddy, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1022, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
35. "Thus, the Bommareddy court's interpretation of section 425.13(a) effectively
permits artful pleading to annul the protection afforded by that section." Central Pathology, 3 Cal. 4th at 191, 832 P:2d at 930, 10 Cal. Rptr 2d at 214.
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were provided."' Moreover, because the plaintiffs' causes of action for
fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress in this case were
directly related to "the manner in which defendants performed and communicated the results of medical tests, a matter that is an ordinary and
usual part of medical professional services," section 425.13(a) barred
the amendment to the complaint.'
Ill. CONCLUSION
Clearly, CentralPathology represents a setback for plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases.' In order to claim punitive damages, they must
first receive a preliminary ruling from the trial judge stating that a substantial probability exists of succeeding on the merits. Furthermore, any
such requests must be made at least two years after filing or nine
months before trial, whichever is earlier.' This means that critical facts
must be clarified early in the discovery process. In this particular case, it
meant that the plaintiffs would not be able to collect punitive damages
despite egregious conduct on the part of the defendant clinic and doctor."

However, section 425.13(a) appears to strike a balance between the
needs of plaintiffs and the concern about unsubstantiated punitive damages claims against medical practitioners. ' This is of particular concern
to health care practitioners because punitive damages are not covered by
malpractice insurance.' Without this protection, there is fear that many

36. Id. at 192, 832 P.2d at 931, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215.
37. Id. at 193, 832 P.2d at 931, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215.
38. The plaintiffs were still allowed to pray for other types of damages. "Although
[the plaintiff] said she was disappointed in the ruling, (she] said it would not deter
her from pursuing the lawsuit." Amy Pyle, Ruling Limits Damages in Malpractice
Suit, LA. TIAES, Aug. 1, 1992, at 1.
39. See Harriet Chiang, State Ruling Makes it Harder to Sue Doctors, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., August 1, 1992, at A14.
40. See CAL Cw. PROC. CODE § 425.13(a) (West 1992). See 6 B.E. WmraN, SUMMARY
OF CAUFORNIA LAW Torts § 1368 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing application of section

425.13).
41. The clinic had a 21% error rate and was shut down by the state. See Amy
Pyle, Cancer Lawsuits are Legacy Left by Pap Test Uncertainty, LA. TIMES, Aug. 18,
at BI (stating that there are at least five related suits in southern California and
chronicling the history of the Central Pathology Medical Services Group).
42. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
43. Mike McKee, MedMal Limits Face Challenge in Supreme Court, THE RECORDER, May 13, 1992, at 1.

competent doctors would leave the health care profession.' Moreover,
the CentralPathology decision offers some protection to health care providers who are suffering a new round of attacks based on AIDS-infected
blood transfusions. In many cases, it is argued that the blood was given
without consent and, therefore, the transfusion qualifies as a battery.' It
is now clear that the plaintiffs in these cases will have to meet the requirements of section 425.13(a) in order to qualify for punitive damages.
The court's broad interpretation of the statute does offer some assurance against frivolous claims for punitive damages. Because of this, it
will require plaintiffs' attorneys to be more cautious in pleading. Moreover, plaintiffs will have to gather evidence of conduct that may entitle
them to punitive damages early in the discovery process. However, a
competent, effective plaintiffs attorney should not be unduly burdened
with what is essentially a procedural rule.
DAN O'DAY
C.

When neither the mishandling of a decedent's remains nor
its consequences are observed, (1) close family members may
recoverfor negligent infliction of emotional distress if they
were both (a) aware that funeral and/or crematory services
were being performed, and (b) recipients of the benefit of or
contractorsfor the services rendered, and (2) in order to
recover on a theory of intentionalinfliction of emotional distress, the defendant must have directed the misconduct primarUy at the plaintiff either (a) intentionally, (b) with
knowledge to a substantialcertainty that injury would result,
or (c) recklessly and with knowledge of the plaintiffs
presence: Christensen v. Los Angeles Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The California Supreme Court's ruling in Christensen v. Los Angeles
Superior Court' determined who has standing to sue for emotional dis-

44. ld.
45. See Mike McKee, Doctors Hit by Awards That Blood Banks Avoid, THE RECORDER, May 26, 1992, at 1 (citing Ashcraft v. King, 228 Cal. App. 3d 604, 278 Cal.
Rptr. 900, 902 (1991) (ruling that the trial court committed prejudicial error in granting a motion for nonsuit as to a patient's battery claim for failure to use familydonated blood as had been requested)).
1. 54 Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (1991). Justice Baxter wrote
the majority opinion in which Justices Lucas, Panelli, George and Turner concurred.
Justices Mosk and Kennard concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Mosk
disagreed with the majority's intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) analysis. See infra notes 52-53. Justice Kennard disagreed with the majority's negligent
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tress caused by the negligent or intentional mishandling of a decedent's
remains when neither the actual misconduct nor its consequences are
observed.2 Considering the standing issue as if it had been raised on a
demurrer,3 the court considered the allegations in the complaint as true
and then assessed whether the plaintiffs (individually and as a class) had
stated causes of action which allowed recovery for emotional distress.'
The elements in controversy with regard to the negligent infliction of
emotional distress (NIED) claim were duty and causation.5 As to the
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim, the disagreement
between the parties and among the members of the court focused exclusively on the element of intent.6
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In February 1987, the plaintiffs discovered through the mass media
that the defendants had mishandled, mutilated, and commingled the remains of dead bodies between 1980 and 1987. Thereafter, the plaintiffs

infliction of emotional distress (NIED) analysis. See infra notes 26 and 39.
As the successor of Justice Allen E. Broussard, who retired in August 1991, Justice Ronald M. George represents Governor Pete Wilson's first appointee to the Callfornia Supreme Court. Philip Hager & Jerry Gillam, Wilson Names L.A. Justice to
High Court, LA. TMEs, July 30, 1991, at Al. Justice George is considered a conservative, thereby bringing the total number of conservatives on the California Supreme
Court to five (the other four conservatives are Lucas, Panelli, Arabian and Baxter,
Kennard is considered a moderate conservative who is liberal at times). Id.
Paul A. Turner, currently a justice for the California Court of Appeal, participated in the ruling by special assignment. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 906, 820 P.2d at
204, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102.
2. Id. at 875, 820 P.2d at 183, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81.
3. Because this appeal arose from a decision governing a coordination proceeding,
each plaintiff had to assert a claim for emotional distress by alleging facts that satisfied all elements of the tort Id, at 876, 820 P.2d at 183, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81. Even
if the case were later certified as a class action, which seems likely, each member of
the plaintiff class as well as the named representatives would still have to show
standing to sue. Id. at 876 & n.3, 820 P.2d at 184 & n.3, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82 & n.3.
See generaly CAL R. CT. 1505 (West 1992) (authorizing review of writs issued in
coordination proceedings); CAL. R. CT. 1521 (West 1992) (describing petition procedure for determining the appropriateness of coordinating separate actions); CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 404.1 (West 1973 & Supp. 1992) (stating that efficient use of judicial
resources is one purpose of coordination proceedings).
4. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 876, 820 P.2d at 183-84, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81-82.
5. See iqfra notes 24-49.
6. See ifma notes 50-55.
7. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 879, 820 P.2d at 185, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83.

filed a law suit alleging that the defendants had harvested and sold for
their own profit countless human organs and body parts without the
plaintiffs' consent;8 cremated several bodies at one time in the same
pottery kiln, sometimes with nonhuman residue;' failed to preserve the
individual character or identity of the cremated remains when placing
them in receptacles;' and removed gold and silver from the corpses'
mouths, later selling the precious metals for a profit."
All of the original plaintiffs had either contracted for the funeral-related services and/or were related to the decedents whose remains the
defendants allegedly deprecated. The proposed named representatives
of the class were either statutory right holders and/or contracting parties. 3 The term "statutory right holder" refers to a person who controls
the disposition of the decedent's remains pursuant to section 7100 of the
Health and Safety Code. The plaintiffs brought suit against three categories of defendants: the mortuary defendants," the crematory defendants" and a biological supply company."

8. According to the plaintiffs' complaint, the items stolen and sold included
hearts, lungs,- corneas, eyes--even bones. Id. at 879, 820 P.2d at 185-86, 2 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 83-84.
9. Id. at 879-80, 820 P.2d at 185-86, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83-84.
10. Id, The plaintiffs claimed that the cremations involved as many as 40 bodies at
once and that before being distributed to the relatives, the ashes were commingled in
55-gallon drums. Philip Hager, High Court Limits Suits Over Corpse Desecration,LA.
TIMEs, Dec. 3, 1991, at Bi.
11. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 879, 820 P.2d at 185, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83.
12. Id. at 877, 820 P.2d at 184, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82. The issue of whether a
decedent's friend also has standing arose when the plaintiffs sought to amend the
complaint to include, as an additional plaintiff, a decedent's aggrieved friend. Id. at
877 n.6, 820 P.2d at 184 n.6, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82 n.6.
13. Id. at 876-77 & n.4, 820 P.2d at 184 & n.4, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82 & n.4.
14. Absent instructions to the contrary from the person now deceased, section
7100 gives to the following persons in the following order the right and duty. to inter
the decedent,

(a) The surviving spouse.
(b) The surviving child or children of the decedent.
(c) The surviving parent or parents of the decedent.
(d) The person or persons respectively in the next degrees of kindred in the
order named by the laws of California as entitled to succeed to the estate of
the decedent.
(e) The public administrator when the deceased has sufficient assets.
CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100 (West Supp. 1993).
15. Contracts existed between the mortuary defendants and certain plaintiffs to
provide services connected with the funerals. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 877, 820 P.2d
at 185, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83. The mortuary defendants, in turn, contracted with the
crematory defendants, thus creating a third-party beneficiary situation. Id. at 877, 820
P.2d at 185, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83.
16. The crematory defendants were responsible for performing the actual crema-
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The plaintiffs alleged that the relationship between the mortuary and
crematory defendants was such that the mortuary defendants knew or

should have known of the crematory defendants' illegal operations.' In
addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the circumstances under which the
biological supply company bought human organs and body parts from
the crematory defendants were such that the biological supply company
knew or should have known of the inevitable adulteration of the corpses.1"

The trial court ruled that only two types of plaintiffs had standing: section 7100 statutory right holders' and those who had contracted with
the defendants." However, the appellate court disagreed, holding that
close family members had standing to sue for NIED and in a suit for
IRED, all members of each decedent's family as well as a decedent's close
friends had standing.' Granting review, the supreme court narrowed the
class of persons who had the right to sue under both NIED and IIED
theories.'
III.
A.

THE COURT'S OPINION

NIED Requires Pleadingand Proving Duty, Breach, Causationand

Damages
1.

Standing to sue for NIED is limited to those plaintiffs to whom the
defendants owed a duty

tions and provided the mortuary defendants with authorization forms to obtain consent from the next of kin. Id. at 877-78, 820 P.2d at 185, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83.
17. The biological supply company solicited and purchased large quantities of
human organs from the crematory defendants. Id. at 878, 820 P.2d at 185, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 83.
18. 1L at 879, 820 P.2d at 186, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84.
19. Id at 878, 820 P.2d at 185, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83.
20. See supra note 14 for statutory text.
21. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 880, 820 P.2d at 186, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84.
22. Id. at 875-76, 820 P.2d at 183, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81. In reaching its conclusion
on NIED, the court of appeal reasoned that a mortuary's duty is not limited to contracting parties because the mortuary has a "special relationship" with all close family
members created by the delicate nature of mortuary activities; therefore, any negligence on the part of the mortuary would foreseeably injure such close family members. ld. at 882-83, 820 P.2d at 188, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86. The court of appeal conferred standing to a larger class of persons for the HED claim, reasoning that intentional torts are designed to punish and deter and, thus, do not involve a concern for
disproportionate liability. Ld.at 883, 820 P.2d at 188, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86.
23. ld. at 875-76, 820 P.2d at 183-84, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81-82.

a.

The rules governing bystander recovery only apply when the
defendant did not owe a duty directly to the bystander

The defendants argued that the law governing bystander recovery,
which limits recovery for NIED to relatives who contemporaneously
observe the defendant's negligence cause harm to a closely related family
member," should control the outcome in cases involving the mishandling of corpses because of the danger of disproportionate liability.' But
the court rejected this argument, stating that the percipient witness rule
applies only when the negligent defendant owes the injured person no
distinct duty other than that owed to the general public.' Such was not

24. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 647, 771 P.2d 814, 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. 885,
866 (1989). Recovery for percipient witnesses developed gradually through the DillonOchoa-Thing line of cases. See Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 647, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal.
Rptr. at 866 (1989); Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 166, 703 P.2d 1, 5, 216
Cal. Rptr. 661, 665 (1985); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 74041, 441 P.2d 912, 92021, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80.81 (1968). See generally, James Duff McGinley, California
Supreme Court Survey, Thing v. La Chusa, 17 PEPP. L REv. 523, 588 (1990) (discussing Thing and Dillon); James B. Bristol, California Supreme Court Survey,
Ochoa v. Superior Court, 13 PEPP. L REv. 427, 561 (1986) (discussing Ochoa).
25. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 883-84, 820 P.2d at 188-89, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86-87.
Sometimes referred to as the "percipient witness rule," bystander recovery Is triggered
when a witness neither sustains, nor was in danger of sustaining, a physical injury
due to the defendant's negligent conduct, but who nevertheless suffers emotional distress as a result of observing the defendant's negligence cause physical harm to a
third person. ld,at 884, 820 P.2d at 189, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87. The court reasoned
that despite the foreseeability of a bystander's suffering emotional distress, it was
also foreseeable that anyone who witnessed the Injury-producing event would suffer
some emotional distress, and that because the class of potential plaintiffs was therefore unlimited, the class to whom the defendant owed a duty needed to be clearly
defined and circumscribed. Id. at 884-85, 820 P.2d at 189, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87 (citing Thing, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 653-54, 771 P.2d 814, 819, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 870 and
Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79-80). Thus, the
percipient witness rule represents a public policy exception to the general rule,
embodied in Civil Code section 1714(a), which holds everyone liable for their negligent acts. Id. at 885, 820 P.2d at 189, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87 (citing CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1714(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1993)).
26. Ld.
at 884, 820 P.2d at 189, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87. When the negligent defendant owes the plaintiff a duty directly, as here, the cause of action is simply negligence, not NIED, with emotional distress damages as the relief sought. See Marlene
F. v. Affillated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 590, 770 P.2d 278, 282,
257 CaL Rptr. 98, 102 (1989). See generally, 6 B. WrrnuN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW
Torts § 838 (9th ed. 1988) (distinguishing common negligence from NIED); Mark A.
Clayton, California Supreme Court Survey, Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 17 PEPP. L REv. 523, 584 (1990) (discussing Marlene F.).
According to Justice Kennard, emotional distress claims in the funeral-related
context do raise a concern for disproportionate liability. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at
911, 820 P.2d at 207, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard
would have limited the class to statutory right holders. ld.
at 910, 820 P.2d at 206-07,
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the case here."
b. By accepting responsibilityfor the care, custody and control of
the dead bodies, the mortuary and crematory defendants created
an affirmative duty to eschew injury to the decedents' closefamily members
Although the defendants argued that because the complaint centered
on the existence of a contractual duty, which could not extend to noncontracting parties or to non-statutory right holders,' the court took
note of the distinctive circumstances surrounding the need for mortuary
or crematory services.' The death of a close family member leaves the
survivors emotionally vulnerable. Grieving family members reasonably
expect that funeral professionals will be sensitive to this vulnerability. In
addition, both law review articles and past California decisions acknowledge that mortuaries perform their services for the benefit of family
members other than the contracting party or statutory right holder.'
Thus, the pre-existing relationship between the plaintiffs and both the
mortuary and crematory defendants gave rise to a duty to treat the
plaintiffs' decedents' remains in a respectful and dignified manner."

2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The only exception would be non-statutory right holders who .(1) are close members of the decedent's family, (2) directly
observe the mishandling or its consequences (i.e., a presence requirement) and (3)
suffer severe emotional distress. Id. 914, 820 P.2d at 209, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107

(Kennard, J., dissenting).
27. Id.
28. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 887, 820 P.2d at 190-91, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 90. In
making this argument, the defendants relied upon Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc.,
231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4-6, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964) (holding that
the decedent's siblings lacked standing to sue for negligence because the mortuary
owed them no duty to conduct the funeral ceremony properly unless they had contracted with the mortuary for the burial services), overruled by Christensen, 54 Cal.
3d at 889, 820 P.2d at 193, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91. Although the court stated that it
"disapproved" of Cohen, the effect is to overrule it; the California Supreme Court
specifically "overrules" only its own decisions, but "disapproves" of lower court
decisions. B.E. WmrN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE CoURT OPINIONS § 100 (1977).
29. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 886-87, 820 P.2d at 190-91, 2 Cal Rptr. 2d at 88.
30. Id. at 887-88, 820 P.2d at 191, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89. See, e.g., Draper Mortuary
v. Superior Court, 135 Caf App. 3d 533, 185 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1982); Jack Leavitt, The
F aneral Director's Liability for Mental Anguish, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 464, 466 (1964).
31. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 887-88, 820 P.2d at 191, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89.

c.

The biological supply company owed the plaintiffs a duty not to
induce others to harm them

Because the court found that the bystander recovery limitations did
not apply in this case, the biological supply company argued that "the
statutory right holders lack[ed] standing to seek damages from it on a
negligence theory because no special relationship existed between
them."' However, the court noted two theories under which the biological supply company could owe the plaintiffs a duty to prevent the type of
harm described,' without the need for a contract or special relationship.' The first theory is third-person procuration of harm, where foreseeability of harm is essential.' The second theory is joint enterprise
liability, which requires a mutual undertaking and shared control.'
Based on the first theory, the court reasoned that given the biological
supply company's willingness to purchase substantial quantities of human body parts and internal organs, it was foreseeable that, in order to
obtain the valuable items, the crematories would engage in unscrupulous

32. Id. at 891, 820 P.2d at 194, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92.
33. Section 7051 of the Health and Safety Code provides:
Every person who removes any part of any human remains from any place
where it has been interred, or from any place where it is deposited while
awaiting interment or cremation, with intent to sell it or to dissect it, without authority of law, or written permission of the person or persons having
the right to control the remains under Section 7100, or with malice or wantonness, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison.
CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7051 (West Supp. 1992).
34. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 894, 820 P.2d at 195, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93. See

generaiy 6 B.E. WrnaN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw Torts, §§ 820, 833 (9th ed. 1988
and Supp. 1992) (discussing violation of a statute as a breach of the duty of due
care toward the class of persons protected under the statute); 86 C.J.S. Torts §§ 15,
31 (1954) (stating that violation of a statute generally makes the actor liable to the
persons the statute was designed to protect).
35. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 892, 820 P.2d at 194-95, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92-93. See
generaUy 5 HARPER ET AL, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.1 (2d ed. 1986); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 302A (1965). For cases imposing liability on a third person for
inducing unlawful conduct that harmed another see Pool v. City of Oakland, 42 Cal.
3d 1051, 728 P.2d 1163, 232 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1986); Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15
Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
36. See generaUy W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE AW OF
TORTS § 72 (5th ed. 1984); 5 HARPER ET AL, supra note 34, § 26.13; 6 B.E. WrriaN,
SUMMARY OF CALFORNIA LAw Torts, § 1008 (9th ed 1988). For cases imposing joint
enterprise liability see Holtz v. United Plumbing & Heating Co., 49 Cal. 2d 501, 319
P.2d 617 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Leming v. Oilfields Trucking Co., 44 Cal. 2d 343, 282
P.2d 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955); Shook v. Beals, 96 Cal. App. 2d 963, 103 P.2d 175 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1950).
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behavior likely to cause the plaintiffs' emotional distress.'
d.

The policy considerationsofforeseeability, moral blame, disproportionateliability, and the ultimate cost to society also support
a duty in the funeral services context

In addition to the specific legal theories under which the defendants
could be liable,' the majority considered four policy grounds that would
also support imposing a duty. ' Analogizing to the recovery of emotional
distress damages for breach of a funeral-services contract, the court first
reasoned that the class of foreseeable victims consisted of close family
relatives who were aware that the services were being performed, and
who either received the benefit of or contracted for those services. The
court determined that unborn children, infants, or others who did not
know of the death or the type of disposition chosen were not foreseeable
victims.' Second, California statutes acknowledge that all survivors-not just contracting parties and statutory right holders-deserve
protection from the morally reprehensible conduct alleged in this case."
Third, the court indicated that it is unlikely that imposing liability would
require society to ultimately carry the burden thiough increased costs for
services because the defendants have the ability to prevent such misconduct.' Finally, there is no danger of disproportionate liability because
the plaintiffs' claim does not rest on their witnessing harm inflicted on a
close relative, but on the breach of a specific duty owed to each plaintiff
individually.-

37. Christensen,54 Cal. 3d at 893, 820 P.2d at 195, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93.
38. See sapra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
39. Justice Kennard, in her dissenting opinion, criticized the majority's analysis of
these four factors. See Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 917-19, 820 P.2d at 211-13, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 109-11 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
40. 1l at 894-96, 820 P.2d at 196-97, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94-95.
41. ld. at 896-98, 820 P.2d at 197-98, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95-96. See CAL HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7054.7 (prohibiting commingling or cremation of multiple remains),
§ 7050.5 (providing special handling for the remains of Native Americans found
during excavation in order to respect the delicate treatment that Native Americans
afford such remains), § 7152 (respecting religious beliefs by restricting donation of
organs), § 8115 (seeking to ensure that human remains are treated appropriately and
respectfully), § 8101 (prohibiting anyone from obstructing funeral-related activity)
(West 1970 & Supp. 1992).
42. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 898, 820 P.2d at 198, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96.
43. Id. at 899-900, 820 P.2d at 199-200, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97-98.

2.

The Complaint Satisfies the Element of Causation by Stating That
the Plaintiffs Knew, Upon Learning of the Misconduct, That Their
Decedents Were Among Those Victimized

In a complaint, causation is usually established by inferring that the
wrongful conduct caused the harm;" but when the facts pleaded do not
establish the implication, specific facts supporting direct causation are
required.' Consequently, the defendants argued for a lack of a causal
connection because generalized media reports of the wrongful conduct
precipitated the plaintiffs' professed anguish.' Defendants also argued
that "permitting recovery in this case [would] create tort liability for the
impact of [mentally and emotionally devastating events aired) on the
evening news."'7 The court agreed that learning of the mishandling of
dead bodies from a secondhand source is insufficient to establish a direct causal connection because a period of misconduct in general does
not demonstrate the desecration of each plaintiffs decedent in particular." However, the court found that the complaint satisfied the element
of causation by alleging that the plaintiffs discovered from the reports
that the remains of their decedents were mishandled. The court reasoned that it is not until later that the plaintiffs must actually prove that
they either knew or had a substantial certainty that the mistreatment
involved their decedents' remains which, in turn, resulted in severe emotional distress.' At the complaint stage, a plaintiff need only plead, not
prove. Therefore, the plaintiffs' complaint met this standard.

44. Id. at 900, 820 P.2d at 200, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98. See generally 4 B.E. WnMN,
CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Pleading §§ 561-566 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1992) (discussing
the pleading requirements for causation).
45. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 900-01, 820 P.2d at 200, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98 (citation omitted). The causal connection required is that between a breach of duty owed
to and the injury sustained by a plaintiff. Id, at 901, 820 P.2d at 200, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 98.
46. Id. at 900, 820 P.2d at 200, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98.
47. Id. at 901-02, 820 P.2d at 201, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
48. Id. at 901, 820 P.2d at 200, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 901, 820 P.2d at 200-01, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98-99. "A generalized concern
that the remains of a relative may have been involved, arising out of a media report
of a pattern of misconduct, is insufficient to satisfy the requirement that there be a
direct connection between a defendant's conduct and the injury suffered by the plaintiff.- Id. at 902, 820 P.2d at 201, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99. The court even left it to the
trial court's discretion to allow amendment of the complaint to allege that for several
plaintiffs, part of their distress is due to their never knowing whether the desecration

included their decedents. Id. at 901 n.27, 820 P.2d at 201 n.27, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99
n.27.
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B.

In Order to Support a Cause of Action for lIED, the Defendant's
Misconduct Must Be Directed Primarilyat the Plaintiff

When a plaintiff seeks to recover for IIED, there are three methods of
establishing the requisite intent: (1) subjective intent, (2) knowledge to a
substantial certainty or (3) reckless disregard in and with knowledge of
the plaintiffs presence." The Christensen court limited a plaintiffs ability to satisfy the element of intent by ruling that with any of these methods, the defendant's outrageous conduct must be directed at the plaintiff.' In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that "requiring defendants to perform the acts in plaintiffs' presence ensures the high de-

51. Id at 903, 820 P.2d at 202, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100; id. at 907, 820 P.2d at 205,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Ledger v. Tippett, 164 Cal.
App. 3d 625, 640-42, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814, 822-24 (1985) (stating "'lEDcalls for intentional or at least reckless conduct intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the
realization that injury will result."); Taylor v. Vallelunga, 171 Cal. App. 2d 107, 109,
339 P.2d 910, 911 (1959) (holding that cause of action failed because there was "no
allegation that defendants knew that appellant was present and witnessed the beating
that was administered to her father, nor [was] there any allegation that the beating
was administered for the purpose of causing her to suffer emotional distress or, in
the alternative, that defendants knew that severe emotional distress was substantially
certain to be produced by their conduct"). See generally William L Prosser, Insut
and Outrage, 44 CAL. L REV. 40, 56-59 (1956) (discussing the presence requirement
for outrageous conduct directed at a third person, but through which the defendant
intentionally or recklessly caused another to suffer severe emotional distress).
52. Charistensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 903, 820 P.2d at 202, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100. In so
ruling, the supreme court specifically disapproved part of a California Court of Appeal case which allowed a husband to recover for lED when a close family friend
raped his wife. Della S. v. Torres, 134 Cal. App. 3d 471, 484, 184 Cal. Rptr. 787, 795
(1982) (reftusing to characterize the rape as a wrong only against the wife and not
the husband because it was logical to infer that a husband would suffer extreme
emotional distress over the rape of his wife, particularly one committed by a close
family fend), overruLed by Christensen,54 Cal. 3d at 906 n.28, 820 P.2d at 204 n.28,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102 n.28.
For cases where the defendant's acts were directed at the plaintiff see State
Rubbish Collectors Aas'n v. Sfliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952); Cervantez
v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 595 P.2d 975, 156 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1979); Agarwal
v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 603 P.2d 58, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1979); Alcorn v. Anbro
Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970); Cole v. Fair
Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d 743, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1987).
For cases where the defendant's acts were not directed at the plaintiff see
Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985);
Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252

(1982).

gree of culpability necessary to justify" an award of damages greater than
those for negligent behavior.' The plaintiffs' critical errors in this law
suit were their failure to allege in the complaint that any particular plaintiff was present at the time of the misconduct, and that the defendants
intended to injure the plaintiffs or that the defendants knew to a substantial certainty that harm was sure to follow." By failing to plead all of
the elements of IIED,' the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for
which relief could be granted.'

53. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 905-06, 820 P.2d at 203-04, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101-02.
Justice Mosk disagreed, arguing that requiring defendants to deliberately direct
their scandalous conduct at the plaintiffs renders the "recklessness" prong and the
'subjective intent" prong indistinguishable. ILd.at 908, 820 P.2d at 205, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d

at 103 (Moalc J., dissenting).
The majority noted that although "[riecovery on an BED theory and based on
reckless conduct has been allowed in the funeral-related services context," id. at 905,
820 P.2d at 203, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101 (citing 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 34, § 9.4,
these cases "presuppose[] action directed at the plaintiff or undertaken with knowledge of the likelihood that the plaintiff will suffer emotional distress." Id. at 905, 820
P.2d at 203, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101 (citing KETON ET AL, supra note 35, § 12 at 63).
According to Dean Prosser, "to justify recovery the action must be directed to the
plaintiff, and if reckless conduct is the basis for recovery, the plaintiff is usually
present at the time of the conduct and is known by the defendant to be present." Id.
(citing William L Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL L REV. 58-59 (1956)).
54. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 903, 820 P.2d at 201-02, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99-100.
The complaint simply alleged "that the conduct was intentional,... outrageous,
and... substantially certain to cause extreme emotional distress to relatives and
close friends of the deceased." Id. at 903, 820 P.2d at 202, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100.
The key is that alleging intentional or outrageous conduct is insufficient to satisfy the
element of intent without some showing that the conduct is directed at the plaintiff.
Id. Justice Mosk, in his dissent, argued that although the "defendants may have been
motivated by profit rather than by a subjective desire to distress these plaintiffs, the
trier of fact could still hold the defendants liable on a reckless conduct theory."
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the decedents' survivors are the only persons who
could possibly be hurt by the defendants' outrageous conduct; mortuaries, crematoriums and biological supply companies must necessarily perceive this probability. Id. at
907, 909, 820 P.2d at 205-06, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103-04 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
56. The elements of RED are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of
the defendant, (2) with the intent, knowledge to a substantial certainty, or reckless
disregard for the probability of causing the plaintiff emotional distress, (3) severe
emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff and (4) actual and proximate causation.
Id. at 903, 820 P.2d at 202, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100. See generaUy 5 B. WrTKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW

Torts §§ 402406 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992).

56. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 906, 820 P.2d at 204, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102. However, the supreme court stated that the trial court retained discretion to allow
amendment of the complaint under the laws governing coordination proceedings. Id.
See supra note 3 for court rules governing coordination proceedings.
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IV.

IMPACT

The effect of the majority's opinion is to limit plaintiffs who sue for
the mishandling of their decedents' remains to the weaker legal theory of
NIED 7 because it would be highly unusual for a funeral home to "mutilate a decedent's body in the presence of the grieving family or display
the mutilated body to them."" Mutilation of dead bodies is
quintessential clandestine conduct. In the funeral services setting, it is
impractical to require the plaintiffs presence "at the scene of the outrageous conduct," unfairly restricting his or her ability to recover the larger
damages, including punitives, generally associated with IIED.'
The decision is also expected to limit emotional distress claims in
general and affect a widely publicized case currently pending before the
state supreme court in particular.' That case, Potter v. Firestone Tire
and Rubber Co.,' involves residents of Salinas who are seeking damages for their fear that a nearby disposal site for toxic waste has caused
them to develop cancer.' To prove a direct causal connection between
the alleged source and the harm, at least one attorney believes the "plaintiffs will now have to prove they actually drank contaminated water.'
V.

CONCLUSION

According to one commentator, 1991 was a year in which the supreme
court favored tort defendants." Those rulings endorsing plaintiffs divid-

57. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 90, 820 P.2d at 204, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102.
58. Ld.at 908, 820 P.2d at 205, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103 (Mosk, J., dissenting).

59. Id (Mosk, J., dissenting).
60. Hager, supra note 10.
61. 3 Cal. App. 4th 994, 274 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1990), review granted, 806 P.2d 308,
278 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1991).
62. Hager, supra note 10.
83. Id.
64. Daniel U. Smith, A Year of Pain And Suffering; The Plaintiffs' Bar Took a
Beating from Courts in 1991. Issues of Liability and Damages Became More Clear;
Unfortunately, THE RECORDER, Jan. 10, 1992, at 8. See Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 3d 202, 814 P.2d 1341, 285 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1991) (Lucas, CJ. and Baxter,
J., dissenting) (holding the city liable under respondeat superior for an on-duty police
officer's rape of a female detainee). See generally, Lorraine A. Musko, California
Supreme Court Survey, Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 20 PEPP. L REV. 394 (1992)
(discussing Mary M.).

ed the court.' The court also clarified "substantive grey areas," limiting
the imposition of liability and the recovery of damages.' Consistent
with the supreme court's other 1991 opinions, Christensen represents yet
another limitation on a plaintiff's ability to recover damages.' Now,
when neither the actual misconduct nor its consequences are observed,
only close family members who knew of the rendering of funeral and/or
crematory services, and who received the benefit of the services; may
state a cause of action for NIED. As for IIED, a plaintiff must show outrageous conduct directed at her in particular.
Yet the decision may also be framed as one that takes a middle ground
approach, finding defendants acted negligently, but not intentionally;
holding funeral professionals responsible for clandestine desecration yet
limiting the class of potential plaintiffs to close family members. ' By
restricting liability for IIED, the court avoided the risk of a potential
plaintiff class of more than 100,000 relatives and close friends, the economic burden on society of larger damage awards often associated with
intentional torts, as well as the possibility of punitive damages.'
LORRAINE A. MUSKO

65. Smith, supra note 63.
66. I&
67. See also, Gourley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 53 Cal. 3d 121, 806 P.2d
1342, 279 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1991) (denying prejudgment interest for emotional distress
damages because the emotional distress was based on the insurer's bad faith, not
personal injury, as mandated under California Civil Code § 3291); Walnut Creek v.
Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 54 Cal. 3d 245, 814 P.2d 704, 284 Cal. Rptr.
718 (1991) (prohibiting a state regulatory agency award for emotional distress damages); Adams v. Murakami, 54 Cal. 3d 105, 813 P.2d 1348, 284 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1991)
(holding that before court can award punitive damages, plaintiff must produce evidence of the defendant's financial status); Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp.,
53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991) (holding that before imposing
"strict liability for failure to warn of a product defect," defendant must be allowed
"to introduce state-of-the-art evidence that the particular risk was neither known nor
knowable from scientific knowledge at the time of manufacture or distribution"). See
generally Susan Leigh Sparks, Calfornia Supreme Court Survey, Gourley v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 19 PEPP. L REv. 276 (1991); Kurt M.
Langkow, California Supreme Court Survey, Walnut Creek v. Fair Employment and
Housing Commission, 19 PEPP. L REV. 741 (1992); Richard John Bergstrom M, California Supreme Court Survey, Adams v. Murakami, 19 PEPP. L REV. 842 (1992);
Dean Thomas Triggs, California Supreme Court Survey, Anderson v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglass Corporation, 19 PEPP. L REV. 846 (1992).
68. Hager, supra note 10.
69. See id.
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D.

Under the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers'
CompensationAct, an employee is barredfrom bringing a
civil actionfor intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress against the employer, even when no physical

injury or disability has been alleged, provided the employer's
conduct does not contravenefundamental public policy or
exceed the inherent risks of the employment relationship:
Llvitsanos v. Superior Court.
In Livitsanos v. Superior Court," the California Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an employee's claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress are limited by the exclusive remedy
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act2 to a recovery under the

1. 2 Cal. 4th 744, 828 P.2d 1195, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808 (1992). In 1976, Continental
Culture Specialists, Inc. [Continental], a yogurt manufacturer, hired Apostol Livitsanos
to work In the company's shipping department. Vasa Cubaleski, Continental's owner,
assured Lvitsanos on several occasions that his employment would not be terminated
without good cause and eventually promoted him to general manager in 1982.
Llvitasnos worked long hours, participated in an employee profit-sharing plan, and in
1984, he and one other Continental employee formed a company known as ABA to
replace Continental's former distributor which had gone out of business. Livitsanos
was continually praised for his work by Cubaleski until 1989, when, for an undetermined reason, Cubaleski engaged in a campaign of harassment against Livitsanos.
Cubaleski falsely accused Llvitsanos of writing bad checks, diverting funds from
Continental, and falling to repay a personal loan. The charges were communicated to
Continental employees as well as others. Finally, in August 1989, Cubaleski demanded
that Livitsnos sell ABA to another distributorship that Continental desired to hire.
Cubaleski offered to assume a $100,000 debt owed by one of ABA's clients, provided
that Livitsanos sell ABA to the other distributor. Livitsanos submitted to Cubaleski's
offer and ftrther complied with Cubaleski's demand that he sign a promissory note
for $100,000, only to be terminated two weeks later without notice or severance pay.
LUvitsanos sued both Continental and Cubaleski for breach of contract, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and money lent, alleging that
Cubalesid's campaign of harassment climaxed with the wrongful termination of his
employment. The defendants demurred and the trial court sustained the demurrer.
The court of appeal summarily denied the plaintiff's petition for writ of mandate. The
California Supreme Court granted review in order to determine whether or not the
exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act barred the instant suit.
Justice Arabian authored the unanimous opinion of the court in which Chief Justice
Lucas and Justices Mosk, Panelli, Kennard, Baxter, and George joined. Id.
2. Labor Code 3602 states in relevant part that[w]here the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the
right to recover such compensation is . .. the sole and exclusive remedy of
the employee or his or her dependents against the employer, and ...

the

workers' compensation laws.- The court declared that an employee may
not subvert the workers' compensation scheme simply by failing to allege
a physical disability.' In recognizing that emotional injury lies within the
scope of the workers' compensation laws,6 the court reasoned that the
exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act may not
be abrogated by the fact that an injury is noncompensable'
The supreme court examined the plaintiff's causes of action for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress under the reasoning
set forth in Renteria v. Orange County In Renteria, an employee was

employee's industrial injury shall not permit the employee or his or her dependents to bring an action at law for damages against the employer.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West 1989). See generally 2 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Workers' Compensation §§ 25-28 (9th ed. 1987) (detailing the exclusive remedy provisions under the Act).
3. Livitsanos, 2 Cal. 4th at 750, 828 P.2d at 1199, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 812. The
court characterized this issue as one of first impression. Id. at 750, 828 P.2d at 1199,
7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 812.
The theory underlying the workers' compensation scheme is to place upon the
industry the burden of its industrial accidents. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). In California, an employee's right to compensation for
injury is statutory. Carrigan v. California State Legislature, 263 F.2d 560 (9th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 980 (1959). When the employee's injury falls within the
scope of the Workers' Compensation Act the proceeding thereunder will constitute
the exclusive remedy of the employee. Peterson v. Moran, 111 Cal. App. 2d 766, 245
P.2d 540 (1952).- See generally Denise M. Alter, The Relationship Between California's
Exclusivity Rule and an Employee's Claim for Emotional Distress, 21 U.S.F. L REV.
141, 144-150 (1986) (discussing the legislative history behind the exclusive remedy
provisions and their general applicability).
4. Livitsanos, 2 Cal. 4th at 756, 828 P.2d at 1203, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 816. See
generally 65 CAL JUR. 3D Work Injury Compensation § 22 (1981 & Supp. 1992) (discussing the exclusive character of an employee's remedy under the workers' compensation laws).
5. Livitsanos, 2 Cal. 4th at 754, 828 P.2d at 1202, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 815 (quoting
Renterla v. Orange County, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 840, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447, 451 (1978)).
See Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123 Cal. Rptr.
812 (1975).
6. Livitsanos, 2 Cal. 4th at 754, 828 P.2d at 1202, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 815. A
compensable injury is one that causes either disability or a need for medical treatment. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1273, 1284, 286 Cal.
Rptr. 855, 860 (1991). "The mere fact that a defendant in a tort action is also the
plaintiffs employer is not sufficient to raise the exclusivity provisions of the act as
an affirmative defense." Id. at 1285, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 861. See generally CAL LABOR
CODE §§ 3208, 3208.3 (West 1989 & Supp 1992) (defining injury generally and psychi-

atric Injury specifically).
7. 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978). See generally Joseph H.
Fagundes, Intentional Employer Torts and Workers' Compensation: A Legal Morass,
11 PAc. LJ. 187, 202-11 (1979) (analyzing the complications arising under Renteria as
pleading technicalities which are, in essence, outcome determinative and suggesting
that the judiciary permit civil actions where the Injury suffered is nonphysical and
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not barred from bringing a civil action where the employer intentionally
caused the employee to suffer emotional injury without any accompanying physical injury.' The court here assumed the difficult task of reconciling Renteria, where the cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress was found to constitute an implied exception to the
exclusivity provisions, with the principles established in Cole v. Fair
Oaks Fire ProtectionDistrict.'
In Cole, an employee suffered emotional injury resulting in a physical
disability caused by the employer's intentional conduct that was deemed
0
a normal part of the employment relationship."
The court in Cole held
that the employee could not circumvent the exclusive remedy provisions
of the Workers' Compensation Act by characterizing the employer's misconduct as manifestly unfair, outrageous, harassing or intentional, be-

Intentional and limit employees incurring nonintentional, work-related injuries to a
remedy under the workers' compensation laws).
8. Id. at 842, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 452 (holding an employee's cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress to constitute an implied exception to the
exclusive remedy provisions where the injury was purely emotional and no physical
injury was alleged). The Renteria court reasoned that an employee suffering a pure
emotional ijury with no accompanying physical injury or disability would be left
with no remedy if limited by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. Id. at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 452. The court further reasoned that the
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, like defamation, was
part of an entire class of civil wrongs falling outside the contemplation of the
workers' compensation system. Id. at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 451; accord McGee v.
McNaly, 199 Cal. App. 3d 891, 895, 174 Cal. Rptr. 253, (1981) (finding civil claim
permissible when no actual claim of disability is made); see also Cole v. Fair Oaks
Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 156, 729 P.2d 743, 747, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 312
(1987).
9. 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d 743, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1987) (finding that the exclusive remedy provisions limited the remedy for an employer's misconduct that is a
normal part of the employment relationship which causes an employee to suffer emotional distress resulting in physical injury). See Larson, Nonphysical Torts and
Workmen's Compensation, 12 CAL. W.L. REv. 1, 11-13 (1975) (discussing the general
proposition that when a physical injury is sustained during the course of employment
the exclusive remedy provisions bar civil action).
10. Litilsanos, 2 Cal. 4th at 750, 828 P.2d at 1199, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 812. Under
Renteria, a plaintiff claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress, who had
suffered no physical injury or disability, would be free to bring a civil suit against
his employer. Under Cole, however, a plaintiff claiming Intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from employer conduct that was a normal part of the employment relationship would be limited to a recovery under the workers' compensation
laws. Id. See generally Warren I. Hanna, CA. LAW OF EMP. IN. §§ 11.05(1)(b),
21.05(3)() (rev. 2d ed. 1992).

cause the conduct was a normal part of the employment relationship."
The decision in Renteria presented an anomaly that the courts have
acknowledged, but up to now have failed to address.' The anomaly was
specifically recognized in Cole, but the court made no attempt to resolve
it.' The California Supreme Court in Livitsanos, did turn its attention
towards this anomaly, but failed to do more than provide a rationale for
its occurence. 4 First, the court recognized that while certain wrongs lie
completely outside the workers' compensation scheme," an employer's

11. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 160, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315. See generaly 65
CAL. JuR. 3D Work Injury Compensation § 27 (1981 & Supp. 1992) (discussing the
right to bring an action for an employer's intentional irjury).
12. Livitsanos, 2 Cal. 4th at 752, 828 P.2d at 812, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 1199. The
court specifically addressed the anomaly found in Renteria and recognized by Cole.
43 Cal. 3d at 156, 729 P.2d at 747, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 313. The reasoning of Renteria,
if taken to its fullest logical extent, would ultimately lead to absurd results. For instance, under Renteria, when an employer's misconduct results in emotional distress
alone, without physical injury, the employee may bring a civil action in tort, whereas
when the employer's conduct is so outrageous as to result in actual physical disability, the employee is limited by the exclusive remedy provisions to a recovery under
the workers' compensation laws. Livitsanos, 2 Cal. 4th at 752, 828 P.2d at 1200-01, 7
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 813. Such a rule might tend to incline an employer who acts egregiously to make the employee's working conditions so intolerable as to cause the
employee to suffer a physical injury in order to avoid the more excessive civil liability. Ud
13. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 156-57, 729 P.2d at 747-48, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 313 (recognizing intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting in physical injury or disability
as generally more reprehensible than that which does not result in disability, but
continuing to limit civil actions to situations involving no physical injury or disability). In arriving at its decision that the exclusive remedy provisions applied, the Cole
court distinguished several cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress
where there was substantial physical injury or disabiliy and relied primarily on the
fact that the misconduct at issue was a normal part of the employment relationship.
Id. at 160, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
14. Livitsanos, 2 Cal. 4th at 755, 828 P.2d at 1203, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 816 (noting
the potential existence of a narrow theoretical class of cases where the employee
would be unable to recover under the compensation laws or by way of civil suit, but
falling short of any attempt to eliminate the class).
15. Id. at 752, 828 P.2d at 1200, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 813. See Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1
Cal. 4th 1083, 824 P.2d 680, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 (1992) (holding exclusive remedy
provisions inapplicable under a contravention of fundamental public policy exception
where the employee was terminated in retaliation for testifying truthfully concerning a
coworker's sexual harassment claim); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d
167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (recognizing the propriety of a tort
remedy when employee's discharge contravenes fundamental public policy). See genera~ly 2 STANFORD D. HERUCK, CALIFORNIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW PRACTICE, §
12.20(D) (4th ed. 1991) (reviewing the general exceptions to the exclusive remedy
provisions, typically, suits based upon violations of the federal Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, actions brought under the California *whistieblower" law, Cal. Gov't
Code § 19683, and suits alleging defamation, sex discrimination, or harassment under
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misconduct, even when intentional or egregious, will not necessarily
exceed the scope of the workers' compensation laws." The court then
expanded upon its initial conclusion that a pure emotional injury lies
within the scope of the workers' compensation laws.'
The court noted that workers' compensation laws compensate for only
industrial injuries. 8 The court explained that while it was possible for
an employee to sustain a work-related injury for which no compensation
was available under the workers' compensation laws," such non-compensable injury, by itself, was not sufficient to avoid the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.'
Lastly, the court spoke to the plaintiffs cause of action for defamation.2" The court expressly declined any invitation to decide whether
such a claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act, instead leaving the question for the court of
appeal to decide on remand.'

FEHA, Cal. Gov't Code § 12900, are considered outside the scope of the Workers'
Compensation Act).
16. Livisanos, 2 Cal. 4th at 752, 828 P.2d at 1200, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 813 (citing
Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal. 3d 1, 801 P.2d 1054, 276 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1990)). In Shoemaker, the court held that where an employer's conduct, (i.e. discipline or criticism),
causes physical or mental injury, which ultimately results in the termination of employment, the exclusive remedy provisions generally bar the bringing of a separate
civil action for wrongful termination. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 7, 801 P.2d at 1056,
276 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
17. Livitsanos, 2 Cal. 4th at 754, 828 P.2d at 1202, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
18. ld. (citing Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1273,
1284, 286 Cal. Rptr. 855, 860 (1991).
19. Livitsanos, 2 Cal. 4th at 754-55, 828 P.2d at 1202, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 815. The
court, in attempting to rationalize the possibility of a seemingly unconscionable result
where an employee suffers a noncompensable injury, referenced the theory underlying
out-of-state authority concluding that "a failure of the compensation law to include
some elements of damage recoverable at common law is a legislative and not a
judicial problem." Id. at 755, 828 P.2d at 1202, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 815 (quoting Willlams v. State, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 122, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815 (1975)).
20. Id,at 744, 828 P.2d at 1202, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 815 (quoting Renteria, 82 Cal.
App. 3d at 840, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 451). In recognizing the narrow possibility that the
plaintiff could have no remedy all, the court alluded to the potential number of such
cases as de minimis and inadequate to abrogate the exclusive remedy provisions. Id.
21. Id. at 756, 828 P.2d at 1204, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 817.
22. Id. at 757, 828 P.2d at 1204, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 817. The court recognized as
unsettled the issue of whether or not a cause of action for defamation was encompassed within the scope of the workers' compensation laws, deeming it one which
the court of appeal should address. Id. Courts in other jurisdictions are split on
whether defamation falls within the workers' compensation scheme. Id.

While the Livitsanos decision clarifies the extent to which the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act apply when an
employee's emotional injury results from an employer's intentional misconduct in the normal course of the employment relationship, it does
little to resolve the anomaly presented by Renteria.' It appears, however, that an employee will no longer be able to manuever around the limitations imposed by the exclusive remedy provisions simply by claiming
emotional injury without any accompanying physical inury. ' Under
Livitsanos, it is incumbent upon the employee sustaining a pure emotional injury to show, prior to bringing a civil claim for remedies other
than those available under the workers' compensation laws,' that the
injury sustained exceeded the inherent risks of the employment.
JAMES J. MOLONEY
E.

"Butfor"jury instructionfor proximate cause eliminated;
instructionalerroris prejudicialwhen it is reasonably
probable that without the errorthe jury would have reached a
contrary conclusion: Mitchell v. Gonzales.
1.

INTRODUCTION

For the cause-in-fact element of negligence, there are two standard
jury instructions in California. Trial courts generally can choose to use

23. Id. at 756, 828 P.2d at 1203, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 816 (continuing to acknowledge

the existence of the Renteria issue as an anomaly in accord with Cole).
24. See Lanouette v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 832 P.2d 585, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 84 (1992)
(transferring the case back to the court of appeal with directions to vacate in light
of Livitsanos). In Lanouette, the appellate court had permitted an employee's action
against his employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress finding the action
not foreclosed by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.
Lanouette v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 1 Cal. App. 4th 1317, 272 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1990). The
appellate court reasoned that contract damages were insufficient to compensate the
employee where the employer's conduct in terminating the employment relationship
was "outrageous." Id at 1329, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 436 ("[A]lowing intentional infliction
of emotional distress claims will not unduly deprive employers of discretion to dismiss an employee. While every termination is necessarl painful for the terminated
employee, every termination is not accompanied by outrageous conduct. The difficulty
in establishing outrageous conduct and intent assures that only 'deserving cases' will
give rise to tort relief.").
25. Livitsanos, 2 Cal. 4th at 755, 828 P.2d at 1203, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 816 ("In
sum, where the employee suffers annoyance or upset on account of the employer's
conduct but is not disabled... and the employer's conduct neither contravenes
fundamental public policy nor exceeds the inherent risks of the employment, the
injury will simply not have resulted in any occupational impairment compensable
under the workers' compensation law or by way of a civil action.").
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one or the other.' The two cause-in-fact instructions are contained in
BAR 3.75, i.e., the "but for" test, and BAR 3.76, i.e., the "substantial factor" test.2 The issue presented in MitcheU v. Gonzales was whether
courts should instruct juries on cause-in-fact in negligence actions using
BAJI 3.75.' After the California Supreme Court disapproved of BAJI 3.75
in general, the court held that the use of BAJI 3.75 in this case resulted
in instructional error.' Moreover, this error was held prejudicial because
it was reasonably probable that the verdict would have been different
had BAJI 3.76 been used.'
I1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involved the drowning death of a twelve-year-old boy,
Damechie Mitchell, during a Fourth of July outing with his fourteen-yearold friend, Luis Gonzalez, and Luis' parents.7 Luis took Damechie out to
the middle of a lake on a paddleboard, even though Luis knew Damechie
could not swim.' Luis admitted that he was acting rowdy and rocked the

1. Mitchell v. Gonzalez, 54 Cal. 3d 1041, 1049, 819 P.2d 872, 876, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d
913, 917 (1991) (citing Maupin v. Widling, 192 Cal. App. 3d 568, 575-78, 237 Cal. Rptr.
521, 525-27 (1987)).
2. BAJI No. 3.75 provides that "[a] proximate cause of [injury, damage, loss, or
harm] is a cause which, In natural and continuous sequence, produces the [injury,
damage, loss, or harm] and without which the [injury, damage, loss, or harm] would
not have occurred." BAJI No. 3.75 (7th ed. 1986).
BARI No. 3.76 provides that "[a] legal cause of [irjury, damage, loss, or harm] is
a cause which is a substantial factor in bringing about the [injury, damage, loss, or
harm]." BAR No. 3.76 (7th ed. 1986).
See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 41, at 265-68 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the but for and substantial factor
tests) [hereinafter THE LAW OF TORTS]; William L Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAL. L REV. 369, 377-81 (1950) (discussing the "but for" and substantial
factor tests) [hereinafter Prnximate Cause].
The court was careful to note that BAJI 3.75 and 3.76 are instructions on causein-fact, even though they contain the terms "proximate cause" and "legal cause."
Mitkhell, 54 Cal. 3d at 1044 n.2, 819 P.2d at 873 n.2, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 914 n.2.
3. 54 Cal. 3d 1041, 819 P.2d 872, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 913 (1991). Justice Lucas wrote
the majority opinion in which Justices Mosk, Panelli, Arabian, Baxter and George
concurred. Justice Kennard dissented and filed a separate opinion.
4. Id. at 1044-45, 819 P.2d at 873, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 915.
5. See infra notes 19-33 and accompanying text.
6. See iTifra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
7. Mitchell, 54 Cal. 3d at 1044, 819 P.2d at 873, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 914.
8. Id, at 1046, 819 P.2d at 874, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916.

float such that it tipped over, and they both fell into the lake. Damechie
grabbed Luis' shorts and then his ankles, but Luis broke free to avoid
being pulled underwater.'* After climbing onto the board, Luis looked
into the water, saw Damechie's fingers, and tried unsuccessfully to grab
them." Although three women were nearby, some time elapsed before
Luis called for help.' Even though Luis had disobeyed his parents on
prior occasions, neither of Luis' parents watched the children to make
sure they did not go into deep water as instructed.'3 Damechie's parents
sued Luis and his parents for negligence and wrongful death."
At trial, the plaintiffs requested BAJI 3.76 for the causation element,
which uses the substantial factor test, while the defendants requested
BAM 3.75, which uses the "but for" test." The trial court decided to use
the "but for" test, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.' The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court erred
in using BAJI 3.75." The supreme court granted review to determine
whether instructional error occurred and if so, whether the error prejudiced the outcome of the case. 8
Ill.
A.

THE COURT'S OPINION

Use of the "ButFor"Test Resulted in InstructionalErrorby Misleading and Confusing Jurors to Focus on the Force Operating
Closest in Time to the Harm

The majority identified several ways in which BAJI 3.75 can mislead a
jury. First, the terminology of BAI 3.75 is conceptually inaccurate because the term "proximate cause" implies proximity in time and space."

9. Id. at 1047, 819 P.2d at 875, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916.

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1046-47, 819 P.2d at 874-75, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916.
13. Id. at 1045.46, 819 P.2d at 874, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 915.

14. Id. at 104748, 819 P.2d at 875, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916.
15. Id. at 1048, 819 P.2d at 875, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916-17.
16. Id. at 1048, 819 P.2d at 875, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 917.
17. Id. at 1044-45, 819 P.2d at 873, 1 CaL Rptr. 2d at 915.
18. Id. at 1048, 819 P.2d at 875, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 917.
19. Id. at. 1050, 819 P.2d at 877, 1 CaL Rptr. 2d at 918. See also THE LAW OF
Tors, supra note 2, § 42, at 273 (stating that the term proximate cause improperly
emphasizes temporal and spatial proximity).

The use of the term "proximate
theoretically proximate cause consists
shifting responsibility, and superseding
P.2d at 876 n.3, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 917
374). The concept of proximate cause
lationships which logically extend into

cause" in BAR' 3.75 is unfortunate because
of numerous issues, including foreseeability,
causes. Mitchell, 54 Cal. 3d at 1049 n.3, 819
n.3 (citing Proximate Cause, supra note 2 at
is an attempt to limit cause and effect reeternity and date back until the beginning of
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Also, laypersons misinterpret proximate cause to mean approximate or
estimated cause.' A grammatical problem involving a dangling modifier2' leads jurors to believe that the cause itself must be in "a natural and
continuous sequence," which is impossible.' It is the chain of events
triggering the cause that must remain uninterrupted, not the cause itself.
This means that no intervening event may break the chain of causation.
In a psycholinguistic study of fourteen jury instructions, BAJI No. 3.75
produced the highest percentage of misunderstanding.'
The majority recommended the use of BAJI 3.76 over BAJI 3.75 because the substantial factor test encompasses the "but for" test" and, in
most cases, reaches the same legal conclusion. ' Furthermore, the substantial factor test addresses more problem situations than the "but for"
test, such as independent causes' and actions that contribute insignifi-

time; without proximate cause, unlimited liability would follow all wrongful conduct.
THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 2, § 41, at 263-64 (stating that in order to limit the
causes and consequences of negligent acts, causation requires some reasonable connection between the act or omission and the damage suffered). However, for purposes of BAJI 3.75, the term "proximate cause" only relates to cause-in-fact. Mitchell,
54 Cal. 3d at 1049 & nn.3-4, 819 P.2d at 876 & nn.3-4, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 917 & nn.
3-4.
20. Mitchell, 54 Cal. 3d at 1051, 819 P.2d 'at 877-88, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 919 (citing
Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructwns, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1353 (1979)
(finding 2396 of the subjects surveyed misunderstood the term "proximate cause")).
21. "The phrase 'natural and continuous sequence' "precedes the verb it is intended
to modify." Charrow & Charrow, upra note 20, at 1323. See supra note 2 for the
text of BAJI 3.75.
22. Mitchell, 54 Cal. 3d at 1051, 819 P.2d at 877, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 919.
23. Id. (citing Charrow & Charrow, supra note 20, at 1353).
24. Id. at 1052, 819 P.2d at 878, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 920.
25. That is, if the conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm, the harm
certainly would not have occurred but for that act; and if the conduct was not a
substantial factor, it cannot be said with certainty that the harm still would have
occurred without it. Id. at 1052-53, 819 P.2d at 878-79, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 920.
26. Id. at 1062, 819 P.2d at 878, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 920. As a general rule, the
substantial factor test should be used when there are concurrent independent causes,
because in California, a tortfeasor is liable even though the same harm would have
occurred anyway as long as her negligence was a material factor in causing the
injury. I& at 1049, 819 P.2d at 876, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 917-18. See generally THE LAW
OF Tors, supra note 2, § 41, at 266-68 (advocating use of 'the substantial factor
rather than the but for test for cases involving independent causes). The term "concurrent independent causes" means that at least "two causes concur to bring about
an event and either one of them, operating alone, could have been sufficient to cause
the result" See generally 6 B. WrrIUN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Torts § 970 (9th

cantly to the harm suffered.v

The majority acknowledged complications in BAJI 3.76 over the terms
"legal cause" and "substantial."' Results of the same psycholinguistic
study that the majority relied on in criticizing BAJI 3.75 showed that
twenty-five percent of the subjects believed that legal cause meant the
opposite of illegal cause.' And in comparative negligence actions, the
substantial factor test can hinder a finding of partial liability by undermining California's comparative negligence principle that each defendant
is responsible for her proportionate share of the harm caused.' Nevertheless, a six-justice majority preferred BAJI 3.76 over BAJI 3.75,"I recommending that the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions' revise
the latter.=

ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992) (discussing causes involving "concurrent independent causes").
27. MitcheU, 54 CaL 3d at 1053, 819 P.2d at 879, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 920. The
majority used the illustration of throwing a lighted match into a forest fire. Id.
28. Id. at 1053-54, 819 P.2d at 879, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 920-21.
29. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 20, at 1353.
30. MitcheU, 54 Cal. 3d at 1053, 819 P.2d at 879, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 920-21.
31. Id. at 1054, 819 P.2d at 879, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921. See generaUy Proximate
Cause, supra note 2, at 421 (favoring the substantial factor test as the standard for

cause-in-fact).
According to Justice Kennard, proximate cause actually consists of two separate
and distinct elements: cause-in-fact and policy considerations. MitcheU, 54 Cal. 3d at
1056, 819 P.2d at 881, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 923 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennard argued that temporal and spatial proximity, as provided in BAI 3.75, are
relevant policy and fairness considerations and thus are important factors that BAJI
3.76's substantial factor test fails to consider. Id.at 1059, 819 P.2d at 883, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 924 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Though not perfect, Justice Kennard felt that
BAJI 3.75 was the only instruction that adequately addressed both elements of proximate cause. Id. at 10590, 819 P.2d at 883, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 925 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
32. The Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, Civil, of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, California prepares these instructions. The committee recommends, but no statute requires, the use of these instructions.
33. Milchei, 54 Cal. 3d at 1054 n.10, 819 P.2d at 879 n.10, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921
n.10. Justice Kennard criticized the majority's failure to suggest a satisfactory replacement for the proximate cause instruction or how to fix BAN 3.75 and that in so doing, the majority failed to fulfill its duty of providing guidance to lower courts. Id. at
1061-62, 819 P.2d at 884-85, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 926 (Kennard, J., dissenting). She
argued that because no alternative instructions consider the policy factors of time,
space, and foreseeability as does BARl 3.75, it should be kept as an acceptable alternative instruction on proximate cause. Id. at 1059-60, 819 P.2d at 883, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 925 (Kennard, J., dissenting). See generally THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 2, § 43,
at 282-83 (asserting that remoteness in time and space makes it more likely that
other intervening causes have broken the chain of causation).
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B.

Pwjudicia1 ErrorOccurred Because It Was Reasonably Probable
That Had the Court Given the "SubstantialFactor"Instruction, the
Jurors Would Have Found That the Defendants' Breach of Duty
Was a ProximateCause of the Child's Death

As a general rule, a reviewing court will reverse a judgment only when
the alleged error precluded a fair outcome at trial.3 The test asks
whether it is reasonably probable that the appellant would have obtained

a more propitious verdict in the absence of error.' Five factors govern
this determination: (1) the extent of controverted evidence on the critical
issue; (2) whether the jury requested a reiteration of the erroneous instruction; (3) the closeness of the jury's determination; (4) whether the
defense attorney's closing argument reinforced the instructional defects,
and (5) the curative effect of other instructions.' In applying these factors, the court found that there was not much conflicting evidence relating to cause-in-fact.' The repetition of the erroneous instruction was
unnecessary because the court gave a copy of the instruction to the jury.'M Because the verdict on causation was nearly unanimous, the jury
was most likely misled by the flaws in BAJI 3.75, stressing its "but for"
standard and focusing on the condition temporally closest to the, death,
Damechie's inability to swim.' The defendants' closing argument em-

34. MitcleU, 54 Cal. 3d at 1054, 819 P.2d at 880, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921. See Article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, which provides, in pertinent part,
that
[n]o judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the
ground of misdirection of the jury ... unless, after an examination of the
entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that
the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
CAL CoNsT. art. VI, § 13.
35. Mitche, 54 Cal. 3d at 1054, 819 P.2d at 880, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921 (citing
People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, 254 (1956)).
36. See LeMons v. Regents of Univ., 21 Cal. 3d 869, 876, 582 P.2d 946, 950, 148
Cal. Rptr. 355, 359 (1978).
37. MitcheU, 54 Cal. 3d at 1054-55, 819 P.2d at 880, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921. That is,
cause-in-fact was evidenced by the relationship between Damechie's death and the
other relevant factors, i.e., Damechie's inability to swim; lack of parental supervision,
and Luis' failure to call for help from nearby adults after capsizing the float Il
38. Id, at 1055, 819 P.2d at 880, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921.
39. Id. at 1055, 819 P.2d at 880, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921-22. With regard to Mr. Gonzales and his son, the jury split 9-3 on the issue of negligence, and ruled 12-0 on the
issue of cause-in-fact. With regard to Mrs. Gonzales, the jury voted 11-1 on the issue
of negligence and 10-2 on the cause-in-fact of the death. Id.

phasized Damechie's inability to swim as the factor operating closest in
time to the death.' Furthermore, another instruction containing the
term "proximate cause" and requiring that the cause operate at the "moment of injury" amplified the time and place misconceptions intrinsic in
the word proximate." The court concluded that after finding a breach of
duty, it was illogical for the jurors not to find that the breach of duty
was a cause-in-fact of the boy's death and that the use of BAJI 3.76 probably would have led to a different verdict.'
IV.

IMPACT

Although the language of the court indicates that it "disapproved" of
BAI 3.75, the effect of the ruling is to eliminate its use entirely. In California, unlike other jurisdictions, the state supreme court "overrules" its
own decisions, but "disapproves" of others.' Merely a semantic complexity, either term leads to an eradication of former precedent or authority.
Attorneys differ over the ruling's impact. Some believe it will lead to
more plaintiff verdicts; others do not." Whether the elimination of the
"but for" test will result in greater liability for defendants because the
cause must now be a substantial factor of the injury will depend on the
circumstances causing injury.' In cases involving multiple concurring
causes, there will probably be more plaintiff verdicts, but more defense
verdicts where the defendant's actions contributed insignificantly to the

injuries.'
One question the opinion leaves open is how to remedy the problems
in the "but for" jury instruction BAJI 3.75.4' Both the drafter of the standard jury instructions and a consultant to the Committee are unsure how
to proceed.' Especially confusing is that although the MitcheU ruling demanded the use of BAR 3.76 in place of BARI 3.75, the majority recoin-

40. d. In the defense's closing argument, they emphasized that the drowning
would not have occurred but for Damechie's decision to venture into deep water
despite his inability to swim. d.
41. Id. at 1055-56, 819 P.2d at 881, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 922.
42. Ic. at 1056, 819 P.2d at 881, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 922.
43. B. WmUN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS § 100 (1977).
44. Joanne Wojcik, Attorneys Split Over Ruling's Impact, Bus. INS., Dec. 16, 1991,
at 17.

45. Id.
48. Id.
47. This was a main point of criticism n Justice Kennard's dissent Mitchell v.
Gonzalez, 54 Cal. 3d 1041, 1059, 819 P.2d 872, 883, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 913, 924-25 (1991)
(Kennard, J., dissenting). See supra note 33.
48. Susan Orenstein, Ruling is Proximate Cause of a Lot of Confusion, THE RECORDER, Dec. 24, 1991, at 2.
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mended improvement of the substantial factor instruction, without providing further guidance.* Another question the court did not address is
whether the "but for instruction should still be given in products liability
or fraud cases.' Some attorneys believe that the ruling will have a wide
impact on all tort cases, including products liability and misrepresentation.5
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite its use as an acceptable cause-in-fact instruction for nearly
fifty years,' the supreme court has proscribed the use of BAJI 3.75 unless and until the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions remedies its
substance and structure problems. Causation and proximate cause are
difficult concepts, even for the legal profession.' The result is that juries will most likely throw the baby out with the bathwater, deciding the
more manageable question of whether the defendant should pay for the
plaintiff's injuries."
Prosser and Keeton, however, identify five clearly identifiable turns in
the "causation maze" as follows: (1) cause-in-fact; (2) apportionment of
damages among causes; (3) unforeseeable consequences; (4) intervening
causes, and (5) shifting responsibility.' Breaking jury instructions into
49. Mitchell, 54 Cal. 3d at 1053 n.9, 819 P.2d at 879 n.9, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 920
11.9.

50. See supra note 48. See generally THE LAW OF ToRS, supra note 2, § 102, at
711 and § 110, at 767 (discussing the causation element in products liability and misrepresentation cases).
51. See supra note 44.
52. The instruction used prior to the inception of BAJI 3.75 in 1969 was nearly
identical in its terms and had been used since 1943. Mitchell, 54 Cal. 3d at 1059, 819
P.2d at 883, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 924-25 (Kennard J., dissenting).
53. 1d. at 1050, 819 P.2d at 876-77, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 918. It is no surprise that
laypersons are baffled by the meaning of proximate cause, given the long-standing
struggle with the term among legal scholars. See generally Proximate Cause, supra
note 2, at 369 ("Proximate cause remains a tangle and a jungle, a palace of mirrors
and a maze.*); Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L REV. 103
(1911).
Witldn discusses causation as a composition of two elements, cause-in-fact and
proximate cause, using proximate cause as a synonym for foreseeability and other
policy factors. See 6 B. WmITN, SUMMARY OF. CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts § 968 (9th ed.
1988 & Supp. 1992). However, Dean Prosser uses the term "proximate cause" to
describe the entire element of causation which includes cause-in-fact, apportionment
of damages and foreseeabilIty. See Proximate Cause, supra note 2, at 374.
54. Proximate Cause, supra note 2, at 420, 424.
56. THE LAw OF Torrs, supra note 2, § 42, at 279. See also Proximate Cause,

more manageable pieces, similar to Prosser and Keeton's five-step approach, would help eliminate juror confusion over the term "proximate
cause. Another way to make the element of causation clearer to jurors is to break it down into two jury instructions, one addressing causein-fact and another addressing proximate cause.67 Under this solution,
BAJI 3.75 and 3.76 could still be used as alternate cause-in-fact instructions and the proximate cause instruction could contain policy considerations, such as foreseeability and fairness.
One solution to the problems in BAJI 3.75 and 3.76 is to replace the
terms "proximate cause" and "legal cause" with "cause-in-fact." Another
solution is to follow the suggestion of the psycholinguistic study to modify BAJI 3.75 to read as follows: "The law defines 'cause' in its own particular way. A cause of an injury is something that triggers a natural
chain of events that ultimately produces the injury. Without the cause,
the injury would not occur."
LORRAINE A. MUSKO

supra note 2, at 374 (discussing a seven-step approach to proximate cause).
56. See Praximate Cause, supra note 2, at 420 (stating that proximate cause
consists of numerous complex unrelated issues).
57. Witkln describes "legal cause" as containing the following two elements- (1)
cause-in-fact, which uses either the but for or the substantial factor test to show that
the 'defendant's negligence somehow contributed to the injury, and (2) proximate
cause, which limits liability when it would be unfair to hold the defendant liable because of the way in which the ijury occurred. 6 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW Torts § 968 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992). See generauly TIlE LAW OF TORTs,
supra note 2, § 42, at 278 (criticizing the use of the substantial factor test for both
cause-in-fact and proximate cause, including policy considerations).
58. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 20, at 1352-53.

